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This paper provides a survey and synthesis of econometric tools that have been employed 
to study economic growth. While these tools range across a variety of statistical methods, 
they are united in the common goals of first, identifying interesting contemporaneous 
patterns in growth data and second, drawing inferences on long-run economic outcomes 
from cross-section and temporal variation in growth.  We describe the main stylized facts 
that have motivated the development of growth econometrics, the major statistical tools 
that have been employed to provide structural explanations for these facts, and the 
primary statistical issues that arise in the study of growth data.  An important aspect of 
the survey is attention to the limits that exist in drawing conclusions from growth data, 
limits that reflect model uncertainty and the general weakness of available data relative to 
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The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most causal matters of 
geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics…is a man-made fabric 
which impinges on experience only along the edges…total science is like a field of force 
whose boundary conditions are experience…A conflict with experience on the periphery 
occasions readjustments in the interior of the field.  Reevaluation of some statements 
entails reevaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections…But the total 
field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much 
latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary 
experience. 
 






The empirical study of economic growth occupies a position that is notably 
uneasy. Understanding the wealth of nations is one of the oldest and most important 
research agendas in the entire discipline. At the same time, it is also one of the areas in 
which genuine progress seems hardest to achieve. The contributions of individual papers 
can often appear slender. Even when the study of growth is viewed in terms of a 
collective endeavor, the various papers cannot easily be distilled into a consensus that 
would meet standards of evidence routinely applied in other fields of economics. 
A traditional defense of empirical growth research would be in terms of expected 
payoffs. Each time an empirical growth paper is written, the probability of gaining 
genuine understanding may be low, but the payoff to that understanding is potentially 
vast. But even this argument relies on being able to discriminate between the status of 
different pieces of evidence – the good, the bad and the ugly – and this process of 
discrimination carries many difficulties of its own. 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) begin their skeptical critique of evidence on trade 
policy and growth with an apt quote from Mark Twain: “It isn’t what we don’t know that 
kills us. It’s what we know that ain’t so.”  This point applies with especial force in the 
identification of empirically salient growth determinants.  As illustrated in Appendix 2 of 
this chapter, approximately as many growth determinants have been proposed as there are 
countries for which data are available. It is hard to believe that all these determinants are 
                                                 
1“Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review, 1951.  
  1central, yet the embarrassment of riches also makes it hard to identify the subset that truly 
matters.  
There are other respects in which it is difficult to reconcile alternative empirical 
studies, including the functional form posited for the growth process.  An important 
distinction between the neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) and 
many of the models that have been produced in the endogenous growth theory literature 
launched by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) is that the latter can require the specification 
of a nonlinear data generating process. But researchers have not yet agreed on the 
empirical specification of growth nonlinearities, or the methods that should be used to 
distinguish neoclassical and endogenous growth models empirically. 
These and other difficulties inherent in the empirical study of growth have 
prompted the field to evolve continuously, and to adopt a wide range of methods. We 
argue that a sufficiently rich set of statistical tools for the study of growth have been 
developed and applied that they collectively define an area of growth econometrics.  This 
chapter is designed to provide an overview of the current state of this field.  The chapter 
will both survey the body of econometric and statistical methods that have been brought 
to bear on growth questions and provide some assessments of the value of these tools.  
Much of growth econometrics reflects the specialized questions that naturally 
arise in growth contexts. For example, statistical tools are often used to draw inferences 
about long-run outcomes from contemporary behaviors.  This is most clearly seen in the 
context of debates over economic convergence; as discussed below, many of the 
differences between neoclassical and endogenous growth perspectives may be reduced to 
questions concerning the long-run effects of initial conditions.   The available growth 
data typically span at most 140 years (and many fewer if one wants to work with a data 
set that nontrivially spans countries outside Western Europe and the United States) and 
the use of these data to examine hypotheses about long-run behavior can be a difficult 
undertaking. Such exercises lead to complicated questions concerning how one can 
identify the steady-state behavior of a stochastic process from observations along its 
transition path.   
As we have already mentioned, another major and difficult set of growth 
questions involves the identification of empirically salient determinants of growth when 
  2the range of potential factors is large relative to the number of observations. Model 
uncertainty is in fact a fundamental problem facing growth researchers. Individual 
researchers, seeking to communicate the extent of support for particular growth 
determinants, typically emphasize a single model (or small set of models) and then carry 
out inference as if that model had generated the data.  Standard inference procedures 
based on a single model, and which are conditional on the truth of that model, can grossly 
overstate the precision of inferences about a given phenomenon. Such procedures ignore 
the uncertainty that surrounds the validity of the model.  Given that there are usually 
other models that have strong claims on our attention, the standard errors can understate 
the true degree of uncertainty about the parameters, and the choice of which models to 
report can appear arbitrary.  The need to properly account for model uncertainty naturally 
leads to Bayesian or pseudo-Bayesian approaches to data analysis.
2  
Yet another set of questions involves the characterization of interesting patterns in 
a data set comprised of objects as complex and heterogeneous as countries.  Assumptions 
about parameter constancy across units of observation seem particularly unappealing for 
cross-country data. On the other hand, much of the interest in growth economics stems 
precisely from the objective of understanding the distribution of outcomes across 
countries.  The search for data patterns has led to a far greater use of classification and 
pattern recognition methods, for example, than appears in other areas of economics.  Here 
and elsewhere, growth econometrics has imported a range of methods from statistics, 
rather than simply relying on the tools of mainstream econometrics. 
Whichever techniques are applied, the weakness of the available data represents a 
major constraint on the potential of empirical growth research. Perhaps the main obstacle 
to understanding growth is the small number of countries in the world. This is a problem 
for the obvious reason (a fundamental lack of variation or information) but also because it 
limits the extent to which researchers can address problems such as measurement error 
and parameter heterogeneity. Sometimes the problem is stark: imagine trying to infer the 
consequences of democracy for growth in poorer countries.  Because the twentieth 
century provided relatively few examples of stable, multi-party democracies among the 
                                                 
2See Draper (1995) for a general discussion of model uncertainty and Brock, Durlauf, and 
West (2003) for discussion of its implications for growth econometrics. 
  3poorer nations of the world, statistical evidence can make only a limited contribution to 
this debate, unless one is willing to make exchangeability assumptions about nations that 
would seem not to be credible.
3
With a larger group of countries to work with, many of the difficulties that face 
growth researchers could be addressed in ways that are now standard in the 
microeconometrics literature.  For example, the well known concerns expressed by 
Harberger (1987), Solow (1994) and many others about assuming a common linear 
model for a set of very different countries could, in principle, be addressed by estimating 
more general models that allow for heterogeneity. This can be done using interaction 
terms, nonlinearities or semiparametric methods, so that the marginal effect of a given 
explanatory variable can differ across countries or over time. The problem is that these 
solutions will require large samples if the conclusions are to be robust. Similarly, some 
methods for addressing other problems, such as measurement error, are only useful in 
samples larger than those available to growth researchers.  This helps to explain the need 
for new statistical methods for growth contexts, and why growth econometrics has 
evolved in such a pragmatic and eclectic fashion.  
One common response to the lack of cross-country variation has been to draw on 
variation in growth and other variables over time, primarily using panel data methods. 
Many empirical growth papers are now based on the estimation of dynamic panel data 
models with fixed effects. Our survey will discuss not only the relevant technical issues, 
but also some issues of interpretation that are raised by these studies, and especially their 
treatment of fixed effects as nuisance parameters. We also discuss the merits of 
alternatives. These include the before-and-after studies of specific events, such as stock 
market liberalizations or democratizations, which form an increasingly popular method 
for examining certain hypotheses. The correspondence between these studies and the 
microeconometric literature on treatment effects helps to clarify the strengths and 
limitations of the event-study approach, and of cross-country evidence more generally. 
 
 
                                                 
3See Temple (2000b) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a) for a conceptual discussion of this 
issue. 
  4Despite the many difficulties that arise in empirical growth research, we believe 
some progress has been made. Researchers have uncovered stylized facts that growth 
theories should endeavor to explain, and developed methods to investigate the links 
between these stylized facts and substantive economic arguments.  We would also argue 
that an important contribution of growth econometrics has been the clarification of the 
limits that exist in employing statistical methods to address growth questions.  One 
implication of these limits is that narrative and historical approaches (Landes (1998) and 
Mokyr (1992) are standard and valuable examples) have a lasting role to play in 
empirical growth analysis.  This is unsurprising given the importance that many authors 
ascribe to political, social and cultural factors in growth, factors that often do not readily 
lend themselves to statistical analysis.
4  For these reasons, Willard Quine’s classic 
statement of the underdetermination of theories by data, cited at the beginning of this 
chapter, seems especially relevant to the study of growth. 
The chapter is organized as follows.  Section II describes a set of stylized facts 
concerning economic growth.  These facts constitute the objects that formal statistical 
analysis has attempted to explain.  Section III describes the relationship between 
theoretical growth models and econometric frameworks for growth, with a primary focus 
on cross-country growth regressions.  Section IV discusses the convergence hypothesis.  
Section V describes methods for identifying growth determinants, and a range of 
questions concerning model specification and evaluation are addressed.  Section VI 
discusses econometric issues that arise according to whether one is using cross-section, 
time series or panel data, and also examines the issue of endogeneity in some depth.  
Section VII evaluates the implications of different data and error properties for growth 
analysis.  Section VIII concludes with some thoughts on the progress made thus far, and 




                                                 
4Narrative approaches can, of course, be subjected to criticisms every bit as severe as 
apply to quantitative studies.  Similarly, efforts to study qualitative growth ideas using 
formal tools can go awry; see Durlauf (2002) for criticism of efforts to explain growth 
and development using the idea of social capital.  
  5II. Stylized facts 
 
In this section we describe some of the major features of cross-country growth 
data.  Our goal is to identify some of the salient cross-section and intertemporal patterns 
that have motivated the development of growth econometrics.  Section II.i makes some 
general observations on growth in the very long-run. Section II.ii discusses the main data 
set used to study growth since 1960. Section II.iii describes general facts about 
differences in output per worker across countries. Section II.iv extends this discussion by 
focusing on growth miracles and disasters. Basic facts concerning convergence are 
reported in Section II.v. In Section II.vi we describe the general slowdown in growth over 
the last two decades. Section II.vii extends this discussion by considering the question of 
predictability of growth rates over time.  Section II.viii identifies growth differences 
across levels of development and across geographic regions.  In Section II.ix, we 
characterize some aspects of stagnation and volatility. Section II.x draws some general 
conclusions about the basic growth facts. 
 
i. a long-run view 
 
Taking a long view of economic history, a central fact concerning aggregate 
economic activity across countries is the massive divergence in living standards that has 
occurred over the last several centuries. A snapshot of the world in 1700 would show all 
countries to be poor, if their living standards were assessed in today’s terms. Over the 
course of the 18
th and 19
th centuries, growth rates increased slightly in the UK and other 
countries in Western Europe. Annual growth rates appear to have remained low, by 
modern standards, even in the midst of the Industrial Revolution; but because this growth 
was sustained over time, GDP per capita steadily rose. The outcome was that the UK, 
some other countries in Western Europe, and then the USA gradually advanced further 
ahead of the rest of the world.  
What was happening elsewhere? As Pritchett (1997) argues, even in the absence 
of national accounts data, we can be almost certain that rapid productivity growth was 
never sustained in the poorer regions of the world. The argument proceeds by 
  6extrapolating backwards from their current levels of GDP per capita, using a fast growth 
rate. This quickly implies earlier levels of income that would be too low to support 
human life. 
 
ii. data after 1960 
 
Today’s overall inequality across countries is partly the legacy of rapid growth in 
a small group of Western economies, and its absence elsewhere.  But there have been 
important deviations from this general pattern.  Since the 1960s, some developing 
countries have grown at rates that are unprecedented, at least based on the experiences of 
the advanced economies of Europe and North America.  The tiger economies of East 
Asia have seen GDP per worker grow at around 5% a year, or even faster, for the best 
part of forty years. A country that grows at such rates over forty years will see GDP per 
worker rise more than sevenfold, as in the case of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan. 
In the rest of this section, we describe these patterns in more detail. As with most 
of the empirical growth literature, we will focus on the period after 1960, the point at 
which national accounts data start to become available for a larger group of countries.
5 
Our calculations use version 6.1 of the Penn World Table (PWT) due to Heston, 
Summers, and Aten (2002).  They have constructed measures of real GDP that adjust for 
international differences in price levels, and are therefore more comparable across space 
than measures based on market exchange rates.
6
For the purposes of our analysis, the “world” will consist of 102 countries, those 
with data available in PWT 6.1 and with populations of at least 350,000 in the year 1960. 
These 102 countries account for a large share of the world’s population. The most 
important missing countries are economies in Eastern Europe that were centrally planned 
for much of the period. Because of its enormous population, collectivist China is included 
in the sample, but is a country for which output measurement is especially difficult. In a 
                                                 
5Another reason for this starting point is that many colonies did not gain independence 
until the 1960s. 
6For more discussion of the PWT data, and further references, see Temple (1999). 
  7small number of cases, data for GDP per worker for 2000 are extrapolated from 
preceding years using growth rates for the early and mid-1990s. The Appendix gives 
more details of the sample, and the extrapolation procedure. 
Throughout, we use data on GDP per worker. Most formal growth models are 
based on production functions, and their implications relate more closely to GDP per 
worker than GDP per capita. Jones (1997) provides another justification for this choice. 
When there is an unmeasured non-market sector, such as subsistence agriculture, GDP 
per worker could be a more accurate index of average productivity than GDP per capita. 
The paths of GDP per worker and GDP per capita will diverge when there are 
changes in the ratio of workers to population, which is one form of participation rate. 
There has been an upwards trend in these participation rates where such rates were 
originally low, while at the upper end of the distribution participation has been stable.
7  
For a sample of 90 countries with available data, the median participation rate rose from 
41% to 45% between 1960 and 2000. There was a sharp increase at the 25
th percentile 
(from 33% to 40%) but very little change at the 75
th percentile. This pattern suggests that 
growth in GDP per capita has usually been close to growth in GDP per worker, except for 
the countries that started with low participation rates. 
There is an important point to bear in mind, when interpreting our later tables and 
graphs, and those found elsewhere in the literature. Our unit of observation is the country. 
In one sense this is clearly an arbitrary way to divide the world’s population, but one that 
can have systematic effects on perceptions of stylized facts. We can illustrate this with a 
specific example. Sub-Saharan Africa has many countries that have small populations, 
while India and China combined account for about 40% of the world’s population. In a 
decade where India and China did relatively well, such as the 1990s, a country-based 
analysis will understate the overall improvement in living standards. In contrast, in a 
decade where Africa did relatively well, such as the 1960s, the overall growth record 
would appear less strong if assessed on a population-weighted basis. The point that 
countries differ greatly in terms of population size is important when interpreting tables, 
graphs and regressions that use the country as the unit of observation. 
                                                 
7The figures we use for participation rates are those implicit in the Penn World Table, 
6.1. 
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iii. differences in levels of GDP per worker 
 
Initially, we document the international disparities in GDP per worker. We first 
look at data for countries with large populations. Table 1 lists a set of countries that 
together account for 4.3 billion people. Of the countries with large populations, the main 
omissions are Germany, because of the difficulty posed by reunification, and economies 
that were centrally planned, including Russia. 
  9 
Table 1: International Disparities in GDP per Worker 
 
 
Country Population(m,  2000)  R1960  R2000 
USA 275  1  1 
United Kingdom  60  .69  .69 
Argentina 37  .62  .40 
France 60  .60  .76 
Italy 58  .55  .84 
South Africa  43  .47  .34 
Mexico 97  .44  .38 
Spain 40  .40  .68 
Iran 64  .30  .30 
Colombia 42  .27  .18 
Japan 127  .25  .60 
Brazil 170  .24  .30 
Turkey 67  .17  .24 
Philippines 76  .17  .13 
Egypt 64  .17  .21 
Korea, Republic of  47  .15  .57 
Bangladesh 131  .10  .10 
Nigeria 127  .08  .02 
Indonesia 210  .08  .14 
Thailand 61  .07  .20 
Pakistan 138  .07  .11 
India 1016  .06  .10 
China 1259  .04  .10 
Ethiopia 64  .04  .02 
      
Mean   .29  .35 
Median   .21  .27 
 
Notes: 
-  R is GDP per worker as a fraction of that in the USA. 
 
  The table shows GDP per worker, relative to the USA, for 1960 and 2000. The 
countries are ranked in descending order in terms of their 1960 position. Some clear 
patterns emerge: the major economies of Western Europe have maintained their position 
relative to the USA (as in the case of the UK) or substantially improved it (France, Italy, 
Spain). Among the poorer nations, there are some countries that have improved their 
relative position dramatically (Japan, Republic of Korea, Thailand) and others that have 
performed badly (Argentina, Nigeria).  If we look at the mean and median of relative 
  10GDP per worker, there has been a moderate increase, suggesting a slight tendency for 
reduced dispersion. But these statistics disguise a wide variety of experience, and we will 
discuss the issue of convergence in more detail below.  
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We now consider the shape of the international distribution of GDP per worker, 
using the USA’s 1960 value as the benchmark. Figure 1 shows a kernel density plot of 
the distribution of GDP per worker in 1960 and 2000, relative to the benchmark. The 
rightwards movement reflects the growth that took place over this period. Also noticeable 
is a thinning in the middle of the distribution, the “Twin Peaks” phenomenon identified in 
a series of papers by Quah (1993a,b,1996a,b,c,1997). 
Is the position in the league table of GDP per worker in 1960 a good predictor of 
that in 2000? The answer is a qualified yes: the Spearman rank correlation is 0.84. This 
pattern is shown in more detail in Figure 2, which plots the log of GDP per worker 
relative to the USA in 2000, against that in 1960. In this and later figures, one or two 
outlying observations are omitted to facilitate graphing. 
  11 
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Relative GDP per worker
 
The high rank correlation is not a new phenomenon. Easterly et al (1993) report that, for 
28 countries for which Maddison (1989) has data, the rank correlation of GDP per capita 





  12iv. growth miracles and disasters 
 
Despite some stability in relative positions, it is easy to pick out countries that 
have done exceptionally well and others that have done badly. There is an enormous 
range in observed growth rates, to an extent that has not previously been observed in 
world history. To show this, we rank the countries by their annual growth rate between 
1960 and 2000, and present a list of the fifteen best performers (Table 2) and the fifteen 
worst (Table 3). To show the dramatic effects of sustaining a high growth rate over forty 
years, we also show the ratio of GDP per worker in 2000 to that in 1960. 
These tables of growth miracles and disasters show a regional pattern that is 
familiar to anyone who has studied recent economic growth. The best performing 
countries are mainly located in East Asia and Southeast Asia. These countries have 
sustained exceptionally high growth rates; for example, GDP per worker has grown by a 
factor of 11 in the case of Taiwan. If we now turn to the growth disasters, we can see 
many instances of “negative growth”, and these are predominantly countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. Later in this section, we will compare Africa’s performance with that of 
other regions in more detail.
8
                                                 
8Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier and Gunning (1999a,b) examine various 
explanations for slow growth in Africa. 
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Table 2: Fifteen Growth Miracles, 1960-2000 
 
 
Country Growth  1960-2000  Factor  increase 
Taiwan 6.25  11.3 
Botswana 6.07  10.6 
Hong Kong  5.67   9.09 
Korea, Republic of  5.41    8.24 
Singapore  5.09    7.29 
Thailand 4.50    5.83 
Cyprus 4.30    5.39 
Japan 4.13    5.04 
Ireland 4.10    5.00 
China 3.99    4.77 
Romania 3.91    4.63 
Mauritius 3.88    4.58 
Malaysia 3.82    4.48 
Portugal 3.48    3.93 
Indonesia 3.34    3.72 
 
 
Table 3: Fifteen Growth Disasters, 1960-2000 
 
 
Country Growth  1960-2000  Ratio 
Peru   0.00  1.00 
Mauritania -0.11  0.96 
Senegal -0.26  0.90 
Chad -0.43  0.84 
Mozambique -0.50 0.82 
Madagascar -0.60  0.79 
Zambia -0.61  0.78 
Mali -0.77  0.74 
Venezuela -0.88  0.70 
Niger -1.03  0.66 
Nigeria -1.21  0.62 
Nicaragua -1.30  0.59 
Central African Republic  -1.56  0.53 
Angola -2.04  0.44 
Congo, Democratic Rep.  -4.00  0.20 
 
 
  14v. convergence? 
 
An alternative way of showing the diversity of experience is to plot the growth 
rate over 1960-2000 against the 1960 level of real GDP per worker, relative to the USA. 
This is shown in Figure 3. The most obvious lesson to be drawn from this figure is the 
diversity of growth rates, especially at low levels of development. The figure does not 
provide much support for the idea that countries are converging to a common level of 
income, since that would require evidence of a downward sloping relationship between 
growth and initial income. Neither does it support the widespread idea that poorer 
countries have always grown slowly. 
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  15vi. the growth slowdown 
 
Next, we present similar figures for two sub-periods, 1960-1980 and 1980-2000. 
These plots, shown as Figures 4 and 5, reveal another important pattern. For many 
developing countries, growth was significantly lower in the second period, with many 
countries seeing a decline in real GDP per worker after 1980. We can see this more 
clearly by looking at the international distribution of growth rates for the two sub-periods. 
Figure 6 shows kernel density estimates, and reveals a clear pattern: the mass of the 
distribution has shifted leftwards (slower growth) while at the same time the variance has 
increased (greater dispersion in growth rates). 
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A different way to highlight the growth slowdown is to plot the growth rate in 
1980-2000 against that in 1960-1980 as is done in Figure 7, which also includes a 45 
degree line. Countries above the line have seen growth increase, whereas countries below 
have seen growth decline. There are clearly more countries in which growth has declined 
over time, with the crucial exceptions of China and India, which have seen a dramatic 
improvement. To reveal the same pattern, Table 4 lists the countries in various categories, 
classified by growth rates in 1960-80 and in 1980-2000. 
  19Table 4: Growth in 1960-1980 and 1980-2000 
 
 
 G2≤0 0<G2≤1.5 1.5<G2≤3 G2>3 
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-  The above table classifies countries according to their annual growth rates over 1960-80 (G1) and over 
1980-2000 (G2). 
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vii. does past growth predict future growth? 
 
Another lesson to be drawn from Figure 7 and Table 4 is that relative performance 
has been unstable. The correlation between growth in 1960-1980 and that in 1980-2000 is 
just 0.40, so past growth is not a particularly useful predictor of future growth.
9 For the 
whole sample, the correlations across decades are also weak (Table 5).  It is less well 
known that the cross-decade correlation has tended to increase over time, as is clear from 
Table 5’s below diagonal elements for the whole sample. This is tentative evidence that 




Table 5: Growth Rate Correlations Across Decades 
 
 
  1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 
      
Whole  sample      
Growth  1960-1970  1.00     
Growth  1970-1980  0.16 1.00    
Growth  1980-1990  0.28 0.31 1.00  
Growth  1990-2000  0.11 0.33 0.44 1.00 
      
Rich  country  group      
Growth  1960-1970  1.00     
Growth  1970-1980  0.73 1.00    
Growth  1980-1990  0.06 0.40 1.00  
Growth  1990-2000  -0.07  0.37 0.61 1.00 
 
Notes: 
-  Whole sample is 102 countries. Rich country group is 19 countries. 
 
 
                                                 
9Easterly et al (1993) emphasized this point, and suggested that the lack of persistence in 
growth rates indicates the importance of good luck. 
  21viii. Growth differences by development level and geographic region 
 
Can we say anything more about the characteristics of the winners and losers? 
First, we investigate the relationship between growth and initial development levels in 
more detail. We rank the sample of 102 countries by initial income in 1960, and then look 
at the distribution of growth rates for subgroups.  In Table 6, for various ranges of initial 
income relative to the USA, we show the growth rate at the 25
th percentile, the median, 
and the 75
th percentile. If we take the 22 countries which began somewhere between 5% 
and 10% of GDP per worker in the USA, the annual growth rate at the 25
th percentile is 
negative, but is 2.9% at the 75
th percentile. This diversity of experience extends 
throughout the distribution of relative incomes, but is less pronounced for the richest 
group. 
  22 
Table 6: Growth, 1960-2000, by Initial Relative Income 
 
 
Percentile N  25
th Median 75
th
        
All 102  0.7  1.6  2.7 
Relative income:         
R≤0.05 10  1.0  1.5  2.4 
R>0.05 & R≤0.10 22 -0.5  0.9  2.9 
R>0.10 & R≤0.25 33 0.4  1.9  2.7 
R>0.25 & R≤0.50 19 0.8  1.5  3.1 
R>0.50 18  1.6  1.9  2.6 
 
Notes: 
-  This table shows the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles of the distribution of growth rates for countries at 
various levels of development in 1960.  
-  “R” is GDP per worker in 1960 relative to the US level. 
 
 
Table 7: Growth, 1960-2000, by Country Groups 
 
 
Group N  25
th Median 75
th
Sub-Saharan Africa  36  -0.5  0.7  1.3 
South and Central America  21   0.4  0.9  1.5 
East and Southeast Asia  10   3.8  4.3  5.4 
South Asia   7   1.9  2.2  2.9 
Industrialized countries  19   1.7  2.4  3.0 
 
Notes: 
-  This table shows the 25
th, 50
th and 75




Table 7 shows the quartiles of growth rates for countries in different regions.
10 
Once again, sub-Saharan Africa is revealed as a weak performer. Within sub-Saharan 
Africa, even the country at the 75
th percentile shows growth of just 1.3%. Performance is 
slightly better for South and Central America, but still not strong. Against this 
background, the record of East and Southeast Asia looks all the more remarkable. 
                                                 
10These country groupings are not exhaustive; for example Fiji and Papua New Guinea 
do not appear in any of these groups. Analysis of the group of industrialized countries is 
subject to the sample selection issue highlighted by DeLong (1988). 
  23In further work (not shown) we have constructed versions of Tables 6 and 7 for 
1960-1980 and 1980-2000. These reinforce the patterns already discussed: dispersion of 
growth rates at all levels of development, major differences across regional groups, and a 
collapse in growth rates after 1980. Even for the developed countries, growth rates were 
noticeably lower after 1980 than before, reflecting the well-known productivity 
slowdown and the reduced potential for catch-up by previously fast-growing countries, 
such as France, Italy and Japan. 
 
ix. stagnation and output volatility 
 
Some countries did not record fast growth even in the boom of the 1960s. Some 
have simply stagnated or declined, never sustaining a high or even moderate growth rate 
for the length of time needed to raise output appreciably. In our sample, there are nine 
countries that have never exceeded their 1960 level of GDP per worker by more than 
30%. Even more striking, a quarter of the countries (26 of 102) never exceeded their 
1960 level by more than 60%. To put this in context, a country that grew at an average 
rate of 2% a year over a forty-year period would see GDP per worker rise by around 
120%.  Easterly (1994) drew attention to the international prevalence of stagnation, and 
the failure of some poorer countries to break out of low levels of development. 
  There are other ways in which the behavior of the poorer countries looks very 
different to that of rich countries. As emphasized by Pritchett (2000a), it is not 
uncommon for output to undergo a major collapse in less developed countries (LDCs). 
To show this, we calculate the largest percentage drop in output over three years recorded 
for each country, using data from 1960 to the latest available year. The precise statistic 












The largest ten output falls are shown in Table 8, which shows how dramatic an 
output collapse can be. Several of these output collapses are associated with periods of 
  24intense civil war, as in the cases of Rwanda, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.  But the phenomenon of output collapse is a great deal more widespread than may 
be explained by events of this type. Of the 102 countries in our sample, 50 showed at 
least one three-year output collapse of 15% or more. 65 countries experienced a three-
year output collapse of 10% or more. In contrast, between 1960 and 2000, the largest 
three-year output collapse in the USA was 5.4%, and in the UK 3.6%, both recorded in 
1979-82. A corollary of these patterns is that time series modeling of LDC output, 
whether on a country-by-country basis or using panel data, has to be approached with 
care. It is not clear that the dynamics of output in the wake of a major collapse would 
look anything like the dynamics at other times. 
 
 
Table 8: Output Collapses 
 
 
Country  Largest 3-year drop  Dates 
Chad 50%  1980-83 
Rwanda 47%  1991-94 
Angola 46%  1973-76 
Romania 37%  1977-80 
Dem. Rep. Congo  36%  1992-95 
Mauritania 34%  1985-88 
Tanzania 34%  1987-90 
Mali 34%  1985-88 
Cameroon 33%  1987-90 
Nigeria 32%  1997-00 
 
Notes: 
-  This table shows the ten countries with the largest output collapses over a three-year period, using data 
on GDP per worker between 1960 and the latest available year. 
 
 
We conclude our consideration of stylized facts by briefly reporting some 
evidence on long-run output volatility. Table 9 reports figures on the standard deviation 
of annual growth rates between 1960 and 2000. Industrialized countries are relatively 
stable, while sub-Saharan Africa is by far the most volatile region, followed by South and 
Central America. Volatility is not uniformly higher in developing countries, however: 
using the standard deviation of annual growth rates, South Africa is less volatile than the 
USA, Sri Lanka less volatile than Canada, and Pakistan less volatile than Switzerland.
  25 
Table 9: Volatility, 1960-2000, by Regions 
 
 
Group N  25
th Median 75
th
Sub-Saharan  Africa  36  5.5 7.4 9.3 
South and Central America  21  3.9  4.8  5.4 
East and Southeast Asia  10  3.8  4.1  4.7 
South Asia   7  3.0  3.3  5.2 
Industrialized  countries  19  2.3 2.9 3.5 
 
Notes: 
-  This table shows the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles of the distribution of the standard deviation of annual 




x. a summary of the stylized facts 
 
The stylized facts we consider can be summarized as follows:  
 
1. Over the forty-year period as a whole, most countries have grown richer, but vast 
income disparities remain. For all but the richest group, growth rates have differed to an 
unprecedented extent, regardless of the initial level of development. 
 
2. Although past growth is a surprisingly weak predictor of future growth, it is slowly 
becoming more accurate over time, and so distinct winners and losers are beginning to 
emerge. The strongest performers are located in East and Southeast Asia, which have 
sustained growth rates at unprecedented levels. The weakest performers are 
predominantly located in sub-Saharan Africa, where some countries have barely grown at 
all, or even become poorer. The record in South and Central America is also distinctly 
mixed. In these regions, output volatility is high, and dramatic output collapses are not 
uncommon. 
 
3. For many countries, growth rates were lower in 1980-2000 than in 1960-1980, and this 
growth slowdown is observed throughout most of the income distribution. Moreover, the 
dispersion of growth rates has increased.  A more optimistic reading would also 
  26emphasize the growth take-off that has taken place in China and India, home to two-fifths 
of the world’s population and a greater proportion of the world’s poor. 
Even this brief overview of the stylized facts reveals that there is much of interest 
to be investigated and understood. The field of growth econometrics has emerged through 
efforts to interpret and understand these facts in terms of simple statistical models, and in 
the light of predictions made by particular theoretical structures. In either case, the 
complexity of the growth process and the paucity of the available data combine to 
suggest that scientific standards of proof are unattainable.  Perhaps the best this literature 
can hope for is to constrain what can legitimately be claimed. 
Researchers such as Levine and Renelt (1991) and Wacziarg (2002) have argued 
that, seen in this more modest light, growth econometrics can provide a signpost to 
interesting patterns and partial correlations, and even rule out some versions of the world 
that might otherwise seem plausible. Seen in terms of establishing stylized facts, 
empirical studies help to broaden the demands made of future theories, and can act as a 
discipline on quantitative investigations using calibrated models. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we will discuss in more detail the uses and limits of statistical evidence. We first 
examine how empirical growth studies are related to theoretical models, and then return 
in more depth to the study of convergence.  
 
 
III. Cross-country growth regressions: from theory to empirics 
 
The stylized facts of economic growth have led to two major themes in the 
development of formal econometric analyses of growth.  The first theme revolves around 
the question of convergence: are contemporary differences in aggregate economies 
transient over sufficiently long time horizons?  The second theme concerns the 
identification of growth determinants: which factors seem to explain observed differences 
in growth?  These questions are closely related in that each requires the specification of a 
statistical model of cross-country growth differences from which the effects on growth of 
various factors, including initial conditions, may be identified.  In this section, we 
  27describe how statistical models of cross-country growth differences have been derived 
from theoretical growth models. 
Section III.i provides a general theoretical framework for understanding growth 
dynamics. The framework is explicitly neoclassical and represents the basis for most 
empirical growth work; even those studies that have attempted to produce evidence in 
favor of endogenous or other alternative growth theories have generally used the 
neoclassical model as a baseline from which to explore deviations.  Section III.ii 
examines the relationship between this theoretical model of growth dynamics and the 
specification of a growth regression.  This transition from theory to econometrics 
produces the canonical cross-country growth regression.  
 
i. growth dynamics: basic ideas 
   
For economy i at time t, let   denote output,   the labor force assumed to 
obey   where the population growth rate   is constant, and 
, it Y , it L
,, 0
i nt
it i LL e = i n , it A  the efficiency 
level of each worker with  ,, 0
i g t
it i A Ae =  where   is the (constant) rate of (labor 
augmenting) technological progress.  We will work with two main per capita notions: 
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As is well known, the generic one-sector growth model, in either its Solow-Swan or 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans variant, implies, to a first-order approximation, that  
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where   is the steady-state value of   and  .  The parameter  ,
E
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E
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ti t i yy →∞ ∞ = i λ  
(which must be positive) measures the rate of convergence of   to its steady-state value  ,
E
it y
  28and depends on the other parameters of the model.  Given  0 i λ > , the value of  ,
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i y ∞  is 




Eq. (1) expresses growth dynamics in terms of the unobservable . In order to 
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In parallel to equation (1), one can easily see that  
 
  ( ) ,, , 0 lim 0
i gt E
ti t i i yy A e →∞ ∞ − =  (4) 
 
so that the initial value of output per worker has no implications for its long-run value. 
  This description of the dynamics of output provides the basis for describing the 
dynamics of growth.  Let  
 
  ( )
1
, log log ii t ty y γ
− =− , 0 i  (5) 
 
denote the growth rate of output per worker between 0 and t.  Subtracting   from 
both sides of (3) and dividing by t yields 
,0 log i y
 
  ( ) ,0 , ,0 log log log
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11Implicit in our discussion is the assumption that   which eliminates the trivial 
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− − =− −  (7) 
 
The  i β  parameter will prove to play a key role in empirical growth analysis. 
Equation (6) thus decomposes the growth rate in country i  into two distinct 
components.  The first component,  , measures growth due to technological progress, 
whereas the second component 
i g
( ) ,0 , ,0 log log log
E
ii i i yyA β ∞ −−  measures growth due to 
the gap between initial output per worker and the steady-state value, both measured in 
terms of efficiency units of labor.  This second source of growth is what is meant by 
“catching up” in the literature.  As t  the importance of the catch-up term, which 
reflects the role of initial conditions, diminishes to zero. 
→∞
  Under the additional assumptions that the rates of technological progress, and the 
i λ  parameters are constant across  countries,  i.e.  ,  and    ii gg i λ λ = =∀ , (6) may be 
rewritten as  
 
   (8)  ,, 0 log log log
E
ii i gy A γβ β β ∞ =− − + , 0 i y
                                                
 
The important empirical implication of equation (8) is that, in a cross-section of 
countries, we should observe a negative relationship between average rates of growth and 
initial levels of output over any time period – countries that start out below their balanced 
growth path must grow relatively quickly if they are to catch up with other countries that 
have the same levels of steady-state output per effective worker and initial efficiency. 
This is closely related to the hypothesis of conditional convergence, which is often 
understood to mean that countries converge to parallel growth paths, the levels of which 
are assumed to be a function of a small set of variables.
12  Note, however, that a negative 
coefficient on initial income in a cross-country growth regression does not automatically 
imply conditional convergence in this sense, because countries might instead simply be 
moving toward their own different steady-state growth paths. 
 
12We provide formal definitions of convergence in Section IV.i. 
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ii. cross-country growth regressions 
 
 
Equation (8) provides the motivation for the standard cross-country growth 
regression that is the foundation of the empirical growth literature.  Typically, these 
regression specifications start with (8) and append a random error term  i υ  so that  
 
  ,, 0 , log log log
E
ii i gy A y 0 i i γ βββ ∞ =− − + + υ  (9) 
  
Implementation of (9) requires the development of empirical analogs for  , log
E
i y ∞  
and  ,0 log i A .  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) in a pioneering analysis, show how to do 
this in a way that produces a growth regression model that is linear in observable 
variables.  In their analysis, aggregate output is assumed to obey a three-factor Cobb-
Douglas production function 
 
  ( )
1
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α φ αφ − −
=  (10) 
 
where   denotes physical capital and   denotes human capital.  Physical and human 
capital are assumed to follow the continuous time accumulation equations 












respectively, where δ  denotes the depreciation rate,  , K i s  is the saving rate for physical 
capital and  , H i s  is the saving rate for human capital and dots above variables denote time 
  31derivatives.  Note that the saving rates are both assumed to be time invariant.  These 
accumulation equations, combined with the parameter constancy assumptions used to 

























producing a cross-country growth regression of the form 
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Mankiw, Romer and Weil assume that  ,0 i A  is unobservable and that g δ +  is known. 
These assumptions mean that (14) is linear in the logs of various observable variables and 
therefore amenable to standard regression analysis. 
  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil argue that  ,0 i A  should be interpreted as reflecting not 
just technology, which they assume to be constant across countries, but country-specific 
influences on growth such as resource endowments, climate and institutions.  They 
assume these differences vary randomly in the sense that  
 
  ,0 log log ii A Ae = +  (15) 
 
where   is a country-specific shock distributed independently of  ,  i e i n , K i s , and  , H i s
13.  
Substituting this into (14) and defining  iiei ε υβ = − , we have the regression relationship 
 
                                                 
13This independence assumption is justified, in turn, on the basis that 1)  ,  i n , K i s , and  , H i s  
are exogenous in the neoclassical model with isoelastic preferences and 2) the estimated 
parameter values are consistent with those predicted by the model. 





















Using data from a group of 98 countries over the period 1960 to 1985, Mankiw Romer 
and Weil produce regression estimates of  ,  ˆ .299 β =− ˆ .48 α =  and  . ˆ .23 φ =
14 
15  Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil are unable to reject the overidentifying restrictions present in (16).  
While this result is echoed in studies such as Knight, Loayza, and Villenueva (1993), 
other authors, Caselli, Equivel, and Lefort (1996), for example, are able to reject the 
restrictions. 
  Many cross-country regression studies have attempted to extend Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil by adding additional control variables  i Z  to the regression suggested by (16).  
Relative to Mankiw, Romer and Weil, such studies may be understood as allowing for 
predictable heterogeneneity in the steady-state growth term   and initial technology 
term 
i g
,0 i A  that are assumed constant across i in (16).  Formally, the  ,0 log i g i A β −  terms in 
(6) are replaced with  log i gA Z i e β πβ −+ −  rather than with  log i gA e β β − −  which 
produced (16).  (As far as we know, empirical work universally ignores the fact that 
( log i ng ) δ ++  should also be replaced with  ( ) log ii ngδ + + .)  This produces the cross 
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14Based on data from the US and other economies, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil set 
.05 g δ +=  prior to estimation.  
15Using  (
1log 1 t ) t λ β
− =− − , the implied estimate of λ  is .0142.  The relationship 
() ( 1 ii ng ) λ αφ δ =−− ++  was not imposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil, who instead 
treat λ  as a constant to be estimated. Durlauf and Johnson (1995, Table II, note b) show 
that estimating this model when λ  varies with n in the way implied by the theory 
produces only very small changes in parameter estimates.  
  33.  The regression described by (17) does not identify whether the controls  i Z  are 
correlated with steady-state growth   or the initial technology term i g ,0 i A .  For this reason, 
a believer in a common steady-state growth rate will not be dissuaded by the finding that 
particular choices of  i Z  help predict growth beyond the Solow regressors. Nevertheless, 
it seems plausible that the controls  i Z  may sometimes function as proxies for predicting 
differences in efficiency growth   rather than in the initial technology i g ,0 i A .  As argued in 
Temple (1999), even if all countries have the same total factor productivity growth (TFP) 
in the long run, over a twenty- or thirty-year sample the assumption of equal TFP growth 
is highly implausible, so the variables in  i Z  can explain these differences. That being 
said, the attribution of the predictive content of  i Z  to initial technology versus steady 
state growth will entirely depend on a researcher’s prior beliefs.  It is possible that proper 
accounting of the  ( log ii ng ) δ ++term would allow for some progress in identifying   
versus 
i g
,0 i A  effects since   effects would imply a nonlinear relationship between  i g i Z  and 
overall growth  i γ ; however this nonlinearity may be too subtle to uncover given the 
relatively small data sets available to growth researchers. 
The canonical cross-country growth regression may understood as a version of 
(17) when the cross-coefficient restrictions embedded in (17) are ignored (which is 
usually the case in empirical work).  A generic representation of the regression is   
 
  ,0 log ii i i yX Z i γ βψ π ε = ++ +  (18) 
 
where  i X  contains a constant,  ( ) log i ng δ + + ,  , log K i s  and  , log H i s . The variables 
spanned by   and  ,0 log i y i X  thus represent those growth determinants that are suggested 
by the Solow growth model whereas  i Z  represents those growth determinants that lie 
outside Solow’s original theory.
16  The distinction between the Solow variables and  i Z  is 
                                                 
16We distinguish   from the other Solow variables because of the role it plays in 
analysis of convergence; see Section IV for detailed discussion. 
,0 log i y
  34important in understanding the empirical literature.  While the Solow variables usually 
appear in different empirical studies, reflecting the treatment of the Solow model as a 
baseline for growth analysis, choices concerning which  i Z  variables to include vary 
greatly. 
  Equation (18) represents the baseline for much of growth econometrics. These 
regressions are sometimes known as Barro regressions, given Barro’s extensive use of 
such regressions to study alternative growth determinants starting with Barro (1991).   
This regression model has been the workhorse of empirical growth research.
17  In modern 
empirical analyses, the equation has been generalized in a number of dimensions. Some 
of these extensions reflect the application of (18) to time series and panel data settings.  
Other generalizations have introduced nonlinearities and parameter heterogeneity.  We 
will discuss these variants below. 
 
iii. interpreting errors in growth regressions 
 
Our development of the relationship between cross-country growth regressions 
and neoclassical growth theories illustrates the standard practice of adding regression 
errors in an ad hoc fashion. Put differently, researchers usually derive a deterministic 
growth relationship and append an error in order to capture whatever aspects of the 
growth process are omitted from the model that has been developed.  One problem with 
this practice is that some types of errors have important implications for the asymptotics 
of estimators.  Binder and Pesaran (1999) conduct an exhaustive study of this question, 
one important conclusion of which is that if one generalizes the assumption of a constant 
rate of technical change so that technical change follows a random walk, this induces 
nonstationarity in many levels series, raising attendant unit root questions. 
                                                 
17Such regressions appear to have been employed earlier by Grier and Tullock (1989) and 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985).  The reason these latter two studies seem to have received 
less attention than warranted by their originality is, we suspect, due to their appearance 
before endogenous growth theory emerged as a primary area of macroeconomic research, 
in turn placing great interest on the empirical evaluation of growth theories.  To be clear, 
Barro’s development is original to him and his linking of cross-country growth 
regressions to alternative growth theories was unique. 
 
  35Beyond issues of asymptotics, the ad hoc treatment of regression errors leaves 
unanswered the question of what sorts of implicit substantive economic assumptions are 
made by a researcher who does this.  Brock and Durlauf (2001a) address this issue using 
the concept of exchangeability.  Basically, their argument is that in a regression such as 
(18), a researcher typically thinks of the errors  i ε  as interchangeable across observations: 
different patterns of realized errors are equally likely to occur if the realizations are 
permuted across countries. In other words, the information available to a researcher about 
the countries is not informative about the error terms. 
Exchangeability is a mathematical formalization of this idea and is defined as 
follows.  For each observation i, there exists an associated information set   available to 
the researcher.  In the growth context,   may include knowledge of a country’s history 
or culture as well as any “economic” variables that are known.  A definition of 
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where    is an operator that permutes the N indices.    () ρ
Many criticisms of growth regressions amount to arguments that exchangeability 
has been violated. For example, omitted regressors induce exchangeability violations as 
these regressors are elements of  .  Parameter heterogeneity also leads to 
nonexchangeability.  For these cases, the failure of nonexchangeability calls into question 
the interpretation of the regression.  This is not always the case; heteroskedasticity in 
errors violates exchangeability but does not induce interpretation problems for 
coefficients.  
F
Brock and Durlauf argue that exchangeability produces a link between substantive 
social science knowledge and error structure, i.e. this knowledge may be used to evaluate 
the plausibility of exchangeability.  They suggest that a good empirical practice would for 
researchers to question whether the errors in a model are exchangeable, and if not, 
determine whether the violation invalidates the purposes for which the regression is being 
used.  This cannot be done in an algorithmic fashion, but as is the case with empirical 
  36work quite generally, requires judgments by the analyst.  See Draper et al (1993) for 
further discussion of the role of exchangeability in empirical work. 
 
 
IV. The convergence hypothesis 
 
  Much of the empirical growth literature has focused on the convergence 
hypothesis. Although questions of convergence predate them, recent widespread interest 
in the convergence hypothesis originates from Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol (1986).  
This interest and the availability of the requisite data for a broad cross-section of 
countries, due to Summers and Heston (1988,1991), spawned an enormous literature 
testing the convergence hypothesis in one or more of its various guises.
18
  In this section, we explore the convergence hypothesis. In Section IV.i we 
consider the specification of notions of convergence as related to the relationship between 
initial conditions and long-run outcomes.  Section IV.ii explores the main technique that 
has been employed in studying long-run dependence, β -convergence.  Section IV.iii 
considers alternative notions of convergence that focus less on the persistence of initial 
conditions and instead on whether the cross-section dispersion of incomes is decreasing 
across time.  This section explores both σ -convergence and more general notions and 
recent methods that fall under the heading of distributional dynamics. It also considers 
how distibutional notions of convergence may be related to definitions found in Section 
IV.i.  Section IV.iv develops time series approaches to convergence.  Section IV.v moves 
beyond the question of whether convergence is present to consider analyses that have 
attempted to identify the sources of convergence when it appears to be present. 
 
i. convergence and initial conditions 
 
The effect of initial conditions on long-run outcomes arguably represents the 
primary empirical question that has been explored by growth economists.  The claim that 
                                                 
18See Durlauf (1996) and the subsequent papers in the July 1996 Economic Journal, 
Durlauf and Quah (1999), Islam (2003) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for surveys 
of aspects of the convergence literature.  
  37the effects of initial conditions eventually disappear is the heuristic basis for what is 
known as the convergence hypothesis. The goal of this literature is to answer two 
questions concerning per capita income differences across countries (or other economic 
units, such as regions).  First, are the observed cross-country differences in per capita 
incomes temporary or permanent?  Second, if they are permanent, does that permanence 
reflect structural heterogeneity or the role of initial conditions in determining long-run 
outcomes?  If the differences in per capita incomes are temporary, unconditional 
convergence (to a common long-run level) is occurring.  If the differences are permanent 
solely because of cross-country structural heterogeneity, conditional convergence is 
occurring.  If initial conditions determine, in part at least, long-run outcomes, and 
countries with similar initial conditions exhibit similar long-run outcomes, then one can 
speak of convergence clubs.
19  
We first consider how to formalize the idea that initial conditions matter.  While 
the discussion focuses on  , the log level of per capita output in country   at time t; 
these definitions can in principle be applied to other variables such as real wages, life 
expectancy, etc.  Our use of    rather than   reflects the general interest in the 
growth literature in relative versus absolute inequality, i.e. one is usually more interested 
in whether the ratio of income between two countries exhibits persistence than an 
absolute difference, particularly since sustained economic growth will imply that a 
constant levels difference is of asymptotically negligible size when relative income is 
considered.   
, log it y i
, log it y , it y
  We associate with   initial conditions,  , log it y ,0 i ρ . These initial conditions do not 
matter in the long-run if  
 
  ( ) ,, 0 i , lim log        ti t i y does not depend on 0 µ ρ →∞ ρ




19This taxonomy is due to Galor (1996) who discusses the relationship between it and the 
theoretical growth literature, giving several examples of models in which initial 
conditions matter for long-run outcomes. 
  38where  () µ ⋅  is a probability measure.  To see how this definition connects with empirical 
growth work, empirical studies of convergence are often focused on whether long-run per 
capita output depends on initial stocks of human and physical capital.  
Economic interest in convergence stems from the question of whether certain 
initial conditions lead to persistent differences in per capita output between countries (or 
other economic units).  One can thus use (20) to define convergence between two 
economies.  Let   denote a metric for computing the distance between probability 
measures.
20  Then countries i and j exhibit convergence if  
 
  ( ) ( ) ,, 0 , , 0 lim log log 0 ti t i j t j yy µρ µρ →∞ − =  (21) 
 
Growth economists are generally interested in average income levels; eq. (21) implies 
that countries i and j exhibit convergence in average income levels in the sense that 
 
  ( ) ,, i , 0 , 0 lim log log , 0. ti t j t j Ey y ρρ →∞ − =  (22) 
 
To the extent one is interested in whether countries exhibit common steady-state growth 
rates, one can modify (22) to require that the limiting expected difference between 
 and   is bounded.  One way of doing this is due to Pesaran (2004a) and is 
discussed below. 
, log it y , log jt y
These notions of convergence can be relaxed. Bernard and Durlauf (1996) suggest 
a form of partial convergence that relates to whether contemporaneous income 
differences are expected to diminish.  If  , their definition amounts to 
asking whether 
,0 ,0 log log i y > j y
 
  () , . ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 log log , log log it jt i j i j Ey y y y ρρ −< −  (23) 
                                                 
20There is no unique or single generally agreed upon metric for measuring deviations 
between probability measures.   
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  A number of modifications of these definitions have been proposed.  Hall, 
Robertson, and Wickens (1997) suggest appending a requirement that the variance of 
output differences diminish to 0 over time, i.e.  
 
  ( ) ( )
2
, , ,0 ,0 lim log log , 0 ti t j t i j Ey y ρρ →∞ − =  (24) 
 
so that convergence requires output for a pair of countries to behave similarly in the long-
run.  In our view, this is an excessively strong requirement since it does not allow one to 
regard the output series as stochastic in the long-run.  Eq. (24) would imply that 
convergence does not occur if countries are perpetually subjected to distinct business 
cycle shocks.  However, Hall, Robertson and Wickens (1997) do identify a weakness of 
definition (22), namely the failure to control for long-run deviations whose current 
direction is not predictable. To see this, suppose that  , log log it jt y , y −  is a random walk 
with current value 0. In this case, definition (22) would be fulfilled, although output 
deviations between countries i and  j will become arbitrarily large at some future date. 
  In recent work, Pesaran (2004a) has proposed a convergence definition that 
focuses specifically on the likelihood of large long-run deviations. Specifically, Pesaran 
defines convergence as  
 
  ( ) ( )
2 2
, , ,0 ,0 lim Prob log log , ti t j t i j yy C ρ ρ ⇒∞ π − <>  (25) 
 
where C denotes a deviation magnitude and π  is a tolerance probability. The idea of this 
definition is to focus convergence analysis on output deviations that are economically 
important and to allow for some flexibility with respect to the probability with which they 
occur.   
These convergence definitions do not allow for the distinction between the long -
run effects of initial conditions and the long-run effects of structural heterogeneity.  From 
the perspective of growth theory, this is a serious limitation.  For example, the 
distinctions between endogenous and neoclassical growth theories focus on the long-run 
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cross-country differences in preferences can have long-term effects under either theory.  
Hence, in empirical work, it is important to be able to distinguish between initial 
conditions  ,0 i ρ  and structural characteristics  ,0 i θ . Steady state effects of initial conditions 
imply the existence of convergence clubs whereas steady-state effects of structural 
characteristics do not.  In order to allow for this, one can modify (21) so that  
 
  () ( ) , ,0 ,0 , ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 lim log , log , 0 if  ti t i i j t j j i yy j µ ρθ µ ρθ θ θ →∞ −= =  (26) 
 
implies that countries i  and  j exhibit convergence. The notions of convergence in 
expected value (eq. (22)) may be modified in this way as well,  
 
  () ,, i , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 lim log log , , , 0 if  ti t j t i j j i Ey y , 0 j ρ θρθ θ θ →∞ −= =  (27) 
  
as can partial convergence in expected value (eq. (23)) and the other convergence 
concepts discussed above.   
In practice, the distinction between initial conditions and structural heterogeneity 
generally amounts to treating stocks of initial human and physical capital as the former 
and other variables as the latter. As such, both the Solow variables X and the control 
variables Z that appear in cross-country growth regression cf. (18) are usually interpreted 
as capturing structural heteogeneity.  This practice may be criticized if these variables are 
themselves endogenously determined by initial conditions, a point that will arise below. 
  The translation of these ideas into restrictions on growth regressions has led to a 
range of statistical definitions of convergence which we now examine.  Before doing so, 
we emphasize that none of these statistical definitions is necessarily of intrinsic interest 
per se; rather each concept is useful only to the extent it elucidates economically 
interesting notions of convergence such as eq. (20). The failure to distinguish between 
convergence as an economic concept and convergence as a statistical concept has led to a 
good deal of confusion in the growth literature. 
 
  41ii.β -convergence 
 
 Statistical  analyses  of  convergence have largely focused on the properties of β  in 
regressions of the form (18).  β -convergence, defined as  0 β <  is easy to evaluate 
because it relies on the properties of a linear regression coefficient.  It is also easy to 
interpret in the context of the Solow growth model, since the finding is consistent with 
the dynamics of the model. The economic intuition for this is simple. If two countries 
have common steady-state determinants and are converging to a common balanced 
growth path, the country that begins with a relatively low level of initial income per 
capita has a lower capital-labor ratio and hence a higher marginal product of capital; a 
given rate of investment then translates into relatively fast growth for the poorer country.  
In turn, β -convergence is commonly interpreted as evidence against endogenous growth 
models of the type studied by Romer and Lucas, since a number of these models 
specifically predict that high initial income countries will grow faster than low initial 
income countries, once differences in saving rates and population growth rates have been 
accounted for.  However, not all endogenous growth models imply an absence of β -
convergence and therefore caution must be exercised in drawing inferences about the 
nature of the growth process from the results of β -convergence tests.
21
There now exists a large body of studies of β -convergence, studies that are 
differentiated by country set, time period and choice of control variables.  When controls 
are absent,  0 β <  is known as unconditional β -convergence: conditional β -
convergence is said to hold if  0 β <  when controls are present.  Interest in unconditional 
β -convergence, while not predicted by the Solow growth model except when countries 
have common steady-state output levels, derives from interest in the hypothesis that all 
countries are converging to the same growth path, which is critical in understanding the 
                                                 
21Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Kelly (1992) are early examples of endogenous growth 
models compatible with β -convergence. Each model produces steady state growth 
without exogenous technical change yet each implies relatively fast growth for initially 
capital poor economies.  
  42extent to which current international inequality will persist into the far future.
22  
Typically, the unconditional β -convergence hypothesis is supported when applied to 
data from relatively homogeneous groups of economic units such as the states of the US, 
the OECD, or the regions of Europe; in contrast there is generally no correlation between 
initial income and growth for data taken from more heterogeneous groups such as a broad 
sample of countries of the world.
23    
Many cross-section studies employing the β -convergence approach find 
estimated convergence rates of about 2% per year.
24  This result is found in data from 
such diverse entities as the countries of the world (after the addition of conditioning 
variables), the OECD countries, the US states, the Swedish counties, the Japanese 
prefectures, the regions of Europe, the Canadian provinces, and the Australian states, 
among others; it is also found in data sets that range over time periods from the 1860's 
though the 1990's.
25  Some writings go so far as to give this value a status analogous to a 
universal constant in physics.
26  In fact, there is some variation in estimated convergence 
                                                 
22Formally,  β −convergence is an implication of (9) if  , log
E
i y ∞  is assumed constant 
across countries in addition to the assumption on   made in (15).  ,0 log i A
23See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, chapters 11 and 12) for application of β -
convergence tests to a variety of data sets.  Homogeneity can reflect self-selection as 
pointed out by DeLong (1988). He argues that Baumol’s (1986) conclusion that 
unconditional β -convergence occurred over 1870-1979 among a set of affluent (in 1979) 
countries is spurious for this reason.  
24Panel studies estimates of convergence rates have typically been substantially higher 
than cross-section estimates.  Examples where this is true for regressions that only control 
for the Solow variables include Islam (1995) and Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1998). The 
panel approach has possible interpretation problems which we discuss in Section VI. 
25For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) present results for US states and regions 
as well as European regions; Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) for US states, a group of 98 
countries and the OECD; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) for several large groups of 
countries; Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b) for US states, Japanese prefectures, European regions, 
and Canadian provinces; Cashin (1995) for Australian states and New Zealand; Cashin 
and Sahay (1996) for Indian regions; Persson (1997) for Swedish counties; and, Shioji 
(2001a) for Japanese prefectures and other geographic units.   
26An alternative view is expressed by Quah (1996b) who suggests that the 2% finding 
may be a statistical artifact that arises for reasons unrelated to convergence per se.  At the 
most primitive level, like any endogenous variable, the rate of convergence is determined 
by preferences, technology, and endowments.  Operationally, this means that the rate of 
convergence will depend on model parameters and exogenous variables.  For example, as 
  43rates, but the range is relatively small; estimates generally range between 1% and 3%, as 
noted by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
27
Despite the many confirmations of this result now in the literature, the claim of 
global conditional β -convergence remains controversial; here we review the primary 
problems with the β -convergence literature.   
 
a. robustness with respect to choice of control variables 
 
In moving from unconditional to conditional β -convergence, complexities arise 
in terms of the specification of steady-state income.  The reason for this is the 
dependence of the steady-state on Z .  Theory is not always a good guide in the choice of 
elements of Z; differences in formulations of equation (18) have led to a “growth 
regression industry” as researchers have added plausibly relevant variables to the baseline 
Solow specification.  As a result, one can identify variants of (18) where convergence 
appears to occur as   as well as variants where divergence occurs, i.e.  .   ˆ 0 β < ˆ 0 β >
We discuss issues of uncertainty in the specification of growth regressions below.  
Here we note here that one class of efforts to address model uncertainty has led to 
confirmatory evidence of conditional β -convergence. This approach assigns 
probabilities to alternative formulations of (18) and uses these probabilities to construct 
statements about β  that average across the different models. Doppelhofer, Miller, and 
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stated above, in the augmented Solow model studied by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1992), the relationship between the rate of convergence and the parameters of the model 
is  λ αφ δ =−− ++ .  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 111-113) discuss the 
relationship for the case of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with an isoelastic utility 
function and a Cobb-Douglas production function.  Given this dependence, the ubiquity 
of the estimated 2% rate of convergence, taken at face value, appears to suggest a 
remarkable uniformity of preferences, technologies, and endowments across the 
economic units studied. 
27Barro and Sala-i-Martin argue that this variation reflects unobserved heterogeneity in 
steady-state values with more variation  being associated with slower convergence.   
However, in as much as it is correlated with variables included in the regression 
equations, unobserved heterogeneity renders the parameter estimators inconsistent, which 
renders the estimated convergence parameter hard to interpret. 
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linear growth model is 1.00 with a posterior expected value for β of -0.013; this leads to 
a point estimate of a convergence rate of 1.3% per annum, which is somewhat lower than 
the 2% touted in the literature; Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001a) also find that the 
posterior probability that initial income is part of the linear growth model is 1.00, despite 
using a different set of potential models and different priors on model parameters.
28  We 
therefore conclude that the evidence for conditional β -convergence appears to be robust 
with respect to choice of controls.   
 
b. identification and nonlinearity: β −convergence and economic divergence 
 
A second problem with the β -convergence literature is an absence of attention to 
the relationship between β -convergence and economic convergence as defined by eq. 
(20) or variations based upon it.  Put differently, in the β -convergence literature there is 
a general failure to develop tests of the convergence hypothesis that discriminate between 
convergent economic models and a rich enough set of non-converging alternatives.  
While 0 β <  is an implication of the Solow growth model and so is an 
implication of the baseline convergent growth model in the literature, this does not mean 
that 0 β <  is inconsistent with economically interesting non-converging alternatives.   
One such example is the model of threshold externalities and growth developed by 
Azariadis and Drazen (1990).  In this model, there is a discontinuity in the aggregate 
production function for aggregate economies. This discontinuity means that the steady-
state behavior of a given economy depends on whether its initial capital stock is above or 
below this threshold; specifically, this model may exhibit two distinct steady states.  (Of 
course, there can be any number of such thresholds.)  An important feature of the 
Azariadis-Drazen model is that data generated by economies that are described by it can 
exhibit statistical convergence even when multiple steady states are present.   
To illustrate this, we follow an argument in Bernard and Durlauf (1996) based on 
a simplified growth regression.  Suppose that for every country in the sample, the Solow 
                                                 
28Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001a) do not report a posterior expected value for β . 
  45variables  i X  and additional controls  i Z  are identical.  Suppose as well that there is no 
technical change or population growth. Following the standard arguments for deriving a 
cross-country regression specification, the growth regression implied by the Azariadis-
Drazen assumption on the aggregate production function is  
 
  ( )
*




where   indicates the steady state with which country   is associated and   denotes 
output per capita in that steady state; all countries associated with the same steady state 
thus have the same   value. 




* log li y
The threshold externality model clearly does not exhibit economic convergence as 
defined above so long as there are at least two steady states.  Yet the data generated by a 
cross-section of countries exhibiting multiple steady states may exhibit statistical 
convergence. To see this, notice that for this stylized case, the cross-country growth 
regression may be written as 
 
  ,0 log ii ky γ βε = ++  (29) 
 
Since the data under study are generated by (28), this standard regression is misspecified. 
What happens when (29) is estimated when (28) is the data generating process?  Using 
population moments, the estimated convergence parameter  ols β  will equal 
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From the perspective of tests of the convergence hypothesis, the noteworthy feature of  













− , which is a function of the covariance between the initial and 
steady-state incomes of the countries in the sample.  It is easy to see that it is possible for 
ols β  to be negative even when the sample includes countries associated with different 
steady states. Roughly speaking, one would expect  0 ols β <  if low-income countries tend 
to initially be below their steady states whereas high-income countries tend to start above 
their steady states. While we do not claim this is necessarily the case empirically, the 
example does illustrate how statistical convergence (defined as  0 β < ) may be consistent 
with economic nonconvergence.  Interestingly, it is even possible for the estimated 
convergence parameter  ols β  to be smaller (and hence imply more rapid convergence) than 
the structural parameter β  in (28).  
Below, we review evidence of multiple steady states in the growth process.  At 
this stage, we would note two things.  First, some studies have produced evidence of 
multiple regimes in the sense that statistical models consistent with multiple steady states 
appear to better fit the cross-country data than the linear Solow model, e.g. Durlauf and 
Johnson (1995).  Second, other studies have produced evidence of parameter 
heterogeneity such that β  appears to depend nonlinearly on initial conditions so that it is 
equal to 0 for some countries; Liu and Stengos (1999) find precisely this when they reject 
the specification of constant β  for all countries in favor of a specification in which β  
depends on initial income.  These types of findings imply the compatibility of observed 
growth patterns with the existence of permanent income differences between economies 




A third criticism that is sometimes made of the empirical convergence literature is 
based on the failure to account for the endogeneity of the explanatory regressors in 
growth regressions.  One obvious reason why endogeneity may matter concerns the 
consistency of the regression estimates.  This concern has led some authors to propose 
instrumental variables approaches to estimating β .  Barro and Lee (1994) analyze 
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explanatory variables as instruments. Barro and Lee find that the use of instrumental 
variables has little effect on coefficient estimates.  Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) 
employ a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to analyze a panel variant of 
the standard cross-country growth regression; growth in the panel is measured in 5-year 
intervals for 1960-1985.  Their analysis produces estimates of β  on the order of 10%, 
which is much larger than the 2% typically found.  
Endogeneity raises a second identification issue with respect to the relationship 
between  β -convergence and economic convergence: this idea appears in Cohen (1996) 
and Goetz and Hu (1996).  Focusing on the Solow regressors, the value of β  can fail to 
illustrate how initial conditions affect expected future income differences if the 
population and saving rates are themselves functions of income.  Hence,  0 β ≥  may be 
compatible with at least partial economic convergence, if the physical and human capital 
savings rates depend, for example, on the level of income.  In contrast,  0 β <  may be 
compatible with economic divergence if the physical and human capital accumulation 
rates for rich and poor are diverging across time.  As such, this critique is probably best 
understood as a debate over what variables are the relevant initial conditions for 
evaluating (22) and/or (23).  Cohen (1996) argues that the conventional human capital 
accumulation equation, in which accumulation is proportional to per capita output, is 
misspecified, failing to account for feedbacks from the stock of human capital to the 
accumulation process.  This feedback means that poor countries with low initial stocks of 
human capital fail to accumulate human capital as quickly as richer ones.  Goetz and Hu 
(1996) directly focus on the feedback from income to human capital accumulation.  
  The implications of this form of endogeneity for empirical work on convergence 
are mixed.  Cohen (1996) concludes that a proper accounting for the dependence of 
human capital accumulation on initial capital stocks reconciles conditional 
β −convergence with unconditional β −divergence for a broad cross-section.  Goetz and 
Hu (1996), in contrast, find that estimates of the speed of convergence are increased if 
one accounts for the effect of income on human capital accumulation for counties in the 
US South.  This seems to be an area that warrants much more work. 
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d. measurement error 
 
As Abramovitz (1986), Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988), Romer (1990), and 
Temple (1998) point out, measurement errors will tend to bias regression tests towards 
results consistent with the hypothesis of β -convergence.  This occurs because, by 
construction,  , it γ  is measured with positive (negative) error when   is measured 
with negative (positive) error so there tends to be a negative correlation between the 
measured values of the two variables even if there is none between the true values.  To 
see this, we ignore the issue of control variables and consider the case where growth is 
described by 
,0 log i y
,0 log ii ky i γ βε =+ + where  i ε  is independent across observations. Suppose 
that log output is measured with error so that the researcher only observes 
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 is negatively correlated 
with  ,0 i ς  which induces a negative bias in the estimate  ˆ β .  In other words, the regression 
of observed growth rates on observed initial incomes will tend to produce an estimated 
coefficient that is consistent with the β -convergence hypothesis even if the hypothesis is 
not reflected in the actual behavior of growth rates across countries.   In practice, as 
Temple (1998) explains, the direction of the bias is made ambiguous by the possibilities 
that the   are serially dependent and that other right-hand-side (conditioning) variables 
are also measured with error.  The actual effect of measurement error on results then 
becomes an empirical matter to be investigated by individual researchers. 
, it e
  49  In studying the role of the level of human capital in determining the rate of 
growth, Romer (1990) estimates a growth equation that has among its explanatory 
variables the level of per capita income at the beginning of the sample period.  Consistent 
with the conditional β -convergence hypothesis, he finds a negative and significant 
coefficient on this variable when the equation is estimated by ordinary least squares.  
Wary of the possibility and effects of measurement error in initial income, as well as in 
the human capital variable – the literacy rate – Romer also estimates the equation using 
the number of radios per 1000 inhabitants and (the log of) per capita newsprint 
consumption as instruments for initial income and literacy with the result that the 
coefficients on both variables become insignificant “suggesting” that the OLS results are 
“attributable to measurement error” (p. 278).     
  Temple (1998) uses the measurement error diagnostics developed by Klepper and 
Leamer (1984), Klepper (1988), and classical method-of-moments adjustments, to 
investigate the effects of measurement error on the estimated rate of convergence in 
MRW's augmented Solow model.  He finds that allowing for the possibility of small 
amounts of unreliability in the measurement of initial income implies a lower bound on 
the estimated convergence rate just above zero – too low to elevate conditional 
convergence to the status of a stylized fact.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, pp. 472-3) 
use lagged values of state personal income as instruments for initial income to check for 
the possible effects of measurement error in their β -convergence tests for the US states.  
They find little change in the estimated convergence rates and conclude that measurement 
error is not an important determinant of their results.  Barro (1991) follows the same 
procedure for other data sets and reaches a similar conclusion about the unimportance of 
measurement error in his results.  
  Some authors have attempted to address the sources of measurement error. 
Dowrick and Quiggin (1997) is a notable example in this regard in their consideration of 
the role of price indices in affecting convergence tests.  Specifically, they examine the 
effect of constant price estimates of GDP on β -convergence calculations and find that 
when the prices used to construct these measures are based on prices in advanced 
economies, tendencies towards convergence are understated. 
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  There is a body of research that explores the effects of the approximations that are 
employed to produce the linear regression models used to evaluate β -convergence.  As 
outlined earlier, regression tests of the β -convergence hypothesis rely on a log-linear 
approximation to the law of motion in a one sector neoclassical growth model. In 
addition to the possibility that Taylor series approximations in the nonstochastic version 
of the model are inadequate, Binder and Pesaran (1999) show that the standard practice 
of adding a random term to the log-linearized solution of a nonstochastic growth model 
does not necessarily produce the same behavior as associated with the explicit solution of 
a stochastic model.  
Efforts to explore the limits of the linear approximation used in empirical growth 
studies have generally concluded that the approximation is reasonably accurate.  Romer 
(2001, p. 25 n. 18) claims that the approximation will be “quite reliable” in this context 
and Dowrick (2004) presents results showing that the approximation to the true transition 
dynamics is quite good in a Solow model with a single capital good and an elasticity of 
output with respect to capital of 23 .  This is larger than the typical physical capital share 
but it is not an unreasonable number for the sum of the shares of physical and human 
capital.  To test for nonlinearity, Barro (1991) adds the square of initial (1960) income to 
one of his regressions and finds a positive estimated coefficient implying that the rate of 
convergence declines as income rises and that it is positive only for incomes below 
$10800 – a figure that exceeds all of the 1960 income levels in his sample. However, the 
-ratio for the estimated coefficient on the square of initial income is just 1.4 which 
represents weak evidence against the adequacy of the approximation.   
t
How should one interpret such findings? At one level, these studies conclude that 
the approximation used to derive the equation used in cross-section convergence studies 
appears to be reasonably accurate.  It follows that the previously discussed nonlinearities 
in the growth process found by researchers investigating the possibility of multiple steady 
states do not reflect the inadequacy of the linear approximation used in most cross-
section studies.  Put differently, evidence of nonlinearity appears to reflect deeper factors 
than simple approximation error from the use of a first order Taylor series expansion. 
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iii. Distributional approaches to convergence 
 
  A second approach to convergence focuses on the behavior of the cross-section 
distribution of income in levels.  Unlike the β -convergnece approach, the focus of this 
literature has been less on the question of relative locations within the income 
distribution, i.e. whether one can expect currently poor countries to either equal or exceed 
currently affluent countries, but rather on the shape of the distribution as a whole. 
Questions of this type naturally arise in microeconomic analyses of income inequality, in 
which one may be concerned with whether the gap between rich and poor is diminishing, 
regardless of whether the relative positions of individuals are fixed over time. 
 
a. σ -convergence 
 
Much of the empirical literature on the cross-country income distribution has 
focused on the question of the evolution of the cross-section variance of  .  For a 
set of income levels let   denote the variance across   of  . 
, log it y
2
log , yt σ i , log it y σ -convergence is 
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This definition is designed, like β -convergence, to formalize the idea that contemporary 
income differences are transitory, but does so by asking whether the dispersion of these 
differences will decline across time. 
  Recent work has attempted to identify regression specifications from which one 
can infer σ -convergence.  Friedman (1992) and Cannon and Duck (2000) argue that it is 
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requires that  .  The regression coefficient in (33) may be written as 
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, σ 0 π < , then it must be the case that (32) holds. 
Hence a test that accepts null hypothesis that  0 π <  by implication accepts the null 
hypothesis of  σ -convergence.  But even this type of test has some difficulties.  As 
pointed out by Bliss (1999,2000), it is difficult to interpret tests of σ -convergence since 
these tests presume that the data generating process is not invariant; an evolving 
distribution for the data makes it difficult to think about test distributions under a null.  
Additional issues arise when unit roots are present.   
One limitation to this approach is that it is not clear how one can formulate a 
sensible notion of conditional σ -convergence.  A particular problem in this regard is that 
one would not want to control for initial income in forming residuals, which would 
render the concept uninteresting as it could be generated by nothing more than time-
dependent heteroskedasticity in the residuals.  On the other hand, omitting income would 
render the interpretation of the projection residuals problematic since initial income is 
almost certain to be correlated with the variables that have been included when the 
residuals are formed.  An economically interesting formulation of conditional σ -
convergence would be a useful contribution. 
 
b. evolution of the world income distribution 
 
Work on σ -convergence has helped stimulate the more general study of the 
evolution of the world income distribution.  This work involves examining the cross-
  53section distribution of country incomes at two or more points in time in order to identify 
how this cross-section distribution has changed. Of particular interest in such studies is 
the presence or emergence of multiple modes in the distribution.  Bianchi (1997) uses 
nonparametric methods to estimate the shape of the cross-country income distribution 
and to test for multiple modes in the estimated density.  He finds evidence of two modes 
in densities estimated for 1970, 1980, and 1989.  Moreover, he finds a tendency for the 
modes to become more pronounced and to move further apart over time.  This evidence 
supports the ideas of a vanishing middle as the distribution becomes increasingly 
polarized into “rich” and “poor” and of a growing disparity between those two groups.  
While such polarization might be desirable, were it the case that middle income 
economies were becoming high income ones, Bianchi’s evidence suggests that much of 
this movement represents a transition from middle income to poor.  Further, by “cutting” 
each of the estimated densities at the anti-mode between the two modes, Bianchi is able 
to measure mobility within the distribution by counting the crossings of the cut points.  
These crossings represent countries moving from one basin of attraction to the other.  Just 
3 of the possible 238 crossings are observed.
29  The implication is that there is very little 
mobility within the cross-country income distribution.  The 20 or so countries in the 
“rich” basin of attraction in 1970 are still there in 1989 and similarly for the 100 or so 
countries starting in the “poor” basin.  
Paap and van Dijk (1998) model the cross-country distribution of per capita 
income as the mixture of a Weibull and a truncated normal density.  The Weibull portion 
captures the left-hand mode and right skewness in the data while the truncated normal 
portion captures the right-hand mode.  This combination is selected after testing the 
goodness of fit of various combinations of the normal density (truncated at zero), gamma, 
log normal and Weibull distributions; the data set that is employed measures levels of 
real GDP per capita for 120 countries for the time period 1960 and 1989.  They find a 
bimodal fitted density in each year with “poor” and “rich” components corresponding to 
the Weibull and truncated normal densities respectively.  The computed means of these 
                                                 
29Bianchi’s data contains 119 countries observed at 3 distinct years, so each country is 
capable of making two crossings.  The only crossings observed are 1) Trinidad and 
Tobago, which moves down between 1980 and 1989, 2) Venezuela, which moves down 
between 1970 and 1980, and 3) Hong Kong, which moves up between 1970 and 1980. 
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in the mixture jumps in the mid-1970's from about .72 to about .82 implying that the 
mean gap between rich and poor countries grew and the poor increased in number.  The 
attention to levels rather than log levels makes it hard to evaluate the welfare significance 
of this increased dispersion.  
  Recently, analyses of the distributions of income and growth have focused on 
identifying differences in these distributions across time and across subsets of countries. 
Anderson (2003) studies changes in the world income distribution by using 
nonparametric density function estimates combined with stochastic dominance arguments 
to compare the distributions at different points in time.
30  These methods allow him to 
construct measures of polarization of the income distribution; polarization is essentially 
characterized by shifts in probability density mass that increase disparities between 
relatively rich and relatively poor economies. Anderson finds that between 1970 and 
1995 polarization between rich and poor countries increased throughout the time period.  
Maasoumi, Racine, and Stengos (2003) analyze the evolution of the cross-country 
distributions of realized, predicted, and residual growth rates; fitted growth rates and 
residuals are formed from nonparametric growth regressions using the Solow variables.  
These authors find that the distributions of growth rates for OECD and non-OECD 
countries are persistently different between 1965 and 1995, with the OECD distribution’s 
variance reducing over time whereas the non-OECD distribution appears to be becoming 
less concentrated.  One finds the same results for fitted growth rates; in contrast it is 
difficult to identify dimensions along which the distributions of OECD and non-OECD 
growth rate residuals differ. The major methodological difference between these papers 
relative to Paap and van Dijk (1998) is that these analyses do not rely on a mixture 
specification.    
Distributional approaches suggest the utility of convergence measures that are 
based on the complete properties of probability measures characterizing output for 
different economies.  Letting  ( ) i x µ  and  () j x µ  denote the probability density functions 
                                                 
30Anderson (2004) discusses issues related to the interpretation and econometric 
implementation of these methods.  
  55for the variable of interest in economies i and   respectively, Anderson and Ge (2004) 




  () () ( ) , min , ij i j CI x x dx µµ
∞
−∞ =∫  (35) 
   
This statistic is bounded between 0 and 1; a value of zero means that the density 
functions never assign positive probability to any common intervals or values of   
whereas a value of 1 means that the densities coincide on all positive probability intervals 
or values. Anderson and Ge (2004) refer to the case 
x
, 1 ij CI =  as complete convergence.  
This statistic differs from the convergence measure described by eq. (21) as it evaluates 
differences between current densities and not asymptotic ones, but they are clearly 
closely related. 
  In our view, this approach will likely prove useful in a range of contexts. In 
particular, if one is interested in comparing income distributions between two economies, 
the Anderson-Ge statistic is a natural metric.  In growth contexts, it is less clear whether 
the higher moments that distinguish (22) from (35) are of major concern, at least in the 
context of current debates.  
 
d. distribution dynamics 
 
In a series of papers, Quah (1993a,b,1996a,b,c,1997) has persuasively criticized 
standard regression approaches to studying convergence issues for being unable to shed 
light on important issues of mobility, stratification, and polarization in the world income 
distribution.  Rather than studying the average behavior of a representative country, Quah 
proposes a schema, which he calls “distribution dynamics”, for studying the evolution of 
the entire cross-country income distribution.  One way of implementing this approach is 
to assume that the process describing the evolution of the distribution is time-invariant 
and first-order Markov.  Discretizing the state space then permits representation of cross-
country income distribution as a probability mass function,  t λ , with an associated 
transition matrix, M.  Each row of M is a probability mass function describing the 
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in the state corresponding to that row.  The evolution of the income distribution can then 
be described by 1 t M t λ λ − ′ =  so that  ()
s
ts t M λ λ + ′ =  is the s-step-ahead probability mass 
function and  M λ λ ∞ ′ = ∞
                                                
 defines the long-run (ergodic) mass function (if it exists).  Quah 
(1993b, 1996b) takes this approach and finds that the estimated M implies a bimodal 
(“twin-peaked”) ergodic mass function indicating a tendency towards polarization in the 
evolution of the world income distribution.
31   
  Updating Quah's analysis using more recent data, Kremer, Onatski, and Stock 
(2001) also find evidence of twin-peaks in the long-run distribution of per capita 
incomes.  However, they find the rich (right-hand) peak to be much larger than the poor 
(left-hand) peak unlike Quah, who found similarly sized peaks at both ends of the 
distribution.  Kremer, Onatski, and Stock's point estimates imply that most countries will 
ultimately move to the rich state although, during the transition period, which could last 
hundreds of years, polarization in the income distribution may worsen.  They are also 
unable to reject the hypothesis that there is a single right-hand peak in the long-run 
distribution.  Quah (2001) responds to these claims by arguing that the imprecision in the 
estimates of the ergodic distributions is such that it is not possible to reject a wide range 
of null hypotheses including, by construction, that of twin-peakedness.  Importantly, as 
Quah notes his work and that of others, including Kremer, Onatski, and Stock, is 
consistent with the view that the global poor are many in number and likely to be so for a 
very long time. 
In addition, as Quah (1996c,1997,2001) and Bulli (2001) discuss, the process of 
discretizing the state space of a continuous variable is necessarily arbitrary and can alter 
the probabilistic properties of the data.  Especially relevant here is the fact that the shape 
of the ergodic distribution can be altered by changing the discretization scheme.  Reichlin 
(1999) demonstrates that the dynamic behavior inferred from the analysis of Markov 
transition probabilities, and the apparent long-run implications of that behavior, are 
 
31As Quah (1993b, footnote 4) explains, the estimated ergodic distributions “… should 
not be read as forecasts of what will happen in the future…” (his emphasis).  Rather, he 
continues, they “… should be interpreted simply as characterizations of tendencies in the 
post-War history that actually realized.” 
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ergodic distribution can be sensitive to small changes in the transition probabilities.  Bulli 
(2001) addresses this critique and shows how to discretize the state space in a way that 
preserves the probabilistic properties of the data.  Applying her method to cross-country 
income data she finds an estimated ergodic distribution quite different from that found by 
arbitrary discretization as well as being an accurate approximation to the distribution 
computed using a continuous state space method.    
An alternative formulation of distribution dynamics that avoids discretization 
problems is proposed by Quah (1996c,1997) and models the cross-country income 
distribution at time t with the density function,  ( ) t f x .  If the process describing the 
evolution of the distribution is again assumed to be time-invariant and first-order 
Markov, then density at time t τ + ,  0 τ > , will be  () () ()
0 tt f xg x z f z ττ
∞
+ =∫ d z  where 
( gx z τ )  is the τ -period-ahead density of x conditional on z.   The function  ( gx z τ )   is 
the continuous analog of the transition matrix M and, assuming it exists, the ergodic 
(long-run) density function,  ( ) f x ∞ , implied by  ( ) gx z τ  is the solution to 
() () ()
0 f xg x z f z τ
∞
∞ =∫ d z ∞ .  Using nonparametric methods, Quah (1996c,1997) 
estimates various  ( gx z τ )  and finds strong evidence of twin-peakedness in the cross-
country income distribution.  The estimated ergodic densities presented by Bulli (2001) 
and Johnson (2004) support Quah’s conclusions. 
Azariadis and Stachurski (2003) derive the form of the  ( ) gx z τ  implied by a 
stochastic version of the model in Azariadis and Drazen (1990).  Estimation of the 
model’s parameters enables them to compute forward projections of the sequence of 
cross-country income distributions, and ultimately the ergodic distribution, implied by the 
model.   Consistent with the work of Quah (1996c, 1997) they find bimodality to be a 
pervasive feature of the sequence of distributions for about 100 years.  Eventually, 
however, all countries transition to the rich mode so the ergodic distribution is unimodal 
as found by Kremer, Onatski, and Stock (2001).   As Quah (2001) notes, there is “as yet” 
no theory of inference for this case so reconciliation of this result with the view that the 
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while Quah (2001) observes that such a theory is an “obvious next step,” he suggests that 
we may be close to the limits of what can be reasonably inferred from the cross-country 
income data. 
Johnson (2000) offers an interpretation of  ( ) gx z τ  which draws an analogy 
between the median of the conditional distribution and the law of motion of a non-





gz x d z τ = ∫  so that a country with income of  ( ) mx at time t has an equal chance 
of having a higher or lower income at time t τ + .  Consider a point  0 x  such that 
 and suppose that, in some neighborhood of  () 0 0 x x m = 0 x ,  ( ) mx x >  for  0 x x <  and 
 for  () mx x < 0 x x >  implying  ( ) Pr .5 tt xx τ + >>  for  0 x x <  and   for  () Pr .5 tt xx τ + <>
0 x x >  so that, in this neighborhood, countries with incomes different from  0 x  tend to 
move toward  0 x .  In the long run we may expect to find many countries in the vicinity of 
0 x  creating the tendency for a mode in the ergodic density,  ( ) f x ∞ , at  0 x .  Similarly, in a 
non-stochastic one-variable dynamic system with the law of motion  () tt x mx τ + = , the 
condition on the phase diagram for the local stability of a steady-state at  0 x  is that the 
graph of   intersects the 45° line from above at  () mx 0 x .   In both cases,  0 x  is a point of 
accumulation in the sense that the long-run probability of finding countries in the vicinity 
of  0 x  will tend to be high relative to that elsewhere.   Conversely, just as steady states are 
unstable in the non-stochastic case when  ( ) mx crosses the 45° line from below, 
analogous points in the stochastic case tend to produce antimodes in the ergodic density. 
While Quah's estimated  ( ) gx z τ  indicate a strong tendency towards polarization 
in the world income distribution, they do not reveal much about intra-distribution 
mobility.  Bimodality is arguably of less concern in a normative sense if there is 
movement between the two modes than it is if there is none.  Quah (1996c) studies the 
mobility within the distribution by computing, (through stochastic simulation) the mean 
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of the distribution.  He finds an expected time of 201 years for such a miracle to occur.  
  Quah’s methods have subsequently been applied to a range of contexts. Andres 
and Lamo (1995) apply these methods to the OECD, Lamo (2000) to the regions of 
Spain, Johnson (2000) to US states, Bandyopadhyay (2002) to the Indian states, and 
Andrade, Laurini, Madalozzo, and Valls Pereira (2004) to Brazilian municipalities.   
These methods have also been extended to broader notions of distributional dynamics.  
Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2004) develop an analysis of the joint distribution of income levels 
and growth rates; their findings are compatible with the existence of multiple equilibria in 
the sense that countries may become trapped in the lower part of the income distribution. 
 
e. relationship between distributional convergence and the persistence of initial 
conditions 
 
Distributional methods have proven important in establishing stylized facts 
concerning the world income distribution.  At the same time, there has been relatively 
little formal effort to explore the implications of findings such as twin peaks for the 
empirical salience of alternative growth theories.  Some potential implications of 
distributional dynamics for evaluating theories are suggested by Quah (1996c), who finds 
that conditioning on measures of physical and human capital accumulation similar to 
those used by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and a dummy variable for the African 
continent has little effect on the dynamics of the cross-country income distribution.  The 
polarization and immobility features are similar in both cases and conditioning increases 
the expected time for a growth miracle to 760 years.
32  These results suggest that the 
heterogeneity revealed by the distributional approaches is, at least in part, due to the 
existence of convergence clubs. 
                                                 
32Other efforts to find determinants of polarization and immobility have produced mixed 
results.  For the OECD countries, Andres and Lamo (1995) condition on the steady state 
implied by the Solow model and find little decrease in the tendency to polarization unless 
country specific effects are permitted. Lamo (2000) finds only a small increase in 
mobility for Spanish regions after conditioning on interregional migration flows.   
Bandyopadhyay (2002) shows that infrastructure spending and education measures 
appear to contribute to polarization between rich and poor states of India.  
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cross-country income distribution in the context of economic convergence in the sense of 
(22).  To see why this is so, it is useful to focus on the absence of a clear relationship 
between  β -convergence, which measures the relative growth of rich versus poor 
countries and σ -convegence, which focuses explicitly on the distribution of countries.   
These two convergence notions do not have any necessary implications for one another, 
i.e. one may hold when the other does not. For our purposes, what is important is that σ -
convergence is not an implication of β -convergence and so does not speak directly to the 
question of the transience of contemporary income differences.  The erroneous assertion 
that  β -convergence implies σ -convergence is known as Galton’s fallacy and was 
introduced into the modern economic growth context by Friedman (1992) and Quah 
(1993a).  
To understand the fallacy, suppose that log per capita output in each of N 
countries obeys the AR(1) process 
 




where 0 ς <<  and the random variables  , it ε  are i.i.d across countries and time.  For this 
model, each country will, by definition (22), exhibit convergence as any 
contemporaneous difference in output between two countries will disappear over time.  
Further, it is easy to see, using  ( )
1
, log log ii t T Ty y γ
−
+ =− , i t , that the regression of growth 
on a constant and initial income will exhibit β -convergence. This is immediate when one 
considers growth between t and  1 t +  which means that growth obeys  
 
  ( ) , 1l o g it it it y , 1 , γ ας ε − = +− + (37) 
 
 where  1 0 ς −< by assumption.  In this model, by construction, the unconditional 
population variance of log output is constant because the reduction in cross-section 
variance associated with the tendency of high-income countries to grow more slowly than 
low-income countries is offset by the presence of the random shocks  , it ε .  This indicates 
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conditions; rather σ -convergence captures the evolution of the cross-section income 
distribution towards an invariant measure.  This suggests that an important next step in 
the distributional approach to convergence is the development of tools which will allow 
distribution methods to more directly adjudicate substantive growth questions as they 
relate to the persistence of initial conditions. 
 
iv. time series approaches to convergence 
 
 
A final approach to convergence is based on time series methods.  This approach 
is largely statistical in nature, which allows various hypotheses about convergence to be 
precisely defined, and thereby reveals appropriate strategies for formal testing. A 
disadvantage of the approach is that it is not explicitly tied to particular growth theories.  
Bernard and Durlauf (1995,1996), Evans (1998) and Hobijn and Franses (2000) provide a 
systematic framework for time series convergence tests. 
Following Bernard and Durlauf (1995), a set of countries I is said to exhibit 
convergence if 
 
  ( ) ,, lim Proj log log 0 , Ti t T j t T t yy F i j →∞ + + I − =∀ ∈  (38) 
 
where  ( Proj ab )
, y
 denotes the projection of a on b and   denotes some information set; 
operationally, this information set will typically contain various functions of time and 
current and lagged values of   and  .  Relative to our previous discussion, 
this definition represents a form of unconditional convergence that is closely related to 
(22).  One can modify the definition to apply to the residual of per capita income after it 
has been projected on control variables such as savings rates in order to produce a 
definition of conditional convergence, but this has apparently not been done in the 
empirical literature. 
t F
, log it y , log jt y
  In evaluating (38), researchers have generally focused on whether deterministic or 
stochastic trends are present in  , log log it jt y − ; the presence of such trends immediately 
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implemented using unit root tests.  One reason for this focus is that the presence of unit 
roots in   allows for an extreme and therefore particularly interesting form 
of divergence between economies since a unit root implies that the difference 
 will, with probability 1, become arbitrarily large at some point in the 
future.  




, log log it jt y −
The use of unit root and related time series tests has important implications for the 
sorts of countries that may be tested.  Time series tests presuppose that   may be 
thought of as generated by an invariant process in either levels or first differences, i.e., 
either levels or first differences may be modeled as the sum of deterministic terms plus a 
Wold representation for innovations.  Such an assumption has significant economic 
content.  As argued by Bernard and Durlauf (1996) countries that start far from their 
invariant distributions and are converging towards them, as occurs for countries that are 
in transition to the steady-state in the Solow-Swan model, will be associated with 
 series that do not fulfill this requirement. Hence, tests of (38) can 
produce erroneous results if applied to such economies.  To see this intuitively, suppose 
that for country i, 
, it y
, log log it jt y −
, log log it it yy + =  for all t, so that country has converged to a constant 
steady-state. Suppose that country j has the same steady-state as country i and is 
monotonically converging to this state so that   for all observations. Then 
 for all t in the sample; which means that the series has a nonzero 
mean and tests that fail to account for the fact that the density of   is 
changing across time can easily give erroneous inferences. For example one may use a 
test and conclude   possesses a nonzero mean and erroneously interpret 
this as evidence against convergence, when the fact that the process does not have a time-
invariant mean is ignored.  This argument suggests that time series convergence tests are 
really only appropriate for advanced economies that may plausibly be thought of as 
characterized by invariant distributions.   
, log log it jt y > , y
>
, y
,, log log 0 it jt yy −
,, log log it jt yy −
, log log it jt y −
Generally, the first generation of these tests rejected convergence for countries as 
well as other economic units.  For example, Bernard and Durlauf (1995), studying 15 
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Maddison (1982,1989), find little evidence that convergence is occurring; Hobijn and 
Franses (2000) similarly find little evidence of convergence across 112 countries taken 
from the Penn World Table for the period 1960-1989.  The findings of nonconvergence 
in output levels are echoed in recent work by Pesaran (2004a) who employs convergence 
definitions that explicitly focus on the probability of large deviations, i.e. eq. (25). He 
finds little evidence of output level convergence using either the Maddison or Penn 
World Table data.   
  Relatively little explicit attention has been paid to the question of systematically 
identifying convergence clubs using time series methods. One exception is Hobijn and 
Franses (2000) who employ a clustering algorithm to identify groups of converging 
countries.
33  Their algorithm finds many small clusters in their sample of 112 countries – 
depending on the particular rule used to determine cluster membership, they find 42 or 63 
clusters with most containing just two or three countries.  Hobijin and Frances view these 
clusters as convergence clubs but it is not clear that they represent groups of countries in 
distinct basins of attraction of the growth process.  Absent controls for structural 
characteristics, these groupings could simply reflect the pattern of differences in those 
characteristics rather than differences in long-run outcomes due to differences in initial 
conditions.  Moreover, the Bernard and Durlauf (1996) argument about the substantive 
economic assumptions that underlie time series methods for studying convergence seems 
applicable here. Given the breadth of the sample used by Hobijn and Franses, it is 
unlikely that it contains only data generated by countries whose behavior is near their 
respective steady-states; such an assumption is much more plausible for restricted 
samples such as the OECD countries.  The clusters they find could thus reflect, in many 
cases at least, transition dynamics rather than convergence clubs. An important extension 
of this work would be the exploration of how one can distinguish convergence clubs from 
                                                 
33Corrado, Martin, and Weeks (2004) extend this approach to allow for time variation in 
clusters.  They conclude that there is substantial evidence of club convergence as opposed 
to overall convergence for European regions. A nice feature of their analysis is the effort 
to interpret the clubs that are identified statistically with alternative economic theories, 
and conclude that geographic proximity and demographic similarity correlate with their 
observed clusters. 
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transition dynamics. 
A number of studies of time series convergence have criticized these claims of 
nonconvergence; these criticisms are based upon inferential issues that have arisen in the 
general unit roots literature. One of these issues concerns the validity of unit root tests in 
the presence of structural breaks in  , log log it jt y , y − ; as argued initially by Perron (1989), 
the failure to allow for structural breaks when testing for unit roots can lead to spurious 
evidence in support of the null hypothesis that a unit root is present.  An initial analysis of 
this type in cross-country contexts is Greasley and Oxley (1997) who, imposing breaks 
exogenously, find convergence for Denmark and Sweden whereas the sort of test 
employed by Bernard and Durlauf (1995) does not. The role of breaks in time series 
convergence tests is systematically studied in Li and Papell (1999).  An important feature 
of their analysis is that Li and Papell avoid exogenous imposition of trend breaks and in 
fact find that the dates of these breaks exhibit some heterogeneity, although many of 
them cluster around World War II.  Li and Papell find that the evidence for OECD 
convergence is more mixed than did Bernard and Durlauf (1995) in the sense that 
allowing for trend breaks reduces the number of country pairs that fail to exhibit 
convergence. Related findings are due to Carlino and Mills (1993) who study US regions 
and reject convergence except under specifications that allow for a trend break in 1946.  
These conclusions are shown by Loewy and Papell (1996) to hold even if one allows 
potential trend breaks to be endogenously determined by the data. 
While the analysis of trend breaks and convergence tests is valuable because of its 
implications about the time series structure of output differences between countries, 
studies of this type suffer from some interpretation problems.  The presence of the regime 
break is presumably suggestive of an absence of convergence in the sense of (22) or (38), 
since it implies that there is some component of  , log log it jt y , y −  that will not disappear 
over a sufficiently long time horizon.  The time series definition of convergence is 
violated by any long-term predictability in output differences.  Hence, claims by authors 
that allowing for data breaks produces evidence of convergence begs the question of what 
is meant by convergence. That being said, the sort of violation of (22) or (38) implied by 
a trend break is different from the type implied by a unit root.  In particular, a break 
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countries is always bounded, unlike the unit root case. 
A distinct line of criticism of time series convergence tests is due to Michelacci 
and Zaffaroni (2000) who argue that convergence tests based on the presence of unit 
roots may perform badly when the true processes exhibit long memory.  Let   
denote the moving average representation for 
(),. ij t Lu γ
, log log it jt y , y − . Suppose that the  ’th 
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In this case, shocks die out at a hyperbolic rather than geometric rate, which is one 
definition of long memory in a time series process.  Michelacci and Zaffaroni (2000) 
show that if output deviations exhibit long memory, one can reconcile the claim of β -
convergence with time series evidence of divergence, i.e. the failure of various tests to 
reject the presence of a unit root in per capita output deviations.  This is a potentially 
important reconciliation of these two distinct testing strategies.  
That being said, the plausibility of a long memory characterization has yet to be 
established in the economics literature. One problem is that there is an absence of a body 
of economic theory that predicts the presence of long memory.
34 The existing theoretical 
justifications of long memory processes derive from aggregation arguments originating 
with Granger (1980); the conditions under which aggregation produces long memory do 
not have any particular empirical justification.  In addition, there are questions 
concerning the ability of conventional statistical methods to allow one to distinguish 
between long memory models and various alternatives.  Diebold and Inoue (2001) 
indicate how long memory may be spuriously inferred for series subject to regime shifts, 
so the strength of evidence of long memory cited by Michelacci and Zaffaroni (2000) 
                                                 
34There are at least two reasons why unit roots stem naturally from exisiting economic 
theories.  First, technology shocks are generally modeled as permanent.  Second, Euler 
equations often produce unit root or near unit root like conditions.  The random walk 
theory of stock prices is one example of this, in which risk neutral agents produce 
unpredictability of stock price changes as an equilibrium.  
  66may be questioned.  Nevertheless, the Michelacci-Zaffaroni argument is important, not 
least because it focuses attention on the role in growth empirics of size and power issues 
that arise in all unit root contexts.  
Time series approaches to convergence are melded with analysis related to σ -
convergence in Evans (1996) who considers the cross-section variance of growth rates at 
time t, 
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log  and  is the cardinality of  N I .  Evans observes that 
2
t σ  may 
be represented as a unit root process with a quadratic time trend when there is no 
cointegration among the series  . This leads Evans to suggest a time-series test of 
convergence based on unit root tests applied to 
t i y , log
2
t σ .  Employing this test, Evans 
concludes that there is convergence to a common trend among 13 industrial countries.  
One interpretation problem with this analysis is that it allows different countries to 
possess different deterministic trends in per capita output albeit with the same trend 
growth rate.  Such differences are obviously germane with respect to convergence as an 
economic concept being consistent, for example, with the club and conditional 
convergence hypotheses but not with the unconditional convergence hypothesis.   Evans 
(1997) provides a time series approach to estimating rates of convergence.  He shows that 
OLS applied to equation (18) yields a consistent estimator of β , and hence the rate of 
convergence, only if (i) each  t t i y y log log , −  obeys an AR(1) process having the same 
AR(1) parameter lying strictly between 0 and 1; and, (ii) the control variables,   and 
, account for all cross-country heterogeneity.  He argues that neither condition is likely 
to hold and offers an alternative method of measuring the rate of convergence based on 
the supposition that 
i X
i Z
t t i y y log log , −  follows an AR(q) process with lag polynomial 
.  Again, this specification allows countries to follow different parallel balanced  () L Λ
  67growth paths and Evans defines the rate of convergence for economy i as the rate at 
which   “is expected to revert toward its balanced growth path far in the future.”   
He shows that, given that it is a real, distinct, positive fraction, the dominant root of the 
polynomial 
, log it y
( )
1 − Λ z z
q  equals one minus this rate.  Evans computes estimates of the 
convergence rates and their 90% confidence intervals for a sample of 48 countries over 
the period 1950-90 and for the contiguous US states over the period 1929-91.  For the 
states, about a third of the point estimates are negative and about two-thirds of the 
confidence intervals contain zero, while for the countries, about half of the point 
estimates are negative and all but two of the confidence intervals contain zero.  However, 
in spite of these positive estimated average convergence rates of 15.5% and 5.9% 
respectively, Evans' analysis fails to yield persuasive evidence in favor of the conditional 
convergence hypothesis since, in most cases, the hypothesis of a convergence rate of zero 
cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance.   
Later sections of the chapter will discuss how growth researchers can draw on 
time series data in other ways. One popular route has been to use panel data, with 
repeated observations on each country or region. Another method is to use techniques 
broadly similar to those of event studies in empirical finance, and trace out the 
consequences of specific events, such as major political or economic reforms. We will 
consider these approaches in Section VI.iii below. 
 
v. sources of convergence or divergence 
 
  Abramowitz (1986), Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988) and many others, both 
before and since, view convergence as the process of follower countries “catching up” to 
leader countries by adopting their technologies.  Some more recent contributors, such as 
Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), adopt the view that convergence is 
driven by diminishing returns to factors of production.
35   In the neoclassical model, if 
                                                 
35 When an economy is below its steady-state value of capital per efficiency unit of labor, 
the marginal product of capital is relatively high (and is higher than in the steady state).  
As a result, a given investment rate translates into relatively high output growth.  Capital 
grows as well but, because of diminishing returns, the capital-output ratio rises and the 
marginal product of capital declines, causing the growth of output and capital to slow.  
  68each country has access to the same aggregate production function the steady-state is 
independent of an economy's initial capital and labor stocks and hence initial income.  In 
this model, long-run differences in output reflect differences in the determinants of 
accumulation, not differences in the technology used to combine inputs to produce 
output.  Mankiw (1995, p. 301), for example, argues that for “understanding international 
experience, the best assumption may be that all countries have access to the same pool of 
knowledge, but differ by the degree to which they take advantage of this knowledge by 
investing in physical and human capital.”  Even if one relaxes the assumption that 
countries have access to the same production function, convergence in growth rates can 
still occur so long as each country’s production function is concave in capital per 
efficiency unit of labor and each country experiences the same rate of labor-augmenting 
technical change.    
  Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997a) challenge this “neoclassical revival” with 
results suggesting that differences in factor accumulation are, at best, no more important 
than differences in productivity in explaining the cross-country distribution of output per 
capita.  They find that only about half of the cross-country variation in the 1985 level of 
output per worker is due to variation in human and physical capital inputs while a mere 
10% or so of the variation in growth rates from 1960 to 1985 reflects differences in the 
growth of these inputs.  The differences between the results of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1992) and the findings of Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997a) in their reexamination of 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil have two principal origins.  First, citing concerns about the 
endogeneity of the input quantities, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997a) eschew 
estimation of the capital shares and choose to impute parameters based on the results of 
other studies.  Second, they modify Mankiw, Romer and Weil's measure of human capital 
accumulation by supplementing secondary school enrollment rates using data on primary 
enrollment.  This yields a measure of human capital accumulation with less cross-country 
variation than that used by Mankiw, Romer and Weil.  This one modification decreases 
                                                                                                                                                 
Eventually, the economy converges to a steady state in which capital and output grow at 
the same rate and the marginal product of capital is sustained at a constant level by labor-
augmenting technical progress.  Dowrick and Rogers (2002) find that both diminishing 
returns and technology transfer are important contributors to the convergence process.  
See also Bernard and Jones (1996) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997).  
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to variation in the 1985 level of output per worker to 40% from the 78% found by 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil.  Prescott (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999) confirm the view 
that differences in inputs are unable to explain observed differences in output and 
Easterly and Levine (2001, p. 177) state that “[t]he 'residual' (total factor productivity, 
TFP) rather than factor accumulation accounts for most of the income and growth 
differences across countries.”  
Unlike many authors, who estimate TFP as a residual after assuming a common 
Cobb-Douglas production function, Henderson and Russell (2004) use a non-parametric 
production frontier approach (data envelopment analysis) to decompose the 1965 to 1990 
growth of labor productivity into (i) shifts in the (common, worldwide) production 
frontier (technological change); (ii) movements toward (or away from) the frontier 
(technological catch-up); and, (iii) capital accumulation.  They find a dominant role for 
capital accumulation in the growth of the cross-country mean of labor productivity with 
human and physical capital each accounting for about half of that role.
36  They also 
observe that the distribution of labor productivity became more dispersed from 1965 to 
1990 and their results suggest that physical and human capital accumulation were largely 
responsible for the increased dispersion.   
  The results of Henderson and Russell (2004) and those of the previous authors 
are, however, more consistent than it may seem.  Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997a), 
Hall and Jones (1999) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) argue that the standard growth 
accounting decomposition overstates the contribution of capital accumulation to output 
growth by attributing to capital the effect on output of increases in capital induced by 
increases in TFP.  This effect also applies to Henderson and Russell's approach and 
adjusting for it provides some reconciliation of their findings with those of Klenow and 
Rodríguez-Clare (1997a), Prescott (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999).  The standard 
growth accounting formula attributes a fraction (equal to labor’s share of output) of the 
                                                 
36Note that any misspecification of the production function due to the Cobb-Douglas 
assumption in other studies will tend to increase the apparent variation in TFP relative to 
that found by Henderson and Russell (2004) under the weaker assumption of constant 
returns to scale.  In a rare effort to evaluate the Cobb-Douglas specification, Duffy and 
Papageorgiou (2000) reject it in favor of a more general CES functional form. 
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output) to capital accumulation despite the fact that, in the steady-state, growth in output 
per worker is entirely due to technological progress (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 
457-60) and Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997a p. 75, fn. 4)).  The total effect of 
technological progress on output growth can thus be estimated by dividing labor’s share 
into the estimated growth rate of TFP.  Interpreting “capital” broadly, labor’s share is 
about   suggesting that this effect is about three times the rate of growth of TFP.  
Henderson and Russell (2004, Table 5, row (a)) find that, on average, about 90% of the 
increase in output per worker over the 1965 to 1990 period is attributable to the 
accumulation of human and physical capital with increases in TFP accounting for the 
remaining 10%.  Applying the adjustment discussed above suggests that technological 
progress accounts for about 30% of the growth in output per worker over this period 
while capital accumulation, due to transition dynamics, accounts for the remainder. 
3 / 1
As well as determining the relative contributions of inputs and TFP to the cross-
country variation in output and output growth, some have studied what features of the 
cross-country output distribution are explained by the cross-country distributions of 
inputs and TFP.  Henderson and Russell (2004) document the emergence of a second 
mode in the cross-country distribution of output per worker between 1965 and 1990 and 
find changes in efficiency (the distance from the world technological frontier) to be 
largely responsible.  A primary role for TFP in determining the shape of the long-run 
distribution of output per capita is found by Feyrer (2003) who uses Markov transition 
matrices estimated with data from 90 countries over the period 1970 to 1989 to estimate 
the ergodic distributions of output per capita, the capital-output ratio, human capital per 
worker, and TFP.  He finds that the long-run distributions of both output per capita and 
TFP are bimodal while those of both the capital-output ratio and human capital per 
worker are unimodal.  This result, Feyrer observes, has potentially important implications 
for theoretical modelling of development traps. It suggests that models of multiple 
equilibria that give rise to equilibrium differences in TFP are more promising than 
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37  It 
is also consistent with Quah’s (1996c) finding that conditioning on measures of physical 
and human capital accumulation (and a dummy variable for the African continent) has 
little effect on the dynamics of the cross-country income distribution.   
As discussed in Section III.iii.d, the shapes of ergodic distributions computed 
from transition matrices estimated with discretized data are not, in general, robust to 
changes in the way in which the state space is discretized.  To avoid these problems, 
Johnson (2004) extends Feyrer's analysis using Quah's (1996c,1997) continuous state-
space methods and finds evidence of bimodality in the long-run distributions of both the 
capital-output ratio and TFP in addition to that in the long-run distribution of output per 
capita.  This finding is broadly consistent with data produced by a version of the Solow 
growth model that includes a threshold externality à la Azariadis and Drazen (1990) but 
may be partly due to the computation of TFP after supposing a Cobb-Douglas production 
function across countries. Accordingly, some care must be exercised when drawing 
conclusions from these results. 
More generally, in much of the development accounting literature cited above, 
TFP is measured as a residual under the assumption of a concave worldwide production 
function.  Durlauf and Johnson (1995) present evidence contrary to that assumption and 
in support of the implied multiple steady states in the growth process.  It seems likely that 
the imposition of a concave production function in this case will tend to exaggerate the 
measured differences in TFP and so confound inferences about the importance of TFP 
variation.
38  While Henderson and Russell (2004)'s approach is nonparametric and free 
from any assumption of a particular technology per se, it estimates the world technology 
frontier by fitting a convex cone to data on outputs and inputs.  The imposed convexity of 
the production set prevents the method from discovering any nonconvexities that may 
exist and, in addition to masking the presence of multiple steady states, convexifying 
                                                 
37Romer (1993) discusses the intellectual origins of the centrality of capital accumulation 
in models of economic development and argues that “idea gaps are central to the process 
of economic development” (p. 548).    
38Graham and Temple (2003) show that the existence of multiple steady states can 
increase the variance and accentuate bimodality in the observed cross-country 
distribution of TFP.   
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extent to which our current understanding of the relative contributions of variation in 
inputs and variation in TFP to the observed variation in income levels is influenced by 
the effects on measured TFP of a misspecified worldwide technology remains an open 
research question.    
  Despite these concerns and the differences in the precise estimates found by 
different researchers, it is clear that cross-country variation in inputs falls short of 
explaining the observed cross-country variation in output.  The result that the TFP 
residual, a “measure of our ignorance” computed as the ratio of output to some index of 
inputs, is an important (perhaps the dominant) source of cross-country differences in 
long-run economic performance is useful but hardly satisfying and the need for a theory 
of TFP expressed by Prescott (1998) is well founded.  Research such as Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti (2001) and Caselli and Coleman (2003) are promising contributions to that 
agenda.   
 
  
V. Statistical models of the growth process 
 
  While the convergence hypothesis plays a uniquely prominent role in empirical 
growth studies, it by no means represents the bulk of empirical growth studies.  The 
primary focus of empirical growth papers may be thought of as a general exploration of 
potential growth determinants.  This work may be divided into three main categories:  1) 
studies designed to establish that a given variable does or does not help explain cross-
country growth differences, 2) efforts to uncover heterogeneity in growth and 3) studies 
that attempt to uncover nonlinearities in the growth process.  While analyses of these 
types are typically motivated by formal theories, operationally they represent efforts to 
develop statistical growth models that are consistent with certain types of specification 
tests. 
  Section V.i discusses the analysis of how specific determinants affect growth.  We 
describe the range of different variables that have appeared in growth regressions and 
consider alternative methodologies for analyzing growth models in the presence of 
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Section V.ii addresses issues of parameter heterogeneity.  The complexity of the growth 
process and the plethora of new growth theories suggest that the mapping of a given 
variable to growth is likely a function of both observed and unobserved factors; for 
example, the effect of human capital investment on growth may depend on the strength of 
property rights.  We explore methods to account for parameter heterogeneity and 
consider the evidence that has been adduced in support of its presence.  Section V.iii 
focuses on the analysis of nonlinearities and multiple regimes in the growth process.  
Endogenous growth theories are often highly nonlinear and can produce multiple steady 
states in the growth process, both of which have important implications for econometric 
practice. This subsection explores alternative specifications that have been employed to 
allow for nonlinearity and multiple regimes and describes some of the main findings that 
have appeared to date. 
 
i. specifying explanatory variables in growth regressions 
 
  In the search for a satisfactory statistical model of growth, the main area of effort 
has concerned the identification of appropriate variables to include in linear growth 
regressions, this generally amounts to the specification of Z in equation (18).  Appendix 2 
provides a survey of different regressors that have been proposed in the growth literature 
with associated studies that either represent the first use of the variable or a well known 
use of the variable.
39  The table contains 145 different regressors, the vast majority of 
which have been found to be statistically significant using conventional standards.
40  One 
reason why so many alternative growth variables have been identified is due to questions 
of measurement. For example, a claim that domestic freedom affects growth leaves 
unanswered how freedom is to be measured.  We have therefore organized the body of 
growth regressors into 43 distinct growth “theories” (by which we mean conceptually 
                                                 
39Our choices of which studies to include should not be taken to reflect any stance on any 
cases where there is disagreement about priority as to who first proposed a variable. 
40Of course, the high percentage of statistically significant growth variables reflects 
publication bias as well as data mining. 
  74distinct growth determinants); each of these theories is found to be statistically significant 
in at least one study. 
  As Appendix 2 indicates, the number of growth regressors that have been 
identified approaches the number of countries available in even the broadest samples. 
And this regressor list does not consider cases where interactions between variables or 
nonlinear transformations of variables have been included as regressors; both of which 
are standard ways of introducing nonlinearities into a baseline growth regression. This 
plethora of potential regressors starkly illustrates one of the fundamental problems with 
empirical growth research, namely, the absence of any consensus on which growth 
determinants ought to be included in a growth model.  In this section, we discuss efforts 
to address the question of variable choice in growth models.  
To make this discussion concrete, define   as the set of regressors which a 
researcher always retains in a regression and let 
i S
i R  denote additional controls in the 
regression, so that  
 
  ii i SR i γ ψπε = ++  (41) 
 
Notice that the inclusion of a variable in S does not mean the researcher is certain that it 
influences growth, only that that it will be included in all models under consideration.  To 
make this concrete, one can think of an exercise in which one wants to consider the 
relationship between initial income and growth. A researcher may choose to include 
initial income and the other Solow growth regressors in every specification of the model, 
but may in contrast be interested in the effects of different non-Solow growth regressors 
on inferences about the initial income/growth connection. 
  If one takes the regressors that comprise R as fixed, then statements about elements 
 of ψ  are straightforward.  A frequentist approach to inference will compute an estimate 
of the parameter  ˆ ψ  with an associated distribution that depends on the data generating 
process; Bayesian approaches will compute a posterior probability density of ψ  given the 
researcher’s prior, the data, and the assumption that the linear model is correctly 
specified, i.e. the choice of variables in R corresponds to the “true” model.  Designating 
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() , Dm µψ .    
  The basic problem in developing statistical statements either about  ˆ ψ  or 
( , Dm µψ )
1
 is that there do not exist good theoretical reasons to specify a particular 
model m .  This is not to say that the body of growth theories may not be used to identify 
candidates for R.  Rather, the problem is that growth theories are, using a phrase due to 
Brock and Durlauf (2001a), openended.  Theory openendedness means that the growth 
theories are typically compatible with one another.  For example, a theory that 
institutions matter for economic growth is not logically inconsistent with a theory that 
emphasizes the role of geography in growth.  Hence, if one has a set of   potential 
growth theories, all of which are logically compatible with one another (and all subsets of 
theories), there exist   potential theoretical specifications of the form (41), each one 




  One approach to resolving the problem of model uncertainty is based on 
identifying variables whose empirical importance is robust across different model 
specifications.  This is the idea behind Levine and Renelt’s (1992) use of extreme bounds 
analysis (Leamer (1983) and Leamer and Leonard (1983)) to assess growth determinants. 
To see how extreme bounds analysis may be applied to the assessment of robustness of 
growth determinants, suppose that one has specified a space of possible models M . For 
model m , the growth process is 
 
  , i m i m im im SR , γ ψπ ε = ++  (42) 
 
where the subscripts m reflect the model specific nature of the parameters and associated 
residuals. One can compute  ˆm ψ  for every model in M .  Motivated by Leamer (1983), 
Levine and Renelt employ the rule that there is strong evidence that a given regressor in 
S, call it  , robustly affects growth if the sign of the associated regression coefficient  l s
, ˆlm ψ  is constant and the coefficient estimate is statistically significant across all model 
  76specifications in M .  In this analysis the   vector is composed of a variable of interest 
and other variables whose presence is held fixed across specifications.  
S
In the Levine and Renelt (1992) analysis, S  includes a constant, the  initial 
income, the investment share of GDP, secondary school enrollment rates, and population 
growth; these variables proxy for those suggested by the Solow model.  Models are 
distinguished by alternative combinations of 1 to 3 variables taken from a set of 7 
variables; these correspond to alternative choices of  , im R .  Based on the constant sign and 
statistical significance criteria, Levine and Renelt (1992) conclude that the only robust 
growth determinants among the elements of   are initial inome and the share of 
investment in GDP.  These two findings are confirmed in subsequent work by 
Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos (2000) who allow for potential nonlinearities in 
(41).  Specifically, they consider partially linear versions of (41), so that  
i S
 
  ( ) , i m i m im im Sf R , γ ψπ =+ + ε  (43) 
 
Note that the function  () f ⋅  is allowed to vary across specifications of R.  As in Levine 
and Renelt (1992), Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos conclude that initial income 
and physical capital investment rates are robust determinants of growth. Unlike Levine 
and Renelt, they also find that inflation volatility and exchange rate distortions are robust; 
this is interesting as it is an example where the failure to account for nonlinearity in one 
set of variables masks the importance of another. 
From a decision-theoretic perspective, the extreme bounds approach is a 
problematic methodology.  The basic difficulty, discussed in detail in Brock and Durlauf 
(2001a) and Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) is that if one is interested in  l ψ  because 
one is considering whether to change  , by one unit, i.e. one is advising country i on a 
policy change, the extreme bounds standard corresponds to a very risk averse way of 
responding to model uncertainty.  Specifically, suppose that for a policymaker, 
 represents the expected loss associated with the current policy level in country 
i.  We assume that one is only interested in the case where an increase in the policy raises 
, il s
( , , il El s m)
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conclude that one should make the change. One can approximate the t-statistic rule, i.e. 
requiring that the coefficient estimate for    be statistically significant in order to justify 
a policy as implying that 
l s
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, , , ˆˆ 1, , 2 0 il il lm lm El s m El s m sd ψψ +− = − >  (44) 
 
where   is the estimate of the standard deviation associated with  ( , ˆlm sd ψ ) , ˆlm ψ  and the 
statistical significance level required for the coefficient is assumed to correspond to a t-
statistic of 2.  This loss function may look odd, but it is in fact the sort of loss function 
implicitly assumed whenever one relies on t-statistics to make policy decisions.  Extreme 
bounds analysis requires that (44) holds for every model in M. This requires that  ( ) , il Els , 
the expected loss for a policymaker when one conditions only on the policy variable, has 
the property that 
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, , , 10 1 , , > il il il il 0   Els E ls E ls m E ls m m +− >⇒ + − ∀ (45) 
 
This means that the policymaker must have minimax preferences with respect to model 
uncertainty, i.e. he will make the policy change only if it yields a positive expected 
payoff under the least favorable model in the model space. While there are reasons to 
believe that in practice, individuals assess model uncertainty differently than within-
model uncertainty
41, the extreme risk aversion embedded in (45) seems hard to justify. 
Even when one moves away from decision-theoretic considerations, extreme 
bounds analysis is somewhat difficult to interpret as a statistical procedure. Hoover and 
Perez (2004), for example, show that the use of extreme bounds analysis can lead to the 
conclusion that many growth determinants are fragile even when they are part of the data 
                                                 
41See discussion in Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) of the Ellsberg Paradox.  
  78generating process. They also find that the procedure has poor power properties in the 
sense that some regressors that do not matter may spuriously appear to be robust.
42  
The concern that extreme bounds analysis represents an excessively conservative 
approach to evaluating empirical results led Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) to propose a 
different way to evaluate the robustness of findings.  Within a model, suppose there is an 
evaluative criterion for  ˆm ψ  that is used to determine whether the variable    matters for 
the growth process.  One example of such a standard is whether or not 
l s
, ˆlm ψ  is statistically 
significant at some level.  Sala-i-Martin first proposes averaging the statistical 
significance levels via 
 
  , ˆ ˆ im
m
S ω = ˆ
i m S ∑  (46) 
 
where   is the statistical significance level associated with  , ˆ
im S ˆm ψ  and  ˆm ω  is the weight 
assigned to model m,  . Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) employs weights determined by 
the likelihoods of each model  as well as employing equal weighting.  Second, Sala-i-
Martin (1997a,b) proposes examining the percentage of times a variable appears 
statistically significant with a given sign; a variable whose sign and statistical 
significance holds across 95% of the different models estimated is regarded as robust.  
This approach finds that initial income, the investment to GDP ratio and secondary 
school education are all robust determinants of growth.  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) extends 
this analysis to the evaluation of additional variables and finds a number also are robust 




While these approaches have the important advantage over extreme bounds 
analysis of accounting for the informational content of the entire distribution of  ˆm ψ , the 
procedures do not have any decision-theoretic or conventional statistical justification. We 
are unaware of any statistical interpretation to averaged significance levels.   Further, 
little is understood about the statistical properties of these procedures.  Hoover and Perez 
                                                 
42For further discussion of extreme bounds analysis, see Temple (2000b) and the 
references therein.  
  79(2004), for example, find that the second Sala-i-Martin procedure has poor size 
properties, in the sense that “true” growth determinants are still likely to fail to be 
identified. 
Dissatisfaction with extreme bounds analysis and the variants we have described 
have led some authors to embed the determinants of robust growth regressors in a general 
model selection context.  Hendry and Krolzig (2004) and Hoover and Perez (2004) both 
employ general-to-specific modeling methodologies generally associated with the 
research program of David Hendry (cf. Hendry 1995)) to select one version of (41) out of 
the model space.  In both papers, the linear model that is selected out of the space of 
possible models is one where growth is determined by years an economy is open, the rate 
of equipment investment, a measure of political instability based on the number of coups 
and revolutions, a measure of the percentage of the population that is Confucian and a 
measure of the percentage of the population that is Protestant. 
Methodologically, these papers in essence employ algorithms which choose a 
particular regression model from a space of models through comparisons based on a set 
of statistical tests.  The extent to which one finds this approach appealing is a function of 
the extent to which one is sympathetic to the general methodological foundations of the 
Hendry research program; we avoid such an extended evaluation here, but simply note 
that like other general prescriptions the program remains controversial, especially the 
extent to which it relies on automatic model selection procedures that do not possess a 
clear decision-theoretic justification.  As such, it is somewhat unclear how to evaluate the 
output of the procedure in terms of the objectives of a researcher.  That being said, the 
automated procedures Hendry works with have the important virtue that they can 
facilitate identifying small sets of models that are well supported by available data.   
Identification of such models is important, for example, in forecasting, where Hendry’s 
procedures appear to have a strong track record.  
In our judgment, the most promising current approach to accounting for model 
uncertainty employs model averaging techniques to construct parameter estimates that 
formally address the dependence of model-specific estimates on a given model.   
Examples where model averaging has been applied to cross-country growth data include 
Brock and Durlauf (2001a), Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003), Doppelhofer, Miller, and 
  80Sala-i-Martin (2004), Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001a) and Masanjala and 
Papageorgiou (2004).  The basic idea in this work is to treat the “true” growth model
43 as 
an unobservable variable.  In order to account for this variable, each element m in the 
model space M is associated with a posterior model probability  ( ) mD µ .  By Bayes’ 
rule, 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) mD Dm m µµ µ ∝  (47) 
 
where  ( ) Dm µ  is the likelihood of the data given the model and   is the prior 
model probability. These model probabilities are used to eliminate the dependence of 
parameter analysis on a specific model. For frequentist estimates, averaging is done 
across the model-specific estimates 
() m µ
ˆm ψ  to produce an estimate  ˆ ψ  via 
 
  ( ) ˆˆ m
m
mD ψ ψµ =∑  (48) 
 
whereas for the Bayesian context, the dependence of the posterior probabilility measure 
of the parameter of interest,  ( , Dm µψ )  on the model choice is eliminated via standard 
conditional probability arguments, i.e. 
  
  () ( ) ( ) ,
mM
DD m µψ µψ µ
∈
= m D ∑  (49) 
 
Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) argue that the strategy of constructing posterior 
probabilities that are not model-dependent is the appropriate one when the objective of 
the statistical exercise is to evaluate alternative policy questions such as whether to 
                                                 
43In this discussion, we will assume that one of the models in the model space M is the 
correct specification of the growth process. When none of the model specifications is the 
correct one, this naturally affects the interpretation of the model averaging procedure.  
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exercise is to study a parameter, i.e. 
i S
ψ , not to identify the best growth model. 
Model averaging approaches are still quite new in the growth literature, so many 
questions exist as to how to implement the procedure.  One issue concerns the 
specification of priors on parameters within a model.   Brock and Durlauf (2001a), Brock, 
Durlauf and West (2003), and Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) assume a 
diffuse prior on the model specific coefficients.  The advantage of this prior is that, when 
the errors are normal with known variance, the posterior expected value of ψ , 
conditional on the data D and model  , is the ordinary least squares estimator  m ˆm ψ .  The 
disadvantage of this approach is that since the diffuse prior on the regression parameters 
is improper, one has to be careful that the posterior model probabilities associated with 
the prior are interpretable. For this reason, Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) 
eschew reference to their methodology as strictly Bayesian.  That being said, so long as 
the posterior model probabilities include appropriate penalties for model complexity, 
(and Brock and Durlauf (2001a), Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003), and Doppelhofer, 
Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) all compute posterior model probabilities using BIC 
adjusted likelihoods) we do not see any conceptual problem in interpreting this approach 
as strictly Bayesian.  Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001a) and Masanjala and Papageorgiou 
(2004) employ proper priors and therefore avoid such concerns.
44 We are unaware of any 
evidence that the choice of prior for the within-model regression coefficients is of great 
importance in terms of empirical inferences for the growth contexts that have been 
studied; Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2004) in fact compare results using using proper 
priors with the improper priors we have described and find that the choice of prior is 
unimportant. 
A second unresolved issue concerns the specification of the prior model 
probabilities  .  In the model averaging literature, the general assumption has been 
to assign equal prior probabilities to all models in 
() m µ
M .  This prior may be interpreted as 
assuming that the prior probability that a given variable appears in the “true” model is .5 
                                                 
44Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b) provide a general analysis of proper model specific 
priors for model averaging exercises.  
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others appear.  Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) consider modifications of 
this prior in which the probability that a given variable appears in the true model is 
; these alternative probabilities are chosen in order to assign greater weight to more 
parsimonious growth models, i.e. models in which fewer regressors appear.
.5 p <
45
Brock and Durlauf (2001a) and Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) argue against 
the assumption that the probability that one regressor should appear in a growth model is 
independent of the inclusion of others.  The basic problem with priors that assume 
independence is analogous to the red bus/blue bus problem in discrete choice theory; 
namely, some regressors are quite similar to others, e.g. alternative measures of trade 
openness, whereas other regressors are quite disparate, e.g. geography and institutions.   
Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) propose a tree structure to organize model uncertainty 
for linear growth models. First, they argue that growth models suffer from theory 
uncertainty. Hence, one can identify alternative classes of models based on what growth 
theories are included. Second, for each specification of a body of theories to be 
embedded, they argue there is specification uncertainty. A given set of theories requires 
determining whether the theories interact, whether they are subject to threshold effects or 
other types of nonlinearity, etc.  Third, for each theory and model specification, there is 
measurement uncertainty. The statement that weather affects growth does not specify the 
relevant empirical proxies, e.g. the number of sunny days, average temperature, etc. 
Finally, each choice of theory, specification and measurement is argued to suffer from 
heterogeneity uncertainty, which means that it is unclear which subsets of countries obey 
a common linear model. Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) argue that one should assign 
priors that account for the interdependences implied by this structure in assigning model 
probabilities.  Appendix 2 follows this approach in organizing growth regressors 
according to theory. 
Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Fernandez, Ley, and Steel 
(2001a) employ model averaging methods to identify which growth regressors should be 
                                                 
45In our judgment, this presumption is unappealing as our own prior beliefs suggest that 
the true growth model is likely to contain many distinct factors.  One implication of the 
openendedness of growth theories is that the simultaneous importance of many factors is 
certainly plausible.    
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be included in all regressions and variables whose inclusion determines alternative 
models; all variables are pooled and all possible combinations are considered.   
Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) working with 31 potential growth 
determinants, conclude, weighting prior models so that the expected number of included 
regressors is 7 (this corresponds to a prior probability of variable inclusion of about .25), 
that four variables have posterior model inclusion probabilities above .9: initial income, 
fraction of GDP in mining, number of years the economy has been open,
46 and fraction of 
the population following Confucianism.  Working with a universe of 41 potential growth 
determinants, Fernandez, Ley, and Steel find that, under the assumption that the prior 
probability that a given variable appears in the correct growth model is .5, four variables 
have posterior model inclusion probabilities above .9: initial income, fraction of the 
population following Confucianism, life expectancy, and rate of equipment investment.    
Brock and Durlauf (2001a) and Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2004) employ 
model averaging to study the reason for the poor growth performance of sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Brock and Durlauf (2001a) reexamine Easterly and Levine’s (1997a) finding that 
ethnic heterogeneity helps explain sub-Saharan Africa’s growth problems. This reanalysis 
finds that the Easterly and Levine (1997) claim is robust in the sense that ethnic 
heterogeneity helps explain why growth in sub-Saharan Africa had stagnated relative to 
the rest of the world. On the other hand, Brock and Durlauf (2001a) also find that ethnic 
heterogeneity does not appear to explain growth patterns in the rest of the world.  This 
leads to the unresolved question of why ethnic heterogeneity has uniquely strong growth 
effects in sub-Sahran Africa.  Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2004) conduct a general 
analysis of the determinants of sub-Saharan African growth versus the world as a whole 
and conclude that the relevant growth variables for Africa are quite different.  In 
particular, variation in sub-Saharan growth is much more closely associated with the 
share of the economy made up by primary commodities production. They also find, 
contrary to Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) that the share of mining in the 
economy is a robust determinant of growth in Africa but not the world as a whole.  
                                                 
46Sachs and Warner (1995) use this variable as an index of overall openness of an 
economy. 
  84Finally, model averaging has been applied by Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) to 
analyze the question of how to employ growth regressions to evaluate policy 
recommendations.  Specifically, the paper assesses the question of whether a policymaker 
should favor a reduction of tariffs for sub-Saharan African countries; the analysis 
assumes that the policymaker possesses mean/variance preferences with respect to the 
effects of changes in current policies with a constant tradeoff of mean against standard 
deviation of 1 to 2. The analysis finds strong support for a tariff reduction in that it 
concludes that a policymaker with these preferences should support a tariff reduction for 
any of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa unless the policymaker has a very strong prior 
that sub-Saharan African countries obey a distinct linear growth process from the rest of 
the world. In the case where the policymaker has a strong prior that sub-Saharan Africa is 
“different” from the rest of the world, there is sufficient uncertainty about the relationship 
between tariffs and growth for these countries that a change in the rates cannot be 
justified; the strong prior in essence means that the growth experiences of non-African 
countries have little effect on the precision of estimates of growth behavior that are 
constructed using data on sub-Saharan African countries in isolation.  
   
ii. parameter heterogeneity 
 
From its earliest stages, the use of linear growth models has generated 
considerable unease with respect to the statistical foundations of the exercise. Arguably, 
the data for very different countries cannot be seen as realizations associated with a 
common data generating process (DGP). For econometricians that have been trained to 
search for a good approximation to a DGP, the modeling assumptions and procedures of 
the growth literature can look arbitrary. One expression of this concern is captured in a 
famous remark in Harberger (1987): “What do Thailand, the Dominican Republic, 
Zimbabwe, Greece, and Bolivia have in common that merits their being put in the same 
regression analysis?” 
Views differ on the extent to which this objection is fundamental. There is general 
agreement that, when studying growth, it will be difficult to recover a DGP even if one 
exists. In particular, the prospects for recovering causal effects are clearly weak. Those 
  85who are only satisfied with the specification and estimation of a structural model, in 
which parameters are either ‘deep’ or correspond to precisely defined causal effects 
within a coherent theoretical framework, will be permanently disappointed.
47 The growth 
literature must have a less ambitious goal, namely to investigate whether or not particular 
hypotheses have any support in the data. In practice, growth researchers are looking for 
patterns and systematic tendencies that can increase our understanding of the growth 
process, in combination with historical analysis, case studies, and relevant theoretical 
models. Another key aim of empirical growth research, which is harder than it looks at 
first sight, is to communicate the degree of support for any patterns identified by the 
researcher. 
The issue of parameter heterogeneity is essentially that raised by Harberger. Why 
should we expect disparate countries to lie on a common surface? Clearly this criticism 
could be applied to most empirical work in social science, whether the data points reflect 
the actions and characteristics of individuals and firms, or the aggregations of their 
choices that are used in macroeconometrics. What is distinctive about the growth context 
is not so much the lack of a common surface, as the way in which the sample size limits 
the scope for addressing the problem. In principle, one response would be to choose a 
more flexible model that has a stronger chance of being a good approximation to the data. 
Yet this can be hard, and an inherently fragile procedure, when the sample is rarely 
greater than 100 observations. 
If parameter heterogeneity is present, the consequences are potentially serious, 
except in a special case. If a slope parameter varies randomly across units, and is 
distributed independently of the variables in the regression and the disturbances, the 
coefficient estimate should be an unbiased estimate of the mean of the parameter. The 
assumption of independence is not one, however, that may be expected in light of the 
body of growth theories.  For example, when estimating the relationship between growth 
and investment, the marginal effect of investment will almost certainly be correlated with 
aspects of the economic environment that should also be included in the regression. 
                                                 
47Note that this reflects the shortcomings of economic theory as well as those of data and 
econometric analysis. 
  86The solution to this general problem is to change the specification in a way that 
allows greater flexibility in estimation. There are many ways of doing this.  One approach 
is to consider more general functional forms than the canonical Solow regression which 
for comparison purposes we restate as: 
 
  ( ) ,0 , , log log log log ii n i K K i H H ky n g s s i i γ βπ δ π π =+ + ++ + + + ε  (50) 
  
Liu and Stengos (1999) estimate a semiparametric partially linear version of this model, 
namely 
 
  () ( ) ( ) ,0 , , log log log log
H ii n i K K i H kf y ng s f s βπ i i γ πδ π =+ + ++ + + + ε  (51) 
 
where   and   are arbitrary (except for variance smoothness requirements) 
functions. One important finding is that the value of 
() fβ ⋅ ()
H fπ ⋅
( ) ,0 log i f y β  is only negative when 
initial per capita income exceeds about $1800.  They also find a threshold effect in 
secondary school enrollment rates (their empirical proxy for  , log H i s ) so the variable is 
only associated with a positive impact on growth if it exceeds about 15%.   Banerjee and 
Duflo (2003) use this same regression strategy to study nonlinearity in the relationship 
between changes in inequality and growth; their specification estimates a version of (51) 
where initial income and human capital savings enter linearly (along with some 
additional non-Solow variables) but with the addition on the right hand side of the 
function   where   is the Gini coefficient.   Using a panel of 45 
countries and 5 year growth averages, their analysis produces an estimate of   which 
has an inverted U shape.  One limitation of such studies is that they only allow for 
nonlinearity for a subset of growth determinants, an assumption that has little theoretical 
justification and is, from a statistical perspective, ad hoc; of course the approach is more 
general and less ad hoc then simply assuming linearity as is done in most of the literature. 
() ,, 5 Gi t i t fG G − − , it G
() G f ⋅
  87Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin (2001) extend this approach and estimate a 
version of the augmented Solow model that allows the parameters for each country to 
vary as functions of initial income, i.e. 
 
() () ()() () () ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 , ,0 , log log log log
i
ii i n i i K i K i H i H i ky y y y n g y s y s i
γ
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This formulation means that each initial income level defines a distinct Solow regression; 
as such it shifts the focus away from nonlinearity towards parameter heterogeneity, 
although the model is of course nonlinear in  .  This approach reveals considerable 
parameter heterogeneity especially among the poorer countries.  Durlauf, Kourtellos, and 
Minkin (2001) confirm Liu and Stengos (1999) in finding that 
,0 i y
( ) ,0 i y β  is positive for low 
 values and negative for higher ones.  They also find that  ,0 i y ( ) ,0 Ki y π  fluctuates greatly 
over the range of    values in their sample.  This work is extended in Kourtellos 
(2003a) who finds parameter dependence on initial literacy and initial life expectancy.  
The varying coefficient approach is also employed in Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos 
(2004) who analyze annual measures of total factor productivity for 51 countries. They 
consider a regression model of TFP in which the coefficient on human capital in the 
regression is allowed to depend on human capital both in isolation and in conjunction 
with a measure of trade openness (other coefficients are held constant). Constancy of the 
human capital coefficient is rejected across a range of specifications.   
,0 i y
At a minimum, it generally makes sense for empirical researchers to test for 
neglected parameter heterogeneity, either using interaction terms or by carrying out 
diagnostic tests. Chesher (1984) showed that White’s information matrix test can be used 
in this context. For the normal linear model with fixed regressors, Hall (1987) showed 
that, asymptotically, the information matrix test corresponds to a joint test for 
heteroskedasticity and non-normality. Later in the chapter, we discuss how evidence of 
heteroskedasticity should sometimes be seen as an indicator of misspecification. 
  88Other authors have attempted to employ panel data to identify parameter 
heterogeneity without the imposition of a functional relationship between parameters and 
various observable variables.  An important early effort is Canova and Marcet (1995).   
Defining   as the logarithm of the ratio of a country’s per capita income to the time   
international aggregate value, Canova and Marcet estimate models of the form 
, it s t
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with 1 i ρ −  being the rate of convergence 
towards that value.  Canova and Marcet estimate their model using data on the regions of 
Europe and on 17 western European countries. Restricting the parameters   and  i a i ρ  to be 
constant across i gives a standard β -convergence test and yields an estimated annual 
rate of convergence of approximately 2%.  On the other hand, allowing for heterogeneity 
in these parameters produces a “substantial”, statistically significant, dispersion of the 
implied long-run   forecasts.  Moreover, those forecasts are positively correlated with 
, the initial values of  , implying a dependence of long-run outcomes on initial 
conditions contrary to the convergence hypothesis.  For the country-level data, 
differences in initial conditions explain almost half the cross-sectional variation in long-
run forecasts; in contrast, the role of standard control variables such as rates of physical 
and human capital accumulation and government spending shares is minor.  The latter 
finding must be tempered by the fact that the sample variation in these controls is less 
than that in Barro (1991) or Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), for example. 
, it s
,0 i s , it s
A similar approach is taken by Maddala and Wu (2000) who consider models of 
the form 
 
  ,, log log it i i it it yy 1 , u α ρ − = ++  (54) 
  
  89which is of course very similar to the model analyzed by Marcet and Canova (1995).  
Employing shrinkage estimators for  i α  and  i ρ , they conclude that convergence rates, 
measured as  log ii β ρ =−  exhibit substantial heterogeneity. 
 
iii. nonlinearity and multiple regimes 
 
In this section we discuss several papers that have attempted to disentangle the 
roles of heterogeneous structural characteristics and initial conditions in determining 
growth performance.  These studies employ a wide variety of statistical methods in 
attempting to identify how initial conditions affect growth. Despite this, there is 
substantial congruence in the conclusions of these papers as these studies each provide 
evidence of the existence of convergence clubs even after accounting for variation in 
structural characteristics.   
An early contribution to this literature is Durlauf and Johnson (1995) who use 
classification and regression tree (CART) methods to search for nonlinearities in the 
growth process as implied by the existence of convergence clubs.
48  The CART 
procedure identifies subgroups of countries that obey a common linear growth model 
based on the Solow variables. These subgroups are identified by initial income and 
literacy, a typical subgroup l is defined by countries whose initial income lies within the 
interval  ,, 0 ly i ly y , ϑ ϑ ≤< and whose literacy rate   lies in the interval  i L ,, lL i lL L ϑ ϑ ≤< .  The 
number of subgroups and the boundaries for the variable intervals that define them are 
chosen by an algorithm that trades off model complexity (i.e. the number of subgroups) 
and goodness of fit.  Because the procedure sequentially splits the data into finer and 
finer subgroups, it gives the data a tree structure.  
                                                 
48A detailed discussion of regression tree methods appears in Breiman, Friedman, Olshen 
and Stone (1984). The technical appendix of Durlauf and Johnson (1995) presents a 
treatment tailored to the specific question of identifying multiple regimes in growth 
models. Regression tree methods suffer from the absence of a well-developed asymptotic 
theory for testing the number of regimes that are present in a data set, but the procedure is 
consistent in the sense that under relatively weak conditions, if there are a finite number 
of regimes, as the sample size grows to infinity, the correct model will be revealed.  
  90Durlauf and Johnson (1995) also test the null hypothesis of a common growth 
regime against the alternative hypothesis of a growth process with multiple regimes in 
which economies with similar initial conditions tend to converge to one another.  Using 
income per capita and the literacy rate (as a proxy for human capital) to measure the 
initial level of development and, using the same cross-country data set as Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil, Durlauf, and Johnson reject the single regime model required for 
global convergence.   That is, even after controlling for the structural heterogeneity 
implied by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil's augmented version of the Solow model, there is a 
role for initial conditions in explaining variation in cross-country growth behavior.  
Durlauf and Johnson’s (1995) findings of multiple convergence clubs appear to be 
reinforced by subsequent research.  Papageorgiou and Masanjala (2004) note that one 
possible source for Durlauf and Johnson’s findings may occur due to the misspecification 
of the aggregate production function.  As observed in Section II, the linear representation 
of the Solow model represents an approximation around the steady-state when the 
aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas.  Papageorgiou and Masanjala estimate a 
version of the Solow model based on a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
production function rather than the Cobb-Douglas, following findings in Duffy and 
Papageorgiou (2000).  They then examine the question of whether or not Durlauf and 
Johnson’s multiple regimes remain under the CES specification. Using Hansen’s (2000) 
approach to sample splitting and threshold estimation, they find statistically significant 
evidence of thresholds in the data.  The sample splits they estimate divide the data in four 
distinct growth regimes and are broadly consistent with those found by Durlauf and 
Johnson.
49  
                                                 
49Motivated by the debate over trade openness and growth, Papageorgiou (2002) applies 
Hansen’s method to the Durlauf and Johnson data with the trade share added to the set of 
variables on which sample splits may occur.  He finds that this variable divides the 
middle-income countries into high and low growth groups obeying different growth 
processes; however openness does not appear to matter for high and low income 
countries.  This suggests the importance of further work on which variables are most 
appropriate in characterizing threshold effects. Using the regression tree approach with a 
large collection of candidate  split variables, Johnson and Takeyama (2001) find evidence 
of thresholds in US state economic growth behavior defined by variables likely to be 
proxies for capital/labor ratio, agglomeration effects, and communication effects. 
  91These findings are extended in recent work due to Tan (2004) who employs a 
procedure known as GUIDE (generalized, unbiased interaction detection and estimation) 
to identify subgroups of countries which obey a common growth model.
50  Relative to 
CART, the GUIDE algorithm has two advantages: 1) the algorithm explicitly looks for 
interactions between explanatory variables when identifying splits and 2) some within 
model testing supplements the penalties for model complexity and thereby reduces the 
tendency for CART procedures to produce an excessive number of splits in finite 
samples.  Tan (2004) finds strong evidence that measures of institutional quality and 
ethnic fractionalization define convergence clubs across a wide range of countries.  He 
also finds weaker evidence that geography distinguishes the growth process for sub-
Saharan Africa from the rest of the world.   
Further research has corroborated the evidence of multiple regimes using 
alternative statistical methods.  One approach that has proven useful is based on 
projection pursuit methods
51.  Desdoigts (1999) uses these methods in an attempt to 
separate the roles of microeconomic heterogeneity and initial conditions in the growth 
experiences of a group of countries and identifies groups of countries with relatively 
homogeneous growth experiences based on data about the characteristics and initial 
conditions of each country.  The idea of projection pursuit is to find the orthogonal 
projections of the data into low dimensional spaces that best display some interesting 
feature of the data.  A well-known special case of projection pursuit is principal 
components analysis.  In principal components analysis, one takes only as many 
components as are necessary to account for “most” of the variation in the data.  Similarly, 
in projection pursuit one should only consider as many dimensions as needed to account 
for “most” of the clustering in the data.  
Desdoigts finds several interesting clusters.  The first is the OECD countries.  The 
two projections identifying this cluster put most of their weight on the primary and 
secondary school enrollment rates, the 1960 income gap and the rate of growth in the 
labor force.  The prominence of variables that Desdoigts argues are proxies for initial 
                                                 
50GUIDE originates in Loh (2002). 
51Projection pursuit is developed in Friedman and Tukey (1974) and Friedman (1987).  
Appendix A of Desdoigts (1999) provides a useful primer. 
 
  92conditions among those defining the projections leads him to conclude that initial 
conditions are more important in defining this cluster than are other country 
characteristics.  Reapplication of the clustering method to the remaining (non-OECD) 
countries yields three sub-clusters that can be described as Africa, Southeast Asia, and 
Latin America.  Here the projections put most weight on government consumption, the 
secondary school enrollment rate and investment in electrical machinery and 
transportation equipment. Most of these variables are argued to proxy for structural 
characteristics of the economies, suggesting that they, rather than initial conditions, are 
responsible for the differences in growth experiences across the three geographic sub-
clusters.  Nevertheless, this approach relies on the judgment of the researcher in 
determining which variables proxy for initial conditions and which proxy for structural 
characteristics.    
  Further evidence of the utility of projection pursuit methods may be found in 
Kourtellos (2003b). Unlike Desdoigts, Kourtellos (2003b) uses projection pursuit to 
construct models of the growth process.  Formally, he estimates models of the form 
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Each element in the summation represents a distinct projection.  Kourtellos uncovers 
evidence of two steady-states, one for low initial income and low initial human capital 
countries.  
A third approach to multiple regimes is employed by Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 
(2003) based on the observation that if long-run outcomes are determined by fundamental 
forces alone, the relationship between exogenous variables and income levels ought to be 
unique.  If initial conditions play a role there will be multiple relationships – one for each 
basin of attraction defined by initial conditions.  If there are two (stochastic) steady states, 
and large shocks are sufficiently infrequent,
 52 the system will, under suitable regularity 
 
52The assumed rarity of large shocks implies that movements between basins of attraction 
of each of the steady states are sufficiently infrequent that they can be ignored in 
  93conditions, exhibit an invariant probability measure that can be described by a “reduced 
form” model in which the long-run behavior of   depends only on the exogenous 
variables,  , such as  
, log it y
i m
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where  and  are independent, zero-mean deviations from the steady-state log 
means log  and log  respectively, and 
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 is in the basin of attraction of the first of the two steady states.  From the perspective of 
the econometrician,   thus obeys a mixture process.  The two steady states 
associated with (56) and (57) are possibly interpretable as a low-income regime or 
poverty trap and as a high-income or perpetual growth regime respectively.  Bloom, 
Canning and Sevilla estimate a linear version of this model using 1985 income data from 
152 countries with the absolute value of the latitude of the (approximate) center of each 
country as the fundamental exogenous variable. They are able to reject the null 
hypothesis of a single regime model in favor of the alternative of a model with two 
regimes – a high-level (manufacturing and services) steady state in which income is 
independent of latitude and a low-level (agricultural) steady-state in which income 
depends on latitude (presumably through its influence on climate).  In addition, the 
probability of being in the high-level steady state is found to rise with latitude. 
i
, log it y
A final approach to multiple regimes is due to Canova (2004) who introduces a 
procedure for panel data that estimates the number of groups and the assignment of 
countries or regions to these groups, drawing on Bayesian ideas. This approach has the 
                                                                                                                                                 
estimation.  This assumption is consistent with, for example, Bianchi’s (1997) finding of 
very little mobility in the cross-country income distribution.  
  94important feature that it allows for parameter heterogeneity across-countries within a 
given subgroup.  The researcher can order the countries or regions by various criteria (for 
example, output per capita in the pre-sample period) and the estimation procedure then 
chooses break points and group membership in such a way that the predictive ability of 
the overall model is maximized.  This approach is applied to autoregressive models of per 
capita output as in eq. (54) above. 
Using data on per capita income data in the regions of Europe, Canova (2004) 
finds that ordering the data by initial income maximizes the marginal likelihood of the 
model and breaks the data into 4 clusters.  The estimated mean steady-states for each 
group are significantly different from each other implying that the groups are 
convergence clubs.  The differences in the means are also economically important with 
the lowest and highest being 45% and 115% of the overall average respectively.  Canova 
finds little across-group mobility especially among those regions that are initially poor.  
Using data on per capita income in the OECD countries, two clusters are found and, 
again, initial per capita income is the preferred ordering variable.  The estimated model 
parameters imply an “economically large” long-run difference in the average incomes of 
countries in the two groups with little mobility between them. 
In assessing these analyses, it is important to recognize an identification problem 
in attempting to link evidence of multiple growth regimes to particular theoretical growth 
models.  As argued in Durlauf and Johnson (1995), this identification problem relates to 
whether evidence of multiple regimes represents evidence of multiple steady-states as 
opposed to nonlinearity in the growth process.   
To see why this is so, suppose that one has identified two sets of countries that 
obey separate growth regimes with regime membership determined by a country’s initial 
capital stock, i.e. there exists a capital threshold   that divides the two groups of 
countries.  An example of this can be seen in Figure 8.  Clearly, the two sets of countries 
do not obey a common linear model but it is not clear whether or not multiple steady-
states exist.  The output behavior of low capital countries is compatible with either the 
solid or dashed curve in the lower part of the figure, but only the solid curve produces 
multiple steady-states.  The identification problem stems from the fact that one does not 
have observations that allow one to distinguish differences in the long-run behavior of 
T k
  95countries that start with capital stocks in the vicinity of  .  This argument does not 
depend on growth regimes determined by the capital stock but it does depend on whether 
or not the variable or variables that define the regimes are growing over time, as would 
occur for initial income or initial literacy.  For growing variables, the possibility exists 
that countries currently associated with low levels of the variable will in the future exhibit 
behaviors that are similar to those countries which are currently associated with high 
levels of the variables. 
T k
 




How might evidence of multiple steady-states be achieved?  One possibility is via 
the use of structural models in empirical analysis. While this has not been done 
econometrically, Graham and Temple (2003) follow this strategy and calibrate a two-
sector general equilibrium model with increasing returns to scale in nonagricultural 
production.  Their empirically motivated choice of calibration parameters produces a 
model which implies that some countries are in a low-output equilibrium.  Another 
possibility is to exploit time series variation in a single country to identify the presence of 
jumps from one equilibrium or steady state to another.   
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Our discussion of growth econometrics now shifts from general issues of 
hypothesis testing and model specification to explore specific econometric issues that 
arise in the estimation of growth models.  This section reviews econometric issues that 
arise for the different types of data structures that appear in growth analyses.  By data 
structures, we refer to features such as whether the data are observed in cross-section, 
time series, or panel as well as to whether particular data series are conceptualized as 
endogenous or exogenous.  At the risk of stating the obvious, choices of method involve 
significant trade-offs, which depend partly on statistical considerations and partly on the 
economic context. This means that attempts at universal prescriptions are misguided, and 
we will try to show the desirability of matching techniques to the economic question at 
hand. 
One example, to be discussed further below, would be the choice between panel 
data methods and the estimation of separate time series regressions for each country. The 
use of panel data is likely to increase efficiency and allow richer models to be estimated, 
but at the expense of potentially serious biases if the parameter homogeneity assumptions 
are incorrect. This trade-off between robustness and efficiency is another running theme 
of our survey. The scientific solution would be to base the choice of estimation method 
on a context-specific loss function, but this is clearly a difficult task, and in practice more 
subjective decisions are involved.   
This section has four main elements. Section VI.i examines econometric issues 
that arise in the use of time series data to study growth, emphasizing some of the 
drawbacks of this approach.  Section VI.ii discusses the many issues that arise when 
panel data are employed, an increasingly popular approach to growth questions. We 
consider the estimation of dynamic models in the presence of fixed effects, and 
alternatives to standard procedures. Section VI.iii describes another increasingly popular 
approach, namely the use of “event studies” to analyze growth behavior, based on 
studying responses to major shocks such as policy reforms.  Section VI.iv examines 
endogeneity and the use of instrumental variables.  We argue that the use of instrumental 
variables in growth contexts is more problematic than is often appreciated and suggest 
  98the importance of combining instrumental variable choice with a systematic approach to 
model selection. 
 
i. time series approaches 
 
At first glance, the most natural way to understand growth would be to examine 
time series data for each country in isolation. As we saw previously, growth varies 
substantially over time, and countries experience distinct events that contribute to this 
variation, such as changes in government and in economic policy. 
In practice a time series approach runs into substantial difficulties. One key 
constraint is the available data. For many developing countries, some of the most 
important data are only available on an annual basis, with limited coverage before the 
1960s. Moreover, the listing of annual data in widely used sources and online databases 
can be misleading, because some key variables are measured less frequently. For 
example, population figures are often based primarily on census data, while measures of 
average educational attainment are often constructed by interpolating between census 
observations using school enrollments. When examining published data, it is not always 
clear where this kind of interpolation has been used.  The true extent of information in the 
time series variation may be less than appears at first glance, and conventional standard 
errors on parameter estimates will be misleading when interpolated data are used.  
Even where reliable data are available, some key growth determinants display 
relatively little time variation, a point that has been emphasized by Easterly et al (1993), 
Easterly (2001) and Pritchett (2000a). There do exist other variables that appear to show 
significant variation, but this variation may not correspond to the concept the researcher 
has in mind. An example would be political stability. Since Barro (1991), researchers 
have sometimes used the incidence of political revolutions and coups as a measure of 
political instability. The interpretation of such an index clearly varies depending on the 
length of the time period used to construct it. If the hypothesis of interest relates to 
underlying political uncertainty (say, the ex-ante probability of a transfer of power) then 
the observations on political instability would need to be averaged over a long time 
  99period. The variation in political instability at shorter horizons only casts light on a 
different hypothesis, namely the direct impact of revolutions and coups.   
There are other significant problems with the time series approach. The 
hypotheses of most interest to growth theorists are mainly about the evolution of potential 
output, not deviations from potential output such as business cycles and output collapses. 
Since measured output is a noisy indicator of potential output, it is easy for the 
econometric modeling of a growth process to be contaminated by business cycle 
dynamics. A simple way to illustrate this would be to consider what happens if measured 
log output is equal to the log of potential output plus a random error. If log output is trend 
stationary, this is a classical measurement error problem. When lags of output or the 
growth rate are used as explanatory variables, the parameter estimates will be 
inconsistent.  
Such problems are likely to be even more serious in developing countries, where 
large slumps or crises are not uncommon, and output may deviate for long periods from 
any previous structural trend (Pritchett (2000a)). We have already seen the extent to 
which output behaves very differently in developing countries compared to OECD 
members, and a major collapse in output is not a rare event. There may be no underlying 
trend in the sense commonly understood, and conventional time series methods should be 
applied with caution. Some techniques that are widely used in the literature on business 
cycles in developed countries, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter, will often be 
inappropriate in the context of developing countries. 
The problem of short-run output instability extends further. It is easy to construct 
examples where the difference between observed output and potential output is correlated 
with variables that move up and down at high frequencies, with inflation being one 
obvious example. This means that time series studies of inflation and growth based on 
observed output will find it hard to isolate reliably an effect of inflation on potential 
output; for further discussion see Temple (2000a). When considerations like these are 
combined with the paucity of the available data, it appears a hard task to learn about 
long-term growth using time series regressions, especially when developing countries are 
the main focus of interest. 
  100Nevertheless, despite these problems, there are some hypotheses for which time 
series variation can be informative. We have already seen the gains from time series 
approaches to convergence issues. Jones (1995) and Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) show 
how time series models can be used to discriminate between different growth theories. To 
take the simplest example, the AK model of growth predicts that the growth rate will be a 
function of the share of investment in GDP. Jones points out that investment rates have 
trended upwards in many OECD countries, with no corresponding increase in growth 
rates. Although this might be explained by offsetting changes in other growth 
determinants, it does provide evidence against simple versions of the AK model. 
Jones (1995) and Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) develop a statistical test of 
endogenous growth models based on regressing growth on lagged growth and a lagged 
policy variable (or the lagged investment rate, as in Jones). Exogenous growth models 
predict that the coefficients on the lagged policy variable should sum to zero, indicating 
no long-run effect of permanent changes in this variable on the growth rate. In contrast, 
some endogenous growth models imply that the sum of coefficients should be non-zero. 
A simple time series regression then provides a direct test of the predictions of these 
models. More formally, as in Jones (1995), for a given country i one can investigate a 
dynamic relationship for the growth rate , it γ  where  
 
  ,, 1 , () () it it it it AL BLz , γ γ − ε = ++  (58) 
 
. 
wherez is the policy variable or growth determinant of interest, and   and  () AL () B L  are 
lag polynomials assumed to be compatible with stationarity.  The hypothesis of interest is 
whether  . If the sum of the coefficients in the lag polynomial  (1) 0 B ≠ () B L  is 
significantly different from zero, this implies that a permanent change in the variable z 
will affect the growth rate indefinitely. As Jones (1995) explicitly discusses, this test is 
best seen as indicating whether a policy change affects growth over a long horizon, rather 
than firmly identifying or rejecting the presence of a long-run growth effect in the 
theoretical sense of that term. The theoretical conditions under which policy variables 
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models are best seen as new theories of potentially sizeable level effects.
53
This approach is closely related to Granger-causality testing, where the hypothesis 
of interest would be the explanatory power of lags of  , it Z  for  , it γ  conditional on lagged 
values of  , it γ . Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan (1996) carry out Granger-causality tests for 
investment and growth using panel data with five-year subperiods. They find strong 
evidence that lagged growth rates have explanatory power for investment rates, but much 
weaker evidence for causality in the more conventional direction from investment to 
growth. Hence, the partial correlation between growth and investment found in many 
cross-section studies may not reflect a causal effect of investment.  In a similar vein, 
Campos and Nugent (2002) find that, once Granger-causality tests are applied, the 
evidence that political instability affects growth may be weaker than usually believed.  
The motivation for these two studies, and others like them, is that evidence of 
temporal precedence helps to build a case that one variable is influenced by another. 
When this idea is extended to panels, an underlying assumption is that timing patterns 
and effects will be similar across units (countries or regions). Potential heterogeneity has 
sometimes been acknowledged, as in the observation of Campos and Nugent (2002) that 
their results are heavily influenced by the African countries in the sample. The potential 
importance of these factors is also established in Binder and Brock (2004) who, by using 
panel methods to allow for heterogeneity in country-specific dynamics, find feedbacks 
from investment to growth beyond those that appear in Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan 
(1996). 
A second issue is more technical. Since testing for Granger-causality using panel 
data requires a dynamic model, the use of a standard fixed effects (within groups) 
estimator is likely to be inappropriate when individual effects are present. We discuss this 
further in section VI below. One potential solution is the use of instrumental variable 
procedures, as in Campos and Nugent (2002).
 In the context of investment and growth, a 
comprehensive examination of the associated econometric issues has been carried out by 
                                                 
53See Temple (2003) for more discussion of this point and the long-run implications of 
different growth models. 
 
  102Bond, Leblebicioglu, and Schiantarelli (2004). Their work shows that these issues are 
more than technicalities: unlike Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan (1996), they find strong 
evidence that investment has a causal effect on growth. 
A familiar objection to the more ambitious interpretations of Granger-causality is 
that much economic behavior is forward-looking (see for example Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997b)). The movements of stock markets are one instance where 
temporal sequences can be misleading about causality. Similarly, when entrepreneurs or 
governments invest heavily in infrastructure projects, or when unusually high inflows of 
foreign direct investment are observed, the fact that such investments precede strong 
growth does not establish a causal effect. 
 
ii. panel data 
 
As we emphasized above, the prospects for reliable generalizations in empirical 
growth research are often constrained by the limited number of countries available. This 
constraint makes parameter estimates imprecise, and also limits the extent to which 
researchers can apply more sophisticated methods, such as semiparametric estimators. 
A natural response to this constraint is to use the within-country variation to 
multiply the number of observations.  Using different episodes within the same country is 
ultimately the only practical substitute for somehow increasing the number of countries. 
To the extent that important variables change over time, this appears the most promising 
way to sidestep many of the problems that face growth researchers. Moreover, as the 
years pass and more data become available, the prospects for informative work of this 
kind can only improve.  
We first discuss the implementation and advantages of panel data estimators in 
more detail, and then some of the technical issues that arise in the context of growth. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, these methods introduce a set of problems of their own, and 
should not be regarded as a panacea. Too often, panel data results are interpreted without 
sufficient care and risk leading researchers astray. In particular, we highlight the care 
needed in interpreting estimates based on fixed effects.  
  103We will use T to denote the number of time series observations in a panel of N 
countries or regions. At first sight, T should be relatively high in this context, because of 
the availability of annual data. But the concerns about time series analysis raised above 
continue to apply. Important variables are either measured at infrequent intervals, or 
show little year-to-year variation that can be used to identify their effects. Moreover, 
variation in growth rates at annual frequencies may give very misleading answers about 
the longer-term growth process. For this reason, most panel data studies in the growth 
field have averaged data over five or ten year periods. Given the lack of data before 1960, 
this implies that growth panels not only have relatively few cross-sectional units (the 
number of countries employed is often between 50 and 100) but also very low values of 
T, often 5 or 6 at most.
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Most empirical growth models estimated using panel data are based on the 
hypothesis of conditional convergence, namely that countries converge to parallel 
equilibrium growth paths, the levels of which are a function of a few variables. A 
corollary is that an equation for growth (essentially the first difference of log output) 
should contain some dynamics in lagged output. In this case, the growth equation can be 
rewritten as a dynamic panel data model in which current output is regressed on controls 
and lagged output, as in Islam (1995). In statistical terms this is the same model, the only 
difference of interpretation being that the coefficient on initial output (originallyβ ) is 
now 1 β + : 
 
  ,, 1 , , log (1 )log it it it it i t it yy X Z, β ψπ α µ − =+ + + ++ + ε  (59) 
 
This regression is a general panel analog to the cross-section regression (18). In 
this formulation,  i α  is a country-specific effect and  t µ  is a time-specific effect. The 
inclusion of time-specific effects is important in the growth context, not least because the 
means of the log output series will typically increase over time, given productivity 
growth at the world level. 
                                                 
54This is true of the many published studies that have used version 5.6 of the Penn World 
Tables.  Now that more recent data are available, there is more scope for estimating 
panels with a longer time dimension. 
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income between countries that are not captured by   or  , it X , it Z .  In principle, one can also 
allow the parameters 1 β + ,  ψ , and π  to differ across i; Lee, Pesaran, and Smith 
(1997,1998) do this for the coefficients for  ,1 log it y −  and a linear time trend (the latter 
allowing for steady-state differences in the rate of technological change, corresponding to 
non-parallel growth paths in the steady state). 
The vast majority of panel data growth studies use a fixed effects (within-group) 
estimator rather than a random effects estimator. Standard random effects estimators 
require that the individual effects  i α  are distributed independently of the explanatory 
variables, and this requirement is clearly violated for a dynamic panel such as (59) by 
construction, given the dependence of   on  , log it y i α .  
Given the popularity of fixed effects estimators, it is important to understand how 
these estimators work.  In a fixed effects regression there is a full set of country-specific 
intercepts, one for each country, and inference proceeds conditional on the particular 
countries observed (a natural choice in this context). Identification of the slope 
parameters, usually constrained to be the same across countries, relies on variation over 
time within each country. The “between” variation, namely the variation across countries 
in the long-run averages of the variables, is not used.   
The key strength of this method, familiar from the microeconometric literature, is 
the ability to address one form of unobserved heterogeneity: any omitted variables that 
are constant over time will not bias the estimates, even if the omitted variables are 
correlated with the explanatory variables.  Intuitively, the country-specific intercepts can 
be seen as picking up the combined effects of all such variables. This is the usual 
motivation for using fixed effects in the growth context, especially in estimating 
conditional convergence regressions, as is further discussed in Islam (1995), Caselli 
Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) and Temple (1999). A particular motivation for the use of 
fixed effects arises from the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) implementation of the 
Solow model. As discussion in Section III, their version of the model implies that one 
determinant of the level of the steady-state growth path is the initial level of efficiency 
( ,0 i A ) and cross-section heterogeneity in it should usually be regarded as unobservable, 
  105cf. eq. (15).  Islam (1995) explicitly develops a specification in which this term is treated 
as a fixed effect, while world growth and common shocks are incorporated using time-
specific effects. 
The use of panel data methods to address unobserved heterogeneity can bring 
substantial gains in robustness, but is not without costs. The fixed-effects identification 
strategy cannot be applied in all contexts. Sometimes a variable of interest is measured at 
only one point in time. Even where variables are measured at more frequent intervals, 
some are highly persistent, in which case the within-country variation is unlikely to be 
informative. At one extreme, some explanatory variables of interest are essentially fixed 
factors, like geographic characteristics or ethnolinguistic diversity. Here the only 
available variation is “between-country”, and empirical work will have to be based on 
cross-sections or pooled cross-section time-series. Alternatively a two-stage hybrid of 
these methods can be used, in which a panel data estimator is used to obtain estimates of 
the fixed effects, which are then explicitly modeled in a second stage as in Hoeffler 
(2002).  As we discuss further below, an important direction for future panel data work 
may be the analysis of the information content of country-specific effects. 
A common failing of panel data studies based on within-country variation is that 
researchers do not pay enough attention to the dynamics of adjustment. There are many 
panel data papers on human capital and growth that test only whether a change in school 
enrollment or years of schooling has an immediate effect on aggregate productivity, 
which seems an implausible hypothesis. Another example, given by Pritchett (2000a), is 
the use of panels to study inequality and growth. All too often, changes in the distribution 
of income are implicitly expected to have an immediate impact on growth.  Yet many of 
the relevant theoretical papers highlight long-run effects, and there is a strong 
presumption that much of the short-run variation in measures of inequality is due to 
measurement error. In these circumstances, it is hard to see how the available within-
country variation can shed much useful light. 
There is also a more general problem. Since the fixed effects estimator ignores the 
between-country variation, the reduction in bias typically comes at the expense of higher 
standard errors. Another reason for imprecision is that either of the devices used to 
eliminate the country-specific intercepts – the within-groups transformation or first-
  106differencing – will tend to exacerbate the effect of measurement error.
55  As a result, it is 
common for researchers using panel data models with fixed effects, especially in the 
context of small T, to obtain imprecise sets of parameter estimates.  
Given the potentially unattractive trade-off between robustness and efficiency, 
Barro (1997), Temple (1999), Pritchett (2000a) and Wacziarg (2002) all argue that the 
use of fixed effects in empirical growth models has to be approached with care. The price 
of eliminating the misleading component of the between variation – namely, the variation 
due to unobserved heterogeneity – is that all the between variation is lost.  
There are alternative ways to reveal this point, but consider the random effects 
GLS estimator of the slope parameters, which will be more efficient than the within-
country estimator for small T when the random-effects assumptions are appropriate. This 
GLS estimator can be written as a matrix-weighted average of the within-country 
estimator and the between-country estimator, which is based on averaging the data over 
time and then estimating a simple cross-section regression by OLS.
56 The weights on the 
two sets of parameter estimates are the inverses of their respective variances. The 
corollary of high standard errors using within-country estimation, indicating that the 
within-country variation is relatively uninformative, is that random effects estimates 
based on a panel of five-yearly averages are very similar to OLS estimates based on 
thirty-year averages (Wacziarg (2002)). Informally, the random effects estimator sees the 
between-country variation as offering the greatest scope for identifying the parameters.
57  
This should not be surprising: growth episodes within countries inevitably look a 
great deal more alike than growth episodes across countries, and therefore offer less 
identifying variation. Restricting the analysis to the within variation eliminates one 
source of bias, but immediately makes it harder to identify growth effects with any 
degree of precision.  This general problem is discussed in Pritchett (2000a). Many of the 
                                                 
55See Arellano (2003, p. 47-51) for a more formal treatment of this issue.  
56This result holds for the GLS estimator of the random effects model. In practice, since 
the true variance components are unknown, feasible GLS must be used. 
57Of course, this does not imply that the random effects estimator is the best choice; as 
we have seen, the underlying assumptions for consistency of the estimator are necessarily 
invalid for a dynamic panel.  Instead, our discussion is intended to draw attention to the 
trade-off between bias and efficiency in deciding whether or not to use fixed-effects 
estimation.  
  107explanatory variables currently used in growth research are either highly stable over time, 
or tending to trend in one direction. Educational attainment is an obvious example. 
Without useful identifying variation in the time series data, the within-country approach 
is in trouble.  Moreover, growth is quite volatile at short horizons. It will typically be 
hard to explain this variation using predictors that show little variation over time, or that 
are measured with substantial errors. The result has been a number of panel data studies 
suggesting that a given variable “does not matter” when a more accurate interpretation is 
that its effect cannot be identified using the data at hand.  
Some of these problems suggest a natural alternative to the within-country 
estimator, which is to devote more attention to modeling the heterogeneity, rather than 
treating it as unobserved (Temple (1999)). To put this differently, current panel data 
methods treat the individual effects as nuisance parameters. As argued by Durlauf and 
Quah (1999) this is clearly inappropriate in the growth context. The individual effects are 
of fundamental interest to growth economists because they appear to be a key source of 
persistent income differences. This suggests that more attention should be given to 
modeling the heterogeneity rather than finding ways to eliminate its effects.
58
Depending on the sources of heterogeneity, even simple recommendations, such 
as including a complete set of regional dummies, can help to alleviate the biases 
associated with omitted variables. More than a decade of growth research has identified a 
host of fixed factors that could be used to substitute for country-specific intercepts. A 
growth model that includes these variables can still exploit the panel structure of the data, 
and overall this approach has clear advantages in both statistical and economic terms. It 
means that the between variation is retained, rather than entirely thrown away, while the 
explicit modeling of the country-specific effects is directly informative about the sources 
of persistent income and growth differences. 
In practice, the literature has focused on another aspect of using panel data 
estimators to investigate growth. Nickell (1981) showed that within-groups estimates of a 
                                                 
58Note that fixed-effects estimators could retain a useful role, because it would be natural 
to compare their parameter estimates with those obtained using a specific model for the 
heterogeneity.  Where the estimates of common parameters, such as the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable, are different across the two methods, this could indicate the 
chosen model for the heterogeneity is misspecified. 
  108dynamic panel data model can be badly biased for small T, even as N goes to infinity. 
The direction of this bias is such that, in a growth model, output appears less persistent 
than it should (the estimate of β  is too low) and the rate of conditional convergence will 
be overestimated. 
In other areas of economics, it has become increasingly common to avoid the 
within-groups estimator when estimating dynamic models. The most widely-used 
alternative strategy is to difference the model to eliminate the fixed effects, and then use 
two stage least squares or GMM to address the correlation between the differenced 
lagged dependent variable and the induced MA(1) error term. To see the need for 
instrumental variable procedures, first-difference (59) to obtain 
 
  ,, 1 , , log (1 ) log it it it it i it it yy X Z , , 1 β ψπ µ ε ε − − ∆ = + ∆ +∆ +∆ +∆ + −  (60) 
 
and note that (absent an unlikely error structure) the  ,1 log it y − component of  ,1 log it y − ∆ will 
be correlated with the 1 it ε − component of the new composite error term, as is clearly seen 
by considering equation (59) lagged one period. Hence, at least one of the explanatory 
variables in the first-differenced equation will be correlated with the disturbances, and 
instrumental variable procedures are required. 
Arellano and Bond (1991), building on work by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen 
(1988), developed the GMM approach to dynamic panels in detail, including methods 
suitable for unbalanced panels and specification tests. Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort 
(1996) applied their estimator in the growth context and, as discussed above, this 
approach yielded a much faster rate of conditional convergence than found in cross-
section studies.  
The GMM approach is typically based on using lagged levels of the series as 
instruments for lagged first differences. If the error terms in the levels equation ( it ε ) are 
serially uncorrelated then  ,1 log it y − ∆  can be instrumented using   and earlier 
lagged levels (where available). This corresponds to a set of moment conditions that can 
be used to estimate the first-differenced equation by GMM. Bond (2002) provides an 
accessible introduction to this approach. 
,2 log it y −
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could alleviate biases due to measurement error and endogenous explanatory variables. In 
practice, many researchers are skeptical that lags are suitable instruments. It is easy to see 
that a variable such as educational attainment may influence output with a considerable 
delay, so that the exclusion of lags from the growth equation can look arbitrary. More 
generally, the GMM approach relies on a lack of serial correlation in the error terms of 
the growth equation (before differencing). Although this assumption can be tested using 
the methods developed in Arellano and Bond (1991), and can also be relaxed by an 
appropriate choice of instruments, it is nevertheless restrictive in some contexts.  
Another concern is that the explanatory variables may be highly persistent, as is 
clearly true of output. Lagged levels can then be weak instruments for first differences, 
and the GMM panel data estimator is likely to be severely biased in short panels. Bond, 
Hoeffler, and Temple (2001) illustrate this point by comparing the Caselli, Esquivel, and 
Lefort (1996) estimates of the coefficient on lagged output with OLS and within-group 
estimates. Since the OLS and within-group estimates of β  are biased in opposing 
directions then, leaving aside sampling variability and small-sample considerations, a 
consistent parameter estimate should lie between these two extremes (see Nerlove 
(1999,2000)). Formally, when the explanatory variables other than lagged output are 
strictly exogenous, we have 
 
  ˆˆ lim lim lim WG OLS pp p ˆ ββ β <<  (61) 
 
where  ˆ β  is a consistent parameter estimate, ˆ
WG β  is the within-groups estimate and  ˆ
OLS β  
is the estimate from a straightforward pooled OLS regression. For the data set and model 
used by Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, this large-sample prediction is not valid, which 
raises a question mark over the reliability of the first-differenced GMM estimates. 
One device that can be informative in short panels is to make more restrictive 
assumptions about the initial conditions. If the observations at the start of the sample are 
distributed in a way that is representative of steady-state behavior, in a sense that can be 
made more precise, efficiency gains are possible. Assumptions about the initial 
  110conditions can be used to derive a “system” GMM estimator, of the form developed and 
studied by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), and also discussed 
in Ahn and Schmidt (1995) and Hahn (1999). In this estimator, not only are lagged levels 
used as instruments for first differences, but lagged first differences are used as 
instruments for levels, which corresponds to an extra set of moment conditions. 
There is some Monte Carlo evidence (Blundell and Bond (1998)) that this 
estimator is more robust than the Arellano-Bond method in the presence of highly 
persistent series. As also shown by Blundell and Bond (1998), the necessary assumptions 
can be seen in terms of an extra restriction, namely that the deviations of the initial values 
of   from their long-run values are not systematically  related to the individual 
effects.
, log it y
59  For simplicity, we focus on the case where there are no explanatory variables 
other than lagged output. The required assumption on the initial conditions is that, for all 
 we have  1, , i = … N
 
  ( ) ,1 log 0 ii i Ey y α ⎡⎤ − = ⎣⎦  (62) 
 
where the  i y  are the long-run values of the   series and are therefore functions of 
the individual effects 
, log it y
i α and the autoregressive parameterβ . This assumption on the 
initial conditions ensures that  
 
  ,2 log 0 ii Ey α ⎡⎤ ∆ = ⎣⎦  (63) 
 
and this together with the mild assumption that the changes in the errors are uncorrelated 
with the individual effects, i.e.  
 
  , 0 it i E εα ⎡⎤ ∆ = ⎣⎦  (64) 
 
                                                 
59Note that the long-run values of log output are evolving over time when time-specific 
effects are included in the model. 
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Intuitively, as is clear from the new moment conditions, the extra assumptions ensure that 
the lagged first difference of the dependent variable is a valid instrument for 
untransformed equations in levels since it is uncorrelated with the composite error term in 
the levels equation.  These extra moment conditions can then be combined with the more 
conventional conditions used in the Arellano-Bond method. This builds in some 
insurance against weak identification, because if the series are persistent and lagged 
levels are weak instruments for first differences, it may still be the case that lagged first 
differences have some explanatory power for levels.
60
In principle, the validity of the restrictions on the initial conditions can be tested 
using the incremental Sargan statistic (or C statistic) associated with the additional 
moment conditions. Yet the validity of the restriction should arguably be evaluated in 
wider terms, based on some knowledge of the historical forces giving rise to the observed 
initial conditions. This point – that key statistical assumptions should not always be 
evaluated only in statistical terms – is one that we will return to later.   
Alternatives to GMM have been proposed. Kiviet (1995,1999) derives an 
analytical approximation to the Nickell bias that can be used to construct a bias-adjusted 
within-country estimator for dynamic panels. The simulation evidence reported in Judson 
and Owen (1999) and Bun and Kiviet (2001) suggests that this estimator performs well 
relative to standard alternatives when N and T are small.  One minor limitation is that it 
cannot yet be applied to an unbalanced panel.  A more serious limitation, relative to 
GMM, is that it does not address the possible correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the disturbances due to simultaneity and measurement error.  Nevertheless, 
for researchers determined to use fixed effects estimation, there is a clear case for 
implementing this bias adjustment, at least as a complement to other methods. 
 
60An alternative approach would be to use small-sample bias adjustments for GMM panel 
data estimators, such as those described in Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2001). 
  112A further issue that arises when estimating dynamic panel data models is that of 
parameter heterogeneity. If a slope parameter such as β  varies across countries, and the 
explanatory variable is serially correlated, this will induce serial correlation in the error 
term. If we focus on a simple case where a researcher wrongly assumes  β β = i  for all 
 then the error process for a given country will contain a component that 
resembles  . Hence there is serial correlation in the errors, given the 
persistence of output. The estimates of a dynamic panel data model will be inconsistent 
even if GMM methods are applied. 
1, , i = … N
i t () ,1 log i y ββ − −
This problem was analyzed in more general terms by Robertson and Symons 
(1992) and Pesaran and Smith (1995) and has been explored in great depth for the growth 
context by Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1997,1998). Since an absence of serial correlation in 
the disturbances is usually a critical assumption for the GMM approach, parameter 
heterogeneity can be a serious concern. Some of the possible solutions, such as 
regressions applied to single time series, or the pooled mean group estimator developed 
by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999), have limitations in studying growth for reasons 
already discussed. An alternative solution is to split the sample into groups that are more 
likely to share similar parameter values. Groupings by regional location or level of 
development are a natural starting point.  
Perhaps the state of the art in analyzing growth using panel data and allowing for 
parameter heterogeneity is represented by Phillips and Sul (2003). They allow for 
heterogeneity in parameters not only across countries, but also over time.  Temporal 
heterogeneity is rarely investigated in panel studies, but may be important, especially if 
observed growth patterns combine transitional dynamics towards a country’s steady state 
with fluctuations around that steady-state. Phillips and Sul find some evidence of 
convergence towards steady states for OECD economies as well as US regions. 
We close our discussion of panel data approaches by noting some unresolved 
issues in their application. It is important to be aware how panel data methods change the 
substantive interpretation of regression results, and care is needed when moving between 
the general forms of the estimators and the economic hypotheses under study. Relevant 
examples occur in analyses of β -convergence. If one finds β -convergence in a panel 
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than if one finds evidence of convergence in the absence of fixed effects.  Specifically, 
the presence of fixed effects represents an immediate violation of our convergence 
definitions (20) or (22) as different economies must exhibit steady-state differences in per 
capita income regardless of whether they have identical saving rates and population 
growth rates.
61  Fixed effects may even control for the presence of unmodelled 
determinants of steady state growth, an identification problem analogous to the one that 
was previously discussed in the context of interpreting the control variables Z  in 
equations (17) and (18) above.  Similarly, allowing for differences in time trends for per 
capita output, as done in Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1997,1998) means that the finding of 
extremely rapid β -convergence is consistent with long-run divergence of per capita 
output across the economies they study; the long-run balanced growth paths are no longer 
parallel. In an interesting exchange, Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1998) criticize Islam (1995) 
for failing to allow for different time trends across countries. In response, Islam (1998) 
argues that Lee, Pesaran, and Smith are assessing an economically uninteresting form of 
convergence when they allow for trend differences.  This debate is an excellent example 
of the issues of interpretation that are raised in moving between specific economic 
hypotheses and more general statistical models. 
One drawback of many current panel studies is that the construction of the time 
series observations can appear arbitrary. There is no inherent reason why 5 or 10 years 
represent natural spans over which to average observations. Similarly, there is 
arbitrariness with respect to which time periods are aggregated. A useful endeavor would 
be the development of tools to ensure that panel findings are robust with respect to the 
assumptions employed in creating the panel from the raw data.   
More fundamentally, the empirical growth literature has not fully addressed the 
question of the appropriate time horizons over which growth models should be assessed.  
For example, it remains unclear when business cycle considerations (or instances of 
output collapses) may be safely ignored when modeling the growth process.  While cross-
section studies that examine growth over 30-40 year periods might be exempt from this 
                                                 
61 The impact of controlling fixed effects for interpreting β -convergence is recognized in 
the conclusion to Islam (1995).  
  114consideration, it is less clear that panel studies employing 5-year averages are genuinely 
informative about medium-run growth dynamics.  
 
iii. event study approaches 
 
Although we have focused on the limitations of panel data methods, it is clear that 
the prospects for informative work of this kind should improve over time. The addition of 
further time periods is valuable in itself, and the history of developing countries in the 
1980s and 1990s offers various events that introduce richer time series variation into the 
data. These events include waves of democratization, macroeconomic stabilization, 
financial liberalization, and trade liberalization, and panel data methods can be used to 
investigate their unfolding consequences for growth.  
An alternative approach has become popular, and proceeds in a similar way to 
event studies in the empirical finance literature. In event studies, researchers look for 
systematic changes in asset returns after a discrete event, such as a profits warning. In 
fields outside finance, before-and-after studies like this have proved an informative way 
to gauge the effects of devaluations (see Pritchett (2000a) for references), of inflation 
stabilization (Easterly (1996)) and the consequences of the debt crisis for investment, as 
in Warner (1992). 
Pritchett (2000a) argues that there is a great deal of scope for studying the growth 
impact of major events and policy changes in a similar way. The obvious approach is to 
study the time paths of variables such as output growth, investment and TFP growth, 
examined before and after such events. In empirical growth research, Henry (2000,2003) 
has applied this form of analysis to the effects of stock market liberalization on 
investment and growth, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) have considered economic and 
political liberalizations, while Wacziarg and Welch (2003) have studied the effects of 
trade liberalization. Depending on the context, one can also study the response of other 
variables in a way that is informative about the channels of influence. For example, in the 
case of trade liberalization, it is natural to study the response of the trade share, as in the 
work of Wacziarg and Welch. 
  115The rigor of this method should not be overplayed. As with any other approach to 
empirical growth, one has to be cautious about inferring a causal effect. This is clear from 
exploring the analogy with treatment effects, a focus of recent research in 
microeconometrics and labor economics.
62 In the study of growth, the treatments – such 
as democratization – are clearly not exogenously assigned, but are events that have arisen 
endogenously. Moreover, the treatment effects will be heterogeneous and could depend, 
for example, on whether a policy change is seen as temporary or permanent (Pritchett 
(2000a)).  In these circumstances, the ability to quantify even an average treatment effect 
is strongly circumscribed. It may be possible to identify the direction of effects, and here 
the limited number of observations does have one advantage. With a small number of 
cases to examine, it is easy for the researcher to present a graphical analysis that allows 
readers to gauge the extent of heterogeneity in responses, and the overall pattern. At the 
very least, this offers a useful complement to regression-based methods. 
 
iv. endogeneity and instrumental variables 
 
A final set of data-based issues concerns the identification of instrumental 
variables in cross-section and time series contexts.  An obvious and frequent criticism of 
growth regressions is that they do little to establish directions of causation. At one level, 
there is the standard problem that two variables may be correlated but jointly determined 
by a third. It is very easy to construct growth examples. Variables such as growth and 
political stability could be seen as jointly determined equilibrium outcomes associated 
with, say, a particular set of institutions. In this light, a correlation between growth and 
political stability, even if robust in statistical terms, does not appear especially 
informative about the structural determinants of growth.  
There are many instances in growth research when explanatory variables are 
clearly endogenously determined (in the economic, not the statistical sense). The most 
familiar example would be a regression that relates growth to the ratio of investment to 
                                                 
62This connection with the treatment effect literature is sometimes explicitly made, as in 
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) and Persson and Tabellini (2003). The connection helps to 
understand the limitations of the evidence, but the scope for resolving the associated 
identification problems may be limited in cross-country data sets. 
  116GDP. This may tell us that the investment share and growth are associated, but stops 
short of identifying a causal effect. Even if we are confident that a change in investment 
would affect growth, in a sense this just pushes the relevant question further back, to an 
understanding of what determines investment. 
When variables are endogenously determined in the economic sense, there is also 
a strong chance that they will be endogenous in the technical sense, namely correlated 
with the disturbances in the structural equation for growth. To give an example, consider 
what happens if political instability lowers growth, but slower economic growth feeds 
back into political instability. The estimated regression coefficient will tend to conflate 
these two effects and will be an inconsistent estimate of the causal effect of instability.
63  
Views on the importance of these considerations differ greatly. One position is 
that the whole growth research project effectively capsizes before it has even begun, but 
Mankiw (1995) and Wacziarg (2002) have suggested an alternative view. According to 
them, one should accept that reliable causal statements are almost impossible to make, 
but use the partial correlations of the growth literature to rule out some possible 
hypotheses about the world. Wacziarg uses the example of the negative partial correlation 
between corruption and growth found by Mauro (1995).  Even if shown to be robust, this 
correlation does not establish that somehow reducing corruption will be followed by 
higher growth rates. But it does make it harder to believe some of the earlier suggestions, 
rarely based on evidence, that corruption could be actively beneficial. 
One approach is to model as many as possible of the variables that are 
endogenously determined. A leading example is Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), who 
estimate structural equations for various channels through which democracy could 
influence development.  In their analysis, democracy affects growth via factors such as its 
effect on human capital accumulation, physical capital accumulation, inequality and 
government expenditures.  They conclude the net effect of democracy on growth is 
                                                 
63Although this ‘reverse causality’ interpretation of endogeneity is popular and important, 
it should be remembered that a correlation between an explanatory variable and the error 
term can arise for other reasons, including omitted variables and measurement error. As 
we discuss, it is important to bear this more general interpretation of the error term in 
mind when judging the plausibility of exclusion restrictions in instrumental variable 
procedures. 
  117slightly negative, despite the positive contributions that are made from the role of 
democracy in promoting greater human capital and reduced inequality. 
This approach has some important advantages in both economic and statistical 
terms. It can be informative about underlying mechanisms in a way that much empirical 
growth research is not. From a purely statistical perspective, if the structural equations 
are estimated jointly by methods such as three stage least squares or full information 
maximum likelihood, this is likely to bring efficiency gains. That said, systems 
estimation is not necessarily the best route: it has the important disadvantage that 
specification errors in one of the structural equations could contaminate the estimates 
obtained for the others. 
The most common response to the endogeneity of growth determinants has been 
the application of instrumental variable procedures to a single structural equation, with 
growth as the dependent variable.  As mentioned in Section IV, two growth studies that 
employ instrumental variables estimators based on lagged explanatory variables are Barro 
and Lee (1994) and Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996).  Appendices 3 and 4 describe a 
wide range of other instrumental variables that have been proposed for the Solow 
variables and other growth determinants respectively, where the focus has been on the 
endogeneity of particular variables.  The variety of instruments that have been proposed 
illustrates that it is relatively straightforward to find an instrument that is correlated with 
the endogenous explanatory variable(s).  
This apparent success may be illusory. In our view, the belief that it is easy to 
identify valid instrumental variables in the growth context is deeply mistaken.  We regard 
many applications of instrumental variable procedures in the empirical growth literature 
to be undermined by the failure to address properly the question of whether these 
instruments are valid, i.e. whether they may be plausibly argued to be uncorrelated with 
the error term in a growth regression. When the instrument is invalid, instrumental 
variables estimates will of course be inconsistent.  Not enough is currently known about 
the consequences of “small” departures from validity, but it is certainly possible to 
envisage circumstances under which ordinary least squares would be preferable to 
instrumental variables on, say, a mean square error criterion. 
  118A common misunderstanding, perhaps based on confusing the economic and 
statistical versions of “exogeneity”, is that predetermined variables, such as geographical 
characteristics, are inevitably strong candidates for instruments. There is, however, 
nothing in the predetermined nature of these variables to ensure either that they are not 
direct growth determinants or that they are uncorrelated with omitted growth 
determinants.  Even if we take the extreme (from the perspective of being predetermined) 
example of geographic characteristics, there are many channels through which these 
could affect growth, and therefore many ways in which they could be correlated with the 
disturbances in a growth model.  Brock and Durlauf (2001a) use this type of reasoning to 
make a very general critique of the use of instrumental variables in growth economics, 
basing it on the notion of theory open-endedness that we have described earlier.  Since 
growth theories are mutually compatible, the validity of an instrument requires a positive 
argument that it cannot be a direct growth determinant or correlated with an omitted 
growth determinant.  For many of the instrumental variables that have been proposed, 
this is clearly not the case.  
Discussions of the validity of instruments inevitably suffer from some degree of 
imprecision because of the need to make qualitative and subjective judgments.  When one 
researcher claims that it is implausible that a given instrument is valid, unless this claim 
is made on the basis of a joint model of the instruments and the variable of original 
interest, another researcher can always simply reject the assertion as unpersuasive.  To be 
clear, this element of subjectivity does not mean that arguments about validity are 
pointless.
64  Rather, one must recognize that not all statistical questions can be 
adjudicated on the basis of mathematical analysis.   
To see how different instruments might be assigned different levels of 
plausibility, we consider two examples. Brock and Durlauf (2001a) single out Frankel 
and Romer’s (1999) geographic instruments as an example where instrument validity 
                                                 
64Put differently, one does not require a precise definition of what makes an instrument 
valid in order to argue whether a given instrument is valid or not.  To take an example 
due to Taylor (1998), the absence of a precise definition of money does not weaken my 
belief that the currency in my wallet is a form of money, whereas the computer on which 
this paper is written is not. To claim such arguments cannot be made is known as the 
Socratic fallacy.  
  119appears suspect as such variables are likely correlated with features of a country’s 
economic, political, legal, and social institutions.
65   In our view, the large body of 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the role of institutions on growth, as well as even a 
cursory reading of history, renders the orthogonality assumptions required to use the 
instruments questionable.
66  For example, it is a standard historical claim that the fact that 
Great Britain is an island had important implications for its political development.  While 
Frankel (2003) suggests that this worry is contrived, the argument against instrument 
validity flows quite naturally from modern growth theory and the many possible ways in 
which geographic characteristics such as remoteness could influence development.  
As an example where instrument validity may be more plausible, consider Cook 
(2002a). He employs measures of damage caused by World War II as instruments for 
various growth regressors such as savings rates.  The validity of Cook’s instruments 
again relies on the orthogonality of World War II damage with omitted postwar growth 
determinants.  It may be that levels of wartime damage had consequences for post-War 
growth performance in other respects (such as institutional change) but this argument is 
perhaps less straightforward than in the case of geographic characteristics.     
To be clear, this discussion is nowhere near sufficient to conclude that Frankel 
and Romer’s instruments are invalid whereas Cook’s are valid. Rather our point is that 
conclusions concerning the relative plausibility of one set of instruments versus another 
need to rest on explicit arguments. It is not enough to appeal to a variable being 
predetermined, because this does not ensure that it is uncorrelated with the disturbances 
in the structural equation being estimated.  A key implication of our discussion is that 
historical information has a vital role to play in facilitating formal growth analyses and 
evaluating exclusion restrictions.  
                                                 
65While questions about the validity of instrumental variables arise in virtually all 
contexts, the force of these concerns differs across contexts. For example, in rational 
expectations models, lagged variables are natural instruments with respect to variables 
that, from the perspective of the theoretical model, are martingale differences, as occurs 
for excess holding returns.  Objections to particular instruments in these contexts 
typically rely on alternative specifications of preferences or some other modification of 
the economic logic of the original model.  This is quite different from the openendedness 
of growth theories.  
66The body of work on institutions and growth excellently summarized in Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2004) is strongly supportive of this claim.  
  120This discussion of instrumental variables indicates another important, albeit 
neglected, issue in empirical growth analysis: the relationship between model 
specification and instrumental variable selection.  One cannot discuss the validity of 
particular instruments independently from the choice of the specific growth determinants 
under study.  An important outstanding research question is whether model uncertainty 
and instrumental variable selection can be integrated simultaneously into some of the 
methods we have described, including model averaging and automated model selection. 
The recent work of Hendry and Krolzig (2005) on automated methods includes an 
ambitious approach to systematic model selection for simultaneous equation models in 
which identifying restrictions are determined by the data. 
 
 
VII. Econometric issues II: data and error properties 
 
  In this section we consider a range of questions that arise in growth econometrics 
from the properties of data and errors.  Starting with data issues, Section VII.i examines 
how one may handle outliers in growth data.  Section VII.ii examines the problem of 
measurement error.  This is an important issue since there are good reasons to believe that 
the quality of the data is sometimes poor for less developed economies.  In Section VII.iii 
we consider the case where data are not even measured, i.e are missing.  Turning to 
issues of the properties of model errors, Section VII.iv examines the analysis of 
heteroskedasticity in growth contexts.  Finally, Section VII.v addresses the problem of 




Empirical growth researchers often work with small data sets and estimate 
relatively simple models. In these circumstances, OLS regressions are almost 
meaningless unless they have been accompanied by systematic investigation of the data, 
including the sensitivity of the results to outlying observations. 
  121There are various reasons why some observations may be unrepresentative. It is 
possible for variables to be measured with error for that particular region or country. 
Alternatively, the model specified by the researcher may omit a relevant consideration, 
and so a group of country observations will act as outliers.  By construction, least squares 
estimates can be highly sensitive to the presence of small groups of observations. The 
practical implication is that OLS can give a misleading account of the patterns in the 
majority of the data. The dangers of using OLS were forcibly expressed by Swartz and 
Welsch (1986, p. 171): “In a world of fat-tailed or asymmetric error distributions, data 
errors, and imperfectly specified models, it is just those data in which we have the least 
faith that often exert the most influence on the OLS estimates”. 
Some researchers respond to this concern using leverage measures or single-case 
diagnostics such as Cook’s distance statistic. There are well-known problems with these 
approaches, because where more than one outlier is present, its effect can easily be 
hidden by another (known in the statistics literature as “masking”). By far the best 
response is to use a more robust estimator, such as least trimmed squares, at least as a 
preliminary way of investigating the data.
67 These issues are discussed in more detail in 
Temple (1998,2000b).  
 
ii. measurement error 
 
We now turn to a more general discussion of measurement error. It is clear that 
measurement errors are likely to be pervasive, especially in data that relate to developing 
countries. Concepts that appear straightforward in economic models can present huge 
measurement problems in practice, as in the example of the capital stock discussed by 
Pritchett (2000b). Yet relatively few empirical studies of growth consider the impact of 
measurement error in any detail. 
                                                 
67This estimator should not be confused with trimmed least squares, and other methods 
based on deleting observations with high residuals in the OLS estimates. A residual-
based approach is inadequate for obvious reasons.  
  122The best-known statistical result applies to a bivariate model where the 
independent variable is measured with error.
68  The estimate of the slope coefficient will 
be biased towards zero, even in large samples, because measurement error induces 
covariance between the observable form of the regressor and the error term.  This 
attenuation bias is well known, but sometimes misleads researchers into suggesting that 
measurement error will only mask effects, a claim that is not true in general. When there 
are multiple explanatory variables, but only one is measured with error, then typically all 
the parameter estimates will be biased. Some parameter estimates may be biased away 
from zero and, although the direction of the bias can be estimated consistently, this is 
rarely done.  When several variables are measured with error, the assumption that 
measurement error only hides effects is even less defensible.  
Where measurement error is present, the coefficients are typically not identified 
unless other information is used. The most popular solution is to use instrumental 
variables, if an instrument can be found which is likely to be independent of the 
measurement error. A more complex solution is to exploit higher-order sample moments 
to construct more sophisticated estimators, as in Dagenais and Dagenais (1997). These 
procedures may be unreliable in small samples since the use of higher-order moments 
will make them especially sensitive to outliers. 
Sometimes partial identification is possible, in the sense that bounds on the extent 
of measurement error can be used to derive consistent estimates of bounds on the slope 
parameters. Although it can be difficult for researchers to agree on sensible bounds on the 
measurement error variances, there are easier ways of formulating the necessary 
restrictions, as discussed by Klepper and Leamer (1984). Their reverse regression 
approach was implemented by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Temple (1998), but has 
rarely been used by other researchers. Another strategy is to investigate sensitivity to 
varying degrees of measurement error, based on method-of-moments corrections. Again, 
this is easy to implement in linear models, and should be applied more routinely than it is 
at present. Temple (1998) provides a discussion of both approaches in the context of 
                                                 
68This and the following discussion assume classical measurement error. Under more 
general assumptions, it is usually even harder to identify the consequences of 
measurement error for parameter estimates. 
  123estimating technology parameters and the rate of conditional convergence within the 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) model. 
 
iii. missing data 
 
Some countries never appear in growth data sets, partly by design: it is common 
to leave out countries with very small populations, oil producers, and transition 
economies. These are countries that seem especially unlikely to lie on a regression 
surface common to the majority of the OECD countries or the developing world. 
Countries with small populations should not be allowed to carry a great deal of weight in 
attempting to draw generalizations about growth for larger countries.  
Other countries are left out for different reasons. When a nation experiences 
political chaos, or lacks economic resources, the collection of national accounts statistics 
will be a low priority. This means that countries like Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Somalia 
rarely appear in comparative growth studies. In other cases, countries appear in some 
studies but not in others, depending on the availability of particular variables of interest. 
Missing data are of course a potentially serious problem. If one started from a 
representative data set and then deleted countries at random, this would typically increase 
the standard errors but not lead to biased estimates. More serious difficulties arise if 
countries are missing in a systematic way, because then parameter estimates are likely to 
be biased. This problem is given relatively little attention in mainstream econometrics 
textbooks, despite a large body of research in the statistics literature. 
A variety of solutions are possible, with the simplest being one form or another of 
imputation, with an appropriate adjustment to the standard errors. Hall and Jones (1999) 
and Hoover and Perez (2004) are among the few empirical growth studies to carry out 
imputation in a careful and systematic way. This approach may be especially useful when 
countries are missing from a data set because a few variables are not observed for their 
particular cases. It is then easy to justify using other available information to predict the 
missing data, and thereby exploit the additional information in the variables that are 
observed. Alternative approaches to missing data are also available, based on likelihood 
or Bayesian methods, which can be extended to handle missing observations. 
  124iv. heteroskedasticity 
 
It is common in cross-section regressions for the underlying disturbances to have 
a non-constant variance. As is well known, the coefficient estimates remain unbiased, but 
OLS is inefficient and the estimates of the standard errors are biased. Most empirical 
growth research simply uses the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors developed 
by Eicker (1967) and White (1980).  These estimates of the standard errors are consistent 
but not unbiased, which suggests that alternative solutions to the problem may be 
desirable. For data sets of the size found in cross-country empirical work, the alternative 
estimators developed by MacKinnon and White (1985) are likely to have better finite 
sample properties, as discussed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) and supported by 
simulations in Long and Ervin (2000). 
There are at least two other concerns with the routine application of White’s 
heteroskedasticity correction as the only response to heteroskedasticity. The first is that 
by exploiting any structure in the variance of the disturbances, using weighted least 
squares, it may be possible to obtain efficiency gains. The second and more fundamental 
objection is that heteroskedasticity can often arise from serious model misspecification, 
such as omitted variables or neglected parameter heterogeneity. Evidence of 
heteroskedasticity should then prompt revisions of the model for the conditional mean, 
rather than mechanical adjustments to the standard errors. See Zietz (2001) for further 
discussion and references.   
 
v. cross-section error correlation 
 
  An unresolved issue in growth econometrics is the treatment of cross-section 
correlation in model errors. Such correlation may have important consequences for 
inference; as noted by DeLong and Summers (1991) in the growth context, failure to 
account for cross-sectional dependence can lead to incorrect calculation of standard 
errors and hence, incorrect inferences. One would certainly expect cross-sectional 
dependence to be present when studying growth. For example, countries that are 
geographically close together, or trading partners, may experience common shocks.   
  125  Whether this effect is sizeable remains an open question, but one that might be 
addressed using ideas developed in Baltagi et al. (2003) and Driscoll and Kraay (1998), 
among others. In the context of growth regressions, work on cross-section dependence 
may be divided into two lines.  One direction concerns the identification of the presence 
of cross-section dependence.  Pesaran (2004a) develops tests for cross-section 
dependence that do not rely on any prior ordering; this framework in essence sums the 
cross-section sample error correlations in a panel and evaluates whether they are 
consistent with the null hypothesis that the population correlations are zero. Specifically, 
he proposes (recalling that N  denotes the cross-section dimension and T the time 
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where  , ˆij ρ  is the sample correlation between  , it ε  and  , jt ε ; Pesaran gives conditions under 
which this statistic converges to a Normal (0,1) random variable (as N and T become 
infinite) under the null hypothesis of no cross-section correlation.  This test statistic is 
based on earlier work by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and appears to possess good finite 
sample properties in comparison to this earlier work.  Using a country-level panel, 
Pesaran (2004a) finds strong rejections of the null of no cross-section correlation both for 
the world as a whole as well as within several geographic groupings. 
The second and primary direction for the analysis of cross-section correlation has 
been concerned not so much with testing for its presence, but rather accounting for its 
presence in growth exercises. One approach relies on formulating a statistical model of 
the dependence.  Phillips and Sul (2003) model the residuals in a growth panel as 
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  126where  t θ  and   are independent random variables;   is assumed to be i.i.d. across 
countries and across time.  Phillips and Sul (2002) describe the properties of panel 
estimators under this assumption. 
, it u , it u
Another possibility in analyzing cross-sectional dependence is to treat the 
problem as one of spatial correlation in errors.  The problem of spatial correlation has 
been much studied in the regional science literature, and statisticians in this field have 
developed spatial analogues of many time series concepts, see Anselin (2001) for an 
overview.  Spatial methods have, in our view, an important role to play in growth 
econometrics.  However, when these methods are adapted from the spatial statistics 
literature, they raise the problem of identifying the appropriate notion of space. One can 
imagine many reasons for cross-section correlation. If one is interested in technological 
spillovers, it may well be the case that in the space of technological proximity, the United 
Kingdom is closer to the United States than is Mexico. Put differently, unlike the time 
series and spatial cases, there is no natural cross-section ordering to elements in the 
standard growth data sets.  Following language due to Akerlof (1997) countries are 
perhaps best thought of as occupying some general socio-economic-political space 
defined by a range of factors; if one could identify their locations, then spatial methods 
could be implemented.  
  An interesting approach to addressing the relevant spatial location of countries is 
pursued by Conley and Ligon (2002). In their analysis, they attempt to construct 
estimates of the spatial covariation of the residuals  i ε  in a cross-section.  In order to do 
this, they construct different measures of socioeconomic distance between countries.   
They separately consider geographic distance (measured between capital cities), as well 
as measures of the costs of transportation between these cities. Once a distance metric is 
constructed, these are used to construct a residual covariance matrix.  Estimation methods 
for this procedure are developed in Conley (1999).  Conley and Ligon (2002) find that 
allowing for cross-section dependence in this way is relatively unimportant in terms of 
appropriate calculation of standard errors for growth model parameters.  Their methods 
could be extended to allow for comparisons of different variables as the source for cross-
section correlation as is done in Conley and Topa (2002) in the context of residential 
neighborhoods.  A valuable generalization of this work would be the modeling of cross-
  127section correlations as a function of multiple variables. Such an analysis would make 
further progress on the measurement of distances in socioeconomic space, which, as we 
have suggested, presumably are determined by multiple channels. 
A generally unexplored possibility for studying cross-section dependence in 
growth (and other contexts) is to model these correlations structurally as the outcome of 
spillover effects.
69 The theoretical literature on social interactions studies cross-sectional 
dependences in precisely this way (see Brock and Durlauf (2001b) for a survey of this 
literature). While such models have the potential for providing firm microfoundations for 
cross-section dependence, the presence of such spillovers has consequences for 
identification that are not easily resolved (Brock and Durlauf (2001b), Manski (1993)) 
and which have yet to be explored in growth contexts; Binder and Pesaran (2001) and 
Brock and Durlauf (2001b) analyze identification and estimation problems for 
intertemporal environments that are particularly germane to growth contexts. 
 
 
VIII. Conclusions: the future of growth econometrics 
 
In this section, we offer some closing thoughts on the most promising directions 
for empirical growth research. We are not the first authors to set out manifestoes for the 
field, and we explicitly draw on previous contributions, many of which deserve wider 
currency. It is also interesting to compare the current state of the field against the verdicts 
offered in the early survey by Levine and Renelt (1991). One dominant theme will be that 
the empirical study of growth requires an eclectic approach, and that the field has been 
harmed by a tendency for research areas to evolve independently, without enough 
interaction.
70 This is not simply a question of using a variety of techniques: it also means 
that there needs to be a closer connection between theory and evidence, a willingness to 
                                                 
69An exception is Easterly and Levine (1997b).  
70To give a specific example, the macroeconomic literature on international technology 
differences only rarely acknowledges relevant work by trade economists, including 
estimates of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model that suggest an important role for 
technology differences. See Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997b) for more discussion. 
  128draw on ideas from areas such as trade theory, and more attention to particular features of 
the countries under study. 
We start with Pritchett (2000a), who lists three questions for growth researchers 
to address: 
 
•  What are the conditions that initiate an acceleration of growth or the conditions 
that set off sustained decline? 
•  What happens to growth when policies – trade, macroeconomic, investment – or 
politics change dramatically in episodes of reform? 
•  Why have some countries absorbed and overcome shocks with little impact on 
growth, while others seem to have been overwhelmed by adverse shocks? 
 
This agenda seems to us very appropriate, not least because it focuses attention on 
substantive economic issues rather than the finer points of estimating aggregate 
production functions. The importance of the first of Pritchett’s questions is evident from 
the many instances where countries have moved from stagnation to growth and vice 
versa.  A paper by Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004) explicitly models transitions 
to fast growth (“accelerations”) and makes clear the scope for informative work of this 
kind. The second question we have discussed above, and research in this vein is 
becoming prominent, as in Henry (2000, 2003), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004), and 
Wacziarg and Welch (2003). Here, one of the major challenges will be to relax the 
(sometimes only implicit) assumption that policies are randomly assigned. Finally, an 
important paper by Rodrik (1999) has addressed the third question, namely what 
determines varying responses to major shocks.  
In all three cases, it is clear that econometric work should be informed by detailed 
studies of individual countries, such as those collected in Rodrik (2003). Too much 
empirical growth research proceeds without enough attention to the historical and 
institutional context. For example, a newcomer to this literature might be surprised at the 
paucity of work that integrates growth regression findings with, say, the known 
consequences of the 1980s debt crisis. 
  129Another reason for advocating case studies is that much of the empirical growth 
literature essentially points only to reduced-form partial correlations. These can be useful, 
but it is clear that we often need to move beyond this. A partial correlation is more 
persuasive if it can be supported by theoretical arguments. The two combined are more 
persuasive if there is evidence of the intermediating effects or mechanisms that are 
emphasized in the relevant theory. There is plenty of scope for informative work that tries 
to isolate mechanisms by which variables such as financial depth, inequality, and political 
institutions shape the growth process. Wacziarg (2002), in particular, highlights the need 
for a structural growth econometrics, one that aims to recover channels of causation, and 
hence supports (or undermines) the economic significance of the partial correlations 
identified in the literature. 
A more extreme view is that growth econometrics should be supplanted by the 
calibration of theoretical models. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997b) emphasize the 
potential of such an approach and note that Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s (1992) 
influential analysis can be seen partly as a comparison of estimated parameter values with 
those associated with specific theoretical models. Relatively little of the empirical work 
that has followed has achieved a similarly close connection between theory and evidence, 
and this has been a recurring criticism of the literature (for example, Levine and Renelt 
(1991) and Durlauf (2001)). 
It may be premature to say that econometric approaches should be entirely 
replaced by calibration exercises, but the two methods could surely inform each other 
more often than at present. Calibrated models can help to interpret parameter estimates, 
not least in comparing the magnitude of the estimates with the implications of plausible 
models. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997b) discuss examples of this in more detail. At 
the same time, the partial correlations identified in growth econometrics can help to act as 
a discipline on model-building and can indicate where model-based quantitative 
investigations are most likely to be fruitful. This role for growth econometrics is likely to 
be especially useful in areas where the microeconomic evidence used to calibrate 
structural models is relatively weak, or the standard behavioral assumptions may be 
flawed. 
  130The need for a tighter connection between theory and evidence is especially 
apparent in certain areas. The workhorse model for many empirical growth papers 
continues to be Solow-Swan, a closed economy model which leaves out aspects of 
interdependence that are surely important. Howitt (2000) has shown that growth 
regression evidence can be usefully reinterpreted in the light of a multi-country 
theoretical model with a role for technology diffusion. More generally, there is a need for 
researchers to develop empirical growth frameworks that acknowledge openness to flows 
of goods, capital and knowledge. These issues are partly addressed by the theoretical 
analysis of Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and empirical work that builds on 
such ideas deserves greater prominence. Here especially, research that draws on the 
quantitative implications of specific models, as in the work of Eaton and Kortum (1999, 
2001) on technology diffusion and the role of imported capital goods, appears to be an 
important advance. 
The neglect of open economy aspects of the countries under study is mirrored 
elsewhere. Much of the empirical literature uses a theoretical framework that was 
originally developed to explain the growth experiences of the USA and other developed 
nations. Yet this framework is routinely applied to study developing countries, and there 
appears plenty of scope for models that incorporate more of the distinctive features of 
poorer countries. These could include the potentially important roles of agricultural 
employment, dualism, and structural change, and in some cases, extensive state 
involvement in production. This is an area in which empirical growth researchers have 
really only scratched the surface. 
Some of these issues are connected to an important current research agenda, 
namely the need to distinguish between different types of growth and their distributional 
consequences. For example, the general equilibrium effects of productivity improvements 
in agriculture may be very different to those in services and industry. Identifying the 
nature of “pro-poor” growth will require more detailed attention to particular features of 
developing countries. Given that the main source of income for the poor is usually labour 
income, growth researchers will need to integrate their models with theory and evidence 
from labour economics, in order to study how growth and labour markets interact. 
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direction for future research. 
Ideally, research along these various lines will utilize not only statistics, but also 
the power of case studies in generating hypotheses, and in deepening our understanding 
of the economic, social and political forces at work in determining growth outcomes. 
Case studies may be especially valuable in two areas. The first of these is the study of 
technology transfer. As emphasized in the survey by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997b), we do not know enough about why some countries are more successful than 
others in climbing the “ladder” of product quality and technological complexity. What 
are the relative contributions of human capital, foreign direct investment and trade? In 
recent years some of these issues have been intensively studied at the microeconomic 
level, especially the role of foreign direct investment and trade, but there remains work to 
be done in mapping firm and sector-level evidence into a set of aggregate implications. 
A second area in which case studies are likely to prove valuable is the study of 
political economy, in its modern sense. It is a truism that economists, particularly those 
considering development, have become more aware of the need to account for the two-
way interaction between economics and politics. A case can be made that the theoretical 
literature has outpaced the empirical literature in this regard. Studies of individual 
countries, drawing on both economic theory and political science, would help to close 
this gap. 
Thus far, we have highlighted a number of limitations of existing work, and 
directions in which further research seems especially valuable. Some of the issues we 
have considered were highlighted much earlier by Levine and Renelt (1991), and that 
might lead to pessimism over the long-term prospects of this literature.
71 This also shows 
that our prescriptions for future research could seem rather pious, since the improvements 
we recommend are easier said than done. We end our review by considering some areas 
in which genuine progress has been made, and where further progress appears likely. 
One reason for optimism is the potential that recently developed model averaging 
                                                 
71Only now are researchers beginning to engage with some of the issues they raised, such 
as the varying conditions under which it is appropriate to use international rather than 
national prices in making productivity comparisons and constructing capital stocks. 
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the model selection and robustness issues that have long been identified as a major 
weakness of cross-country growth research. By framing the problem explicitly in terms 
of model uncertainty, in the way envisaged by Leamer (1978), it is possible to consider 
many candidate explanatory variables simultaneously, and identify which effects appear 
to be systematic features of the data, as reflected in posterior probabilities of inclusion. 
The Bayesian approach to model averaging also provides an index of model adequacy, 
the posterior model probability, that is easy to interpret, and that allows researchers to 
gauge the extent of overall model uncertainty. Above all, researchers can communicate 
the degree of support for a particular hypothesis with more faith that the results do not 
depend on an arbitrary choice of regression specification. Although the application of 
Bayesian model averaging inevitably has limitations of its own, it appears more rigorous 
than many of the alternatives, and we expect a number of familiar growth questions to be 
revisited using these methods. 
Another reason for optimism is that the quality of available data is likely to 
improve over time. The development of new and better data has clearly been one of the 
main achievements of the empirical growth literature since the early 1990s, and one that 
was not foreseen by critics of the field. Researchers have developed increasingly 
sophisticated proxies for drivers of growth that appeared resistant to statistical analysis. 
One approach, pioneered in the growth literature by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro 
(1995), has been country-specific ratings compiled by international agencies. Such data 
increasingly form the basis for measures of corruption, government efficiency, and 
protection of property rights. More recent work such as that of Kaufmann et al. 
(1999a,1999b,2003) has established unusually comprehensive measures of various 
aspects of institutions. 
The construction of proxies is likely to make increasing use of latent variable 
methods. These aim to reduce a set of observed variables to a smaller number of 
indicators that are seen as driving the majority of the variation in the original data, and 
that could represent some underlying variable of interest. For example, the extent of 
democracy is not directly observed, but is often obtained by applying factor analysis or 
extracting principal components from various dimensions of political freedom. There are 
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that are otherwise hard to measure.
72 They also help to overcome the dimensionality 
problem associated with cross-country empirical work. To be successfully employed, the 
rigorous use of a latent variable as a regressor will generally need to acknowledge the 
presence of measurement error.
73  
Using latent variables makes especially good sense under one view of the proper 
aims of growth research. It is possible to argue that empirical growth studies will never 
give good answers to precise hypotheses, but can be informative at a broader level. For 
example, a growth regression is unlikely to tell us whether the growth effect of inflation 
is more important than the effect of inflation uncertainty, because these two variables are 
usually highly correlated. It may even be difficult to distinguish the effects of inflation 
from the effects of sizeable budget deficits.
74  Instead a growth regression might be used 
to address a less precise hypothesis, such as the growth dividend of macroeconomic 
stability, broadly conceived. In this context, it is natural to use latent variable approaches 
to measure the broader concept.  
Another valuable development is likely to be the creation of rich panel data sets at 
the level of regions within countries. Regional data offer greater scope for controlling for 
some variables that are hard to measure at the country level, such as cultural factors. By 
comparing experiences across regions, there may also be scope for identifying events that 
correspond more closely to natural experiments than those found in cross-country data. 
Work such as that by Besley and Burgess (2000,2002,2004) using panel data on Indian 
                                                 
72A relevant question, not often asked, is how high the correlation between the proxy and 
the true predictor has to be for the estimated regression coefficient on the proxy to be of 
the “true” sign. Krasker and Pratt (1986,1987) have developed methods that can be used 
to establish this under surprisingly general assumptions. 
73In principle this can be addressed by structural equation modeling, using software like 
EQS or LISREL to estimate a system of equations that includes explicit models for latent 
variables, an approach used elsewhere in the social sciences. Most economists are not 
familiar with this approach, and this makes the assumptions and results hard to 
communicate. It is therefore not clear that a full latent variable model should be preferred 
to a simpler solution, such as one of those we discuss in the measurement error section 
above. 
74As Sala-i-Martin (1991) has argued, various specific indicators of macroeconomic 
instability should perhaps be seen as symptoms of some deeper, underlying characteristic 
of a country. 
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one of the main challenges will be to develop empirical frameworks that incorporate 
movements of capital and labour between regions: clearly, regions within countries 
should only rarely be treated as closed economies. Shioji (2001b) is an example of how 
analysis using regional data can take this into account. 
Even with better data, at finer levels of disaggregation, the problem of omitted 
variables can only be alleviated, not resolved. It is possible to argue that the problem 
applies equally to historical research and case studies, but at least in these instances, the 
researcher may have some grasp of important forces that are difficult to quantify. Since 
growth researchers naturally gravitate towards determinants of growth that can be 
analyzed statistically, there is an ever-present danger that the empirical literature, even 
taken as a whole, yields a rather partial and unbalanced picture of the forces that truly 
matter. Even a growth model with high explanatory power, in a statistical sense, has to be 
seen as a rather provisional set of ideas about the forces that drive growth and 
development. 
This brings us to our final points. We once again emphasize that empirical 
progress on the major growth questions requires attention to the evidence found in 
qualitative sources such as historical narratives and studies by country experts.  One 
example we have given in the text concerns the validity of instrumental variables: 
understanding the historical experiences of various countries seems critical for 
determining whether exclusion restrictions are plausible.  In this regard work such as that 
of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001,2002) is exemplary. More generally, nothing 
in the empirical growth literature suggests that issues of long-term development can be 
disassociated from the historical and cultural factors that fascinated commentators such 
as Max Weber. Where researchers have revisited these issues, as in Barro and McCleary 
(2003), the originality resides less in the conception of growth determinants and more in 
the scope for new statistical evidence.  Of course, the use of historical analysis also leads 
back to the value of case studies, a point that has recurred throughout this discussion. 
In conclusion, growth econometrics is an area of research that is still in its 
infancy.  To its credit, the field has evolved in response to the substantive economic 
questions that arise in growth contexts. The nature of the field has also led 
  135econometricians to introduce a number of statistical methods into economics, including 
classification and regression tree algorithms, robust estimation, threshold models and 
Bayesian model averaging, that appear to have wide utility. As with any new literature, 
especially one tackling questions as complex as these, it is possible to identify significant 
limitations of the existing evidence and the tools that are currently applied.  But the 
progress that has been made in growth econometrics in the brief time since its emergence 
gives reason for continued optimism. 
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Key to the 102 countries  
 
AGO, Angola, ARG, Argentina, AUS, Australia, AUT, Austria, BDI, Burundi, BEL, 
Belgium, BEN, Benin, BFA, Burkina Faso, BGD, Bangladesh, BOL, Bolivia, BRA, 
Brazil, BWA, Botswana, CAF, Central African Republic, CAN, Canada, CHE, 
Switzerland, CHL, Chile, CHN, China, CIV, Cote d'Ivoire, CMR, Cameroon, COG, Rep. 
of Congo, COL, Colombia, CRI, Costa Rica, CYP, Cyprus, DNK, Denmark, DOM, 
Dominican Republic, ECU, Ecuador, EGY, Egypt, ESP, Spain, ETH, Ethiopia, FIN, 
Finland, FJI, Fiji, FRA, France, GAB, Gabon, GBR, United Kingdom, GHA, Ghana, 
GIN, Guinea, GMB, The Gambia, GNB, Guinea-Bissau, GRC, Greece, GTM, 
Guatemala, GUY, Guyana, HKG, Hong Kong, HND, Honduras, IDN, Indonesia, IND, 
India, IRL, Ireland, IRN, Iran, ISR, Israel, ITA, Italy, JAM, Jamaica, JOR, Jordan, JPN, 
Japan, KEN, Kenya, KOR, Rep. of Korea, LKA, Sri Lanka, LSO, Lesotho, MAR, 
Morocco, MDG, Madagascar, MEX, Mexico, MLI, Mali, MOZ, Mozambique, MRT, 
Mauritania, MUS, Mauritius, MWI, Malawi, MYS, Malaysia, NAM, Namibia, NER, 
Niger, NGA, Nigeria, NIC, Nicaragua, NLD, Netherlands, NOR, Norway, NPL, Nepal, 
NZL, New Zealand, PAK, Pakistan, PAN, Panama, PER, Peru, PHL, Philippines, PNG, 
Papua New Guinea, PRT, Portugal, PRY, Paraguay , ROM, Romania, RWA, Rwanda, 
SEN, Senegal, SGP, Singapore, SLV, El Salvador, SWE, Sweden, SYR, Syria, TCD, 
Chad, TGO, Togo, THA, Thailand, TTO, Trinidad & Tobago, TUR, Turkey, TWN, 
Taiwan, TZA, Tanzania, UGA, Uganda, URY, Uruguay, USA, USA, VEN, Venezuela, 
ZAF, South Africa, ZAR, Dem. Rep. Congo, ZMB, Zambia, ZWE, Zimbabwe 
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Extrapolation 
 
Where data on GDP per worker for the year 2000 are missing from PWT 6.1, but are 
available for 1996 or after, we extrapolate using the growth rate between 1990 and the 
latest available year. This procedure helps to alleviate the biases that can occur when 
countries are missing from the sample for systematic reasons, such as political or 
economic collapse. 
 
The countries involved are Angola (extrapolated from 1990-1996), Botswana (1999), 
Central African Republic (1998), Democratic Republic of Congo (1997), Cyprus (1996), 
Fiji (1999), Guyana (1999), Mauritania (1999), Namibia (1999), Papua New Guinea 
(1999), Singapore (1996), and Taiwan (1998). 
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Appendix 2: Variables in Cross-Country Growth Regressions 
 
+/- = sign of coefficient in the corresponding growth regression 
? = sign not reported 
* = claimed to be significant 
_ = claimed to be insignificant 
R.H.S. Variables  Studies 
Capitalism  •  Hall and Jones (1999) (+,*)  
Capital account liberalization 
•  Eichengreen and Leblang 
(2003) (+,*) 
Corruption 
•  Mauro (1995) (-,*) 
•  Welsch (2003) (-,*) 
Minimum levels  •  Barro (1996) (1997)  (+,*)  
...Higher levels  •  Barro (1996) (1997)  (-,*) 
Overall 
•  Alesina et al. (1996) (?,_)  
•  Minier (1998) (+,*)  
Democracy 
‘Voice’   •  Dollar and Kraay (2003) (-,*) 
Share of Population 15 or below  •  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,*)  
Share of Population 65 or over   •  Barro and Lee (1994) (?,_) 
Demographic 
Characteristics 
Growth of 15-65 population share  •  Bloom and Sachs (1998) (+,*)
College Level  •  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,_)  
Female (level) 
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,*) 
•  Barro (1996) (1997)  (-,*)  
•  Caselli, et al. (1996) (+,*)  
•  Forbes (2000) (-,*)  
Female (growth)  •  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,*)  
Male (level) 
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (+,*)  
•  Barro (1996) (+,*)  
•  Caselli, et al. (1996) (-,*)  
•  Forbes (2000) (+,*)  
Education 
Male (growth)  •  Barro and Lee (1994) (+,*)  
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Overall (level) 
•  Azariadis and Drazen (1990) 
(+,*)  
•  Barro (1991) (+,*)  
•  Knowles and Owen (1995) (+,_)
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) 
(+,*)  
•  Krueger and Lindahl (2000) 
(+,*) 
•  Bils and Klenow (2000) (+,*)  
Primary Level 
•  Sachs and Warner (1995) (+,_) 
•  Barro (1997) (-,_) 
Secondary Level  •  Sachs and Warner (1995) (+,_) 
Initial Income * Male Schooling  •  Barro (1997) (-,*)  
Proportion of Engineering Students   •  Murphy, et al. (1991) (+,*)  
Proportion of Law Students   •  Murphy, et al. (1991) (-,*)  
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) (-
,*)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (?,_)  




•  Masters and McMillan (2001) (-
,*/_) 
Fertility 
•  Barro (1991) (1996) (1997) (-,*)
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,*)  
Stock Markets 
•  Levine and Zervos (1998) (+,*)
•  Beckaert, et al. (2001) (+,*) 
•  Beck and Levine (2004) (+,*)
Banks  •  Beck and Levine (2004) (+,*) 
Dollarization 
•  Edwards and Magendzo (2003) 
(+,_) 
Finance 
Depth  •  Berthelemy and Varoudakis 
(1995) (+,*) 
•  Odedokun (1996) (+,*) 
•  Ram (1999) (+,_)  
•  Rousseau and Sylla (2001) (+,*)
•  Deidda and Fattouh  (2002) 
(+,_) •  Demetriades and Law (2004) 
(+,*) 
Competition*development 
•  Claessens and Laeven (2003) 
(+,*) 
Repression 
•  Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992) (-,*) 
•  Easterly (1993) (-,*)  
Sophistication 
•  King and Levine (1993) (+,*)  
•  Levine and Zervos (1993) 
(+,robust)  
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) 
(+,*)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (?,_) 
Growth rate 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (+,not
robust) 
•  De Gregorio and Guidotti 
(1995) (+,*)  Credit 
Volatility 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (+,not
robust) 
Foreign Direct Investment 
•  Blonigen and Wang (2004) 
(+,_)  
Fraction of mining in GDP  •  Hall and Jones (1999) (+,*)  
Absolute Latitude 
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (+,*)  
•  Bloom and Sachs (1998) (+,*) 
•  Masters and McMillan (2001) (-
,_) 
•  Easterly and Levine (2001) 
(+,*) 
•  Rodrik et al. (2004) (+,*) 
Disease Ecology 
•  McCarthy, et al. (2000) (+,*) 
•  McArthur and Sachs (2001) 
(+,*) 
•  Easterly and Levine (2002) (-,*)
•  Sachs (2003) (-,*) 
Geography 
Frost days 
•  Masters and McMillan 
(2001)(+,*) 
•  Masters and Sachs (2001) (+,*)
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Coastline (length) 
•  Bloom and Sachs (1998) (+,*) 
•  Masters and Sachs (2001) (+,*)
•  Bloom, et al. (2003) (+,*) 
Arable land  •  Masters and Sachs (2001) (+,*)
Rainfall 
•  Masters and Sachs (2001) (+,*)
•  Bloom, et al. (2003) (+,*) 
Variance of Rainfall  •  Bloom, et al. (2003) (-,*) 
Maximum Temperature  •  Bloom, et al. (2003) (-,*) 
Consumption (growth) 
•  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
(+,_)  
Consumption (level) 
•  Barro (1991) (-,*)  
•  Sachs and Warner (1995) (-,*) 
•  Barro (1996) (-,*)  
•  Caselli, et al. (1996) (+,*)  
•  Barro (1997) (-,*)  
•  Acemoglu, et al. (2002) (-,_) 
Deficits 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (-,not 
robust)  
•  Fischer (1993) (-,*)  
•  Nelson and Singh (1994) (+,_) 
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) (-
,*)  
•  Bloom and Sachs (1998) (+,*) 
Investment 
•  Barro (1991) (+,_)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (?,_)  
•  Kelly (1997) (+,*)  
Various Expenditures 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (-,not 
robust)  
Military Expenditures 
•  Aizenman and Glick (2003) (-
,*) 
•  Guaresma and Reitschuler 
(2003) (-,*) 
Military Expenditures under threat 
•  Aizenman and Glick (2003) 
(+,*) 
Government 
Various Taxes  •  Levine and Renelt (1992) (?,not 
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robust)  
of the G-7 Countries 
•  Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and 
Swagel (1996) (+,*)  
Growth Rate 
in the Previous Period 
•  Easterly, et al. (1993) (+,_) 
•  Alesina, et al. (1996) (+,*/_)  
Life expectancy 
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (+,*) 
•  Bloom and Malaney (1998) 
(+,*) 
•  Bloom and Sachs (1998) (+,*) 
•  Bloom and Williamson (1998) 
(+,*) 
•  Hamoudi and Sachs (1999) 
(+,*) 
•  Gallup et al. (2000) (+,*) 
Change in Malaria Infection Rate  •  Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs 
(2000). 
Health 
Adult Survival Rate  •  Bhargava et al. (2001) 
% Small and Medium Enterprises  •  Beck, et al. (2003) (+,_)  Industrial 
Structure 
Ease of entry and exit  •  Beck, et al. (2003) (+,*) 
Democratic Countries 
•  Persson and Tabellini (1994) (-
,*)  
Non-Democratic Countries 
•  Persson and Tabellini (1994) 
(+,_)   Inequality 
Overall 
•  Alesina and Rodrik (1994) (-,*) 
•  Forbes (2000) (+,*)  
•  Knowles (2001) (-,*) 
Growth 
•  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
(-,*)  
Inflation 
Level  •  Levine and Renelt (1992) (-,not 
robust)  
•  Levine and Zervos (1993) (?,not
robust) 
•  Barro (1997) (-,*) (in the range 
above 15%)  
•  Bruno and Easterly (1998) (-,*) 
•  Motley (1998) (-,*) •  Li and Zou (2002) (-,*) 
Variability 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (-,not 
robust) 
•  Fischer (1993) (-,*)  
•  Barro (1997) (+,_)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (?,_)  
Infrastructure Proxies 
•  Hulten (1996) (+,*) 
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) 
(+,*)  
•  Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) 
(+,*) 
Initial Income 
•  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
(-,*) 
•  Barro (1991) (-,*)  
•  Sachs and Warner (1995) (-,*) 
•  Harrison (1996) (?,_) 
•  Barro (1997) (-,*)  
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a)  
Investment Ratio 
•  Barro (1991) (+,*)  
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (+,*)  
•  Sachs and Warner (1995) (+,*)
•  Barro (1996) (+,_)  
•  Caselli, et al. (1996) (+,*) 
•  Barro (1997) (+,_)  
Equipment or Fixed Capital 
•  DeLong and Summers (1993) 
(+,*)  
•  Blomstrom, et al. (1996) (-,_) 




•  DeLong and Summers (1991) 
(+,*)  
Productivity Growth  •  Lichtenberg (1992) (+,*) 
Productivity Quality 
•  Hanushek and Kimko (2000) 
(+,*) 
Labor  
Labor Force Part. Rate  •  Blomstrom, et al. (1996) (+,*) 
External Debt Dummy  •  Easterly, et al. (1993) (-,_)   Luck 
External Transfers  •  Easterly, et al. (1993) (mixed,_) 
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•  Easterly, et al. (1993) (+,*)  
•  Fischer (1993) (+,*) 
•  Barro (1996) (+,*)  
•  Caselli, et al. (1996) (+,*) 
•  Barro (1997) (+,*)  
•  Blattman, et al. (2003) (+,*) ( 
Money Growth 
•  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
(+,_)  
Neighboring Countries' Education Proxies, Initial 
Incomes, Investment Ratios and Population Growth 
Rates 
•  Ciccone (1996) (*)  
Political Instability Proxies 
•  Barro (1991) (-,*)  
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,*) 
•  Sachs and Warner (1995) (-,_) 
•  Alesina, et al. (1996) (-,*)  
•  Caselli, et al. (1996) (-,*)  
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) (-
,*)  
Civil Liberties 
•  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
(+,_)  
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (?,not 
robust) 
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,*)   






•  Barro (1991) (?,_)  
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (+,*)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (+,*)  
Constraints on Executive  •  Acemoglu, et al. (2001) (+,*)  Political 
Institutions 
Judicial Independence  •  Feld and Voigt (2003) (+,*)  
ICRG index  •  Knack (1999) (+,*)  
Property Rights 
Expropriation Risk 
•  Acemoglu, et al. (2001) (+,*) 
•  Macarthur and Sachs (2001) 
(+,*) 
Density  •  Sachs and Warner (1995) (+,_) 
Population 
Growth 
•  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
(-,*) 
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robust)  
•  Mankiw, et al. (1992) (-,*)  
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (+,_) 
•  Kelley and Schmidt (1995) (-,*)
•  Bloom and Sachs (1998) (-,*) 
Consumption Price 
•  Easterly (1993) (+,_)  
•  Harrison (1996) (-,*)   Price 
Distortions 
Investment Price 
•  Barro (1991) (-,*)  
•  Easterly (1993) (-,*)  
Consumption Price  •  Easterly (1993) (+,_)  
Price Levels 
Investment Price 
•  Easterly (1993) (-,*)  
•  Sachs and Warner (1995) (-,*) 
Black Market Premium 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (-,not 
robust)  
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,*) 
•  Barro (1996) (-,*)  
•  Harrison (1996) (-,*)  
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) (-
,*)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (-,*)  
Distortions 
•  Dollar (1992) (-,*)  
•  Easterly (1993) (-,_)  
•  Harrison (1996) (-,_)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (-,*)  




Variability  •  Dollar (1992) (-,*)  
Absolute Latitude  •  Barro (1996) (+,*)  
East Asia Dummy 
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (+,_) 
•  Barro (1997) (+,_)  
Former Spanish Colonies Dummy  •  Barro (1996) (-,*)  
Regional 
Effects 
Latin America Dummy 
•  Barro (1991) (-,*)  
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,*) 
•  Barro (1997) (-,_)  
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) (-
,*)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (-,*)  
  146Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy 
•  Barro (1991) (-,*)  
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,*) 
•  Barro (1997) (-,_)  
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) (-
,*)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (-,*)  
Buddhist  •  Barro (1996) (+,*)  
Catholic 
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (-,*)  
•  Masters and Sachs (2001) (+,*)
Confucian  •  Barro (1996) (+,*)  
Muslim 
•  Barro (1996) (+,*) 
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997) (+,*)  
•  Masters and Sachs (2001) (+,_)
Protestant 
•  Barro (1996) (+,*) 
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997) (-,*)  
•  Masters and Sachs (2001) (+,*)
Religious belief 




•  Barro and McCleary (2003)  
      (-,*) 
Rule of Law Indices 
•  Barro (1996) (+,*)  
•  Acemoglu, et al. (2001) (+,*) 
•  Easterly and Levine (2001) (-,*)
•  Dollar and Kraay (2003) (+,_) 
•  Alcala and Ciccone (2004) 
(+,_/*)  
•  Rodrik et al. (2004) (+,*) 
Total Area 
•  Barro and Lee (1993)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (?,_)  
Scale Effects 
Total Labor force 
•  Barro and Lee (1993)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (?,_)  
Social “Infrastructure”  •  Hall and Jones (1999) (+,*) 
Citizen Satisfaction with Government  •  Helliwell and Putnam (2000) 
(+,*) (within Italy) 
Social Capital 
and Related 
Civic Participation   •  Helliwell (1996) (,_) (within 
Asia) 
  147•  Knack and Keefer (1997) (+,*) 
Groups – as defined by Putnam (1993)  •  Keefer and Knack (1997) (-
,_), 
Groups - as defined by Olson (1982)  •  Keefer and Knack (1997) 
(+,_), 
Institutional Performance  •  Helliwell and Putnam (2000) 
(+,*) (Italy) 
Civic Community (index of 
Participation newspaper readership, 
political behavior) 
•  Helliwell and Putnam (2000) 
(+,*) (Italy) 
Trust  •  Granato, et al.  (1996) (+, *) 
•  Helliwell (1996) (,_)(Asia) 
•  Knack and Keefer (1997) 
(+,*), 
•  La Porta et al (1997) (+, *) 
•  Beugelsdijk and van Schalk 
(2001) (,_)   
•  Zak and Knack (2001) (+,*) 
Social Development Index  •  Temple and Johnson (1998) 
   Extent of Mass Communication  •  Temple and Johnson (1998) 
   Kinship  •  Temple and Johnson (1998) 
   Mobility  •  Temple and Johnson (1998) 
   Middle Class  •  Temple and Johnson (1998) 
   Outlook  •  Temple and Johnson (1998) 
Social capital (WVS)  •  Rupasingha, Goetz, and 
Freshwater (2000) (+,*) 
Social capital (WVS)  •  Whiteley (2000) (+,*) 
Social Achievement Norm  •  Granato, et al. (1996b) (+,*) 
•  Swank (1996) (-,*) 
Capability 
•  Temple and Johnson (1998) 
(+,*) 
Trade Policy  Import Penetration  •  Levine and Renelt (1992) (?,not 
  148robust)  
Leamer's Intervention Index 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (-,not 
robust)  
Years-Open 1950-1990  
•  Sachs and Warner (1996) (+,*)
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (+,*)  
Openness Indices (growth)  •  Harrison (1996) (+,*)  
Openness Indices (level) 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (?,not 
robust)  
•  Sachs and Warner (1995) (+,*) 
•  Harrison (1996) (+,*)  
•  Wacziarg and Welch (2003) 
(+,*) 
Outward Orientation 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (?,not
robust)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (?,_)  
Indices 
Tariff 
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,_)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (?,_)  
Fraction of Export/Import/Total-Trade 
in GDP 
•  Levine and Renelt (1992) (+,not
robust)  
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) 
(?,_)  
•  Frankel and Romer (1999) (+,*)
•  Dollar and Kraay (2003) (+,_) 
•  Alcala and Ciccone (2004) (+,*)
•  Rodrik et al. (2004) (+,_) 
Fraction of Primary Products in Total 
Exports 
•  Sachs and Warner (1996) (-,*) 
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997) (-,*) 
Growth in Export-GDP Ratio 
•  Feder (1982) (+,*)  
•  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
(+,*)  
•  20+ studies others 
FDI inflows relative to GDP  •  Blomstrom, et al. (1996)  
Trade 
Statistics 
Machinery and Equipment Import  •  Romer (1993) (+,*)  
Volatility of 
Shocks  Growth Innovations 
•  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
(-,*)  
•  Ramey and Ramey (1995) (-,*) 
  149Monetary Shock 
•  Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
(-,*)  
Casualties per Capita  •  Easterly, et al. (1993) (-,_)  
Dummy 
•  Barro and Lee (1994) (-,_)  
•  Easterly and Levine (1997a) 
(?,_)  
•  Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) (-,*)  
War 
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.Appendix 3: Instruments Variables for Solow Growth Determinants 
 
 
Variable Instrument  Study 
GDP growth  Rainfall variation  Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 
(2003) 
GDP – initial  Lagged values  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)  
GDP – initial (per 
capital stock) 
Newsprint consumption, 
and number of radios 
Romer (1990)  
GDP – initial   Log population initial 
and trade measure 
Bosworth and Collins (2003) 
Human Capital  Natural Disasters  Toya, Skidmore, and Robertson 
(2003) 
Investment - Equipment  Equipment  prices,  WCR 
survey variables, 
national savings rates 
DeLong and Summers, (1991) 
Investment - Education  Age demographics (16) 
and lagged capital 
Cook (2002b) 
Investment - Education  Age demographic 
variables 
Higgins (1998) 
Investment - Education  Average level  Beaudry, Collard, and Green 
(2002) 
Investment   Initial values of 
investment/GDP, 
population growth and 
GDP 
Cho (1996)  
Investment Lagged  investment, 
lagged output, lagged 
inflation, trade/GDP and 
gov spend/GDP 
Bond, Leblebicioglu, and 
Schiantarelli (2004).  
Investment  Initial investment in sub-
period, average savings 
rate in sub-period,  
Beaudry, Collard, and Green 
(2002) 
Population Growth  Initial values of 
investment/GDP, 
Cho (1996)  
  151population growth and 
GDP 
Population Growth   Average population 
growth over sub-period 





Civilian fatalities as %of 
population (and 
squared), Number of 
months of occupation by 
German forces, and 
number of months of 
land battles in country 
Cook (2002a)  
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Appendix 4: Instruments Variables for non-Solow Growth Determinants 
 
Variable Instrument  Study 
Capital market 
imperfections 
Degree of insider 
trading 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 
(2001) 
Capital Controls  Lagged Values  McKenzie (2001) 
Capital Controls  Lagged Values  Grilli and Milesi-Ferretii (1995) 
Corruption Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
Mauro (1995)  
Coups  All variables (some 
lagged) 
Londregan and Poole (1990) 
 
Defense variables  Initial levels of 
investment, 
openness, military 
expenditure and GDP 
per capita 
Guaresma and Reitschuler (2003). 
 
Democracy  Various  Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) 
Demography - Urban 
concentration 
Lagged values  Henderson (2000) 
Economic freedom  Lagged values  Lundström (2002)  
Male and 
Female level  
Religion and civil 
liberty measures 





ratio of change 











Krueger and Lindahl (2001).  





diversity, and others 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2003) 
 
  153Development  Legal origins and 
initial income 
Demetriades and Law (2004).  
 




Initial values of same  King and Levine (1993).  
Depth  “Legal origin” and 
lagged versions of all 
explanatory variables 
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000)  
 
Depth Consumption,  GDP, 
and others 
Levine and Zervos (1998). 
Depth  Lagged versions of 
all explanatory 
variables 
Loayza and Ranciere (2002) 
Various 
“factors” 
Wide variety of 
initial values of 
regressors and initial 
inflation 
Rousseau and Sylla (2001).  
 
Finance 
Depth  Initial values of 
inflation and 
financial depth 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) 
 
Gini Coefficient  Number of municipal 
townships in 1962, 
share of labor force 
in manufacturing in 
1990, percentage of 
revenue from 
intergovernmental 
transfers in 1962 
Alesina and La Ferrera (2002)  
Government Change  Lagged government 
change and variable 
reflected composition 
change in the 
executive without a 
government change 
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and 
Swagel (1996)  
Government Expenditure 
and Taxation 
Various  Agell, Ohlsson, and Thoursie 
(2003) 
  154Change in 
Malaria 
Infection rate 
Six variable for % 
land coverage of type 
of forest and desert 




Expenditure Physicians,  visits, 
dialysis, insurance 
coverage, alcohol, 
over 65, beds 
Rivera and Currais (1999)  
 
Inflation Lagged  explanatory 
variables 
Li and Zou (2002).  
 
Inflation  Initial values of 
inflation and 
financial depth 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) 
 
Infrastructure Lagged  values  Esfahani and Ramirez (2003). 
 
Various  Settler mortality rate  Acemoglu, Johnson, and 




component of current 
institutional quality 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and 




component of trade 
as fraction of GDP 
AND linguistic 
origins 
Alcalá and Ciccone (2004). 
Various and 
trust 
Lagged values   
Keefer and Knack (1997).  
Institutions 
Quality  Mortality rates and 
initial income) 
Demetriades and Law (2004). 
Manufacturing Exports  Lagged values  Calderón, Chong, and Zanforlin 
(2001).  
Religiosity Presence  of  state 
religion, regulation 
of religion, indicator 
of religious 
pluralism, and others 
Barro and McCleary (2003)  
  155Social  Infrastructure  State  antiquity  Bockstette, Chanda, and 
Putterman (2003) 





English, Frankel and 
Romer’s log 
predicted trade share 
Hall and Jones (1999).  
Stock markets  Lagged stock market 
activity 
Harris (1997)  




Hultberg, Nadiri, and Sickles 
(2003) 




component of trade 
as fraction of GDP 
AND linguistic 
origins 
Alcalá and Ciccone (2001). 
Policy 
indices 
Lagged values and 









component of trade 
as fraction of GDP 
Frankel and Romer (1996,1999)  
 
Various - Log initial GDP, 
broad money to GDP, gov 
expenditure to GDP  
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